Law Commons^™

Six Scandals: Why We Need Consumer Protection Laws Instead Of Just Markets, Jeff Sovern

Faculty Publications

Markets are powerful mechanisms for serving consumers. Some critics of regulation have suggested that markets also provide consumer protection. For example, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman said “Consumers don’t have to be hemmed in by rules and regulations. They’re protected by the market itself.” This Article’s first goal is to test the claim that the market provides consumer protection by examining several recent incidents in which companies mistreated consumers and then explores whether consumers stopped patronizing the companies, which would deter misconduct. The issue also has normative implications because if markets consistently protected consumers, society would need fewer regulations and …

Written Notice Of Cooling-Off Periods: A Forty-Year Natural Experiment In Illusory Consumer Protection And The Relative Effectiveness Of Oral And Written Disclosures, Jeff Sovern

Faculty Publications

For more than forty years, a standard tool in the consumer protection toolbox has been the cooling-off period. Federal statutes, state statutes, and federal regulations all oblige merchants to give consumers three days to rescind certain contracts. This paper reports on a survey of businesses subject to such cooling-off periods. The study has two principal findings. First, the respondents indicated that few consumers rescind their purchases. Thus, the study raises doubts about whether cooling-off periods benefit consumers or whether they provide only illusory consumer protection. The article also offers speculations about why cooling-off periods have been of such little value …

Fiduciary Duty And The Public Interest, Cheryl L. Wade

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

Professor Tamar Frankel’s excellent book, Fiduciary Law, is a thorough and comprehensive look at the fiduciary-law forest. My contribution to the Symposium on The Role of Fiduciary Law and Trust in the Twenty-First Century is one leaf on one branch of one tree in the forest that Professor Frankel so expertly navigates. In this Essay, I explore the fiduciary relationship between corporate directors and officers and the shareholders they serve. I examine how the breach of fiduciary duties owed to shareholders has the power to dramatically impact non-shareholder groups.

Professor Frankel accurately observes that “[f]iduciary duties are anchored …