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Articles 1 - 30 of 440
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Major Questions Doctrine At The Boundaries Of Interpretive Law, Daniel E. Walters
The Major Questions Doctrine At The Boundaries Of Interpretive Law, Daniel E. Walters
Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court’s apparent transformation of the major questions doctrine into a clear statement rule demanding clear congressional authorization for “major” agency actions has already had, and will continue to have, wide-ranging impacts on American public law. Not the least of these is the impact it will have on the enterprise of statutory interpretation. Indeed, while it is easy to focus on the policy repercussions of a newly constrained Congress and newly hamstrung administrative state, this Article argues that equally important is the novel precedent that is set in this particular formulation of a clear statement rule, which stands almost …
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.
Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?
The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …
Freehold Offices Vs. 'Despotic Displacement': Why Article Ii 'Executive Power' Did Not Include Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Freehold Offices Vs. 'Despotic Displacement': Why Article Ii 'Executive Power' Did Not Include Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
The Roberts Court has relied on an assertion that Article II’s “executive power” implied an “indefeasible” or unconditional presidential removal power. In the wake of growing historical evidence against their theory, unitary executive theorists have fallen back on a claim of a “backdrop” or default removal rule from English and other European monarchies. However, unitary theorists have not provided support for these repeated assertions, while making a remarkable number of errors, especially in the recent “The Executive Power of Removal” (Harvard L. Rev. 2023).
This Article offers an explanation for the difficulty in supporting this historical claim: Because …
State Separation Of Powers And The Federal Courts, Ann Woolhandler
State Separation Of Powers And The Federal Courts, Ann Woolhandler
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
The cases discussed herein mostly surfaced in the regulatory era of the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. This Article first discusses arguments as to state delegations of legislative power, and the Court’s rejection of legislative-style deference that state agencies often argued for. This Article next discusses the Court’s decisions as to state adjudicative bodies, and its refusal to treat state agency adjudicators as full-fledged courts. This Article then addresses the Court’s response to arguments for unreviewable executive discretion and to laws allowing delegations to private parties. It then addresses whether the discussion sheds light …
On The Nexus Between The Strength Of The Separation Of Powers And The Power Of The Judiciary, Rivka Weill
On The Nexus Between The Strength Of The Separation Of Powers And The Power Of The Judiciary, Rivka Weill
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
This Article makes four novel arguments: (1) There is an inverse relationship between the strength of a separation of powers structure and the strength of the judiciary. In a strong separation of powers structure, one should expect a weaker judiciary, and vice versa. This nexus exists empirically, and is supported on normative and strategic grounds. (2) This nexus is manifested through a web of common law doctrines that developed to support a given separation of powers structure and shape the judicial oversight of the political branches. This Article identifies a list of common law doctrines—including standing, justiciability, deference, and judicial …
The Indecisions Of 1789: Inconstant Originalism And Strategic Ambiguity, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
The Indecisions Of 1789: Inconstant Originalism And Strategic Ambiguity, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
The unitary executive theory relies on the First Congress and an ostensible "Decision of 1789" as an originalist basis for unconditional presidential removal power. In light of new evidence, the First Congress was undecided on any constitutional theory and retreated to ambiguity in order to compromise and move on to other urgent business.
Seila Law's strict separation-of-powers argument depends on indefeasibility (i.e., Congress may not set limits or conditions on the president's power of civil removal). In fact, few members of the First Congress defended or even discussed indefeasibility. Only nine of fifty-four participating representatives explicitly endorsed the presidentialist …
A State Within A State: Re-Examining The Federal Lands Question And Its Effect On State Sovereignty, David Wilde
A State Within A State: Re-Examining The Federal Lands Question And Its Effect On State Sovereignty, David Wilde
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Though the path of the public lands debate is well-trodden, this Note will seek to answer the question in novel ways. First, it uses the Corpus of Founding Era American English to perform an objective linguistic analysis of the phrase “dispose of” in the Property Clause. Through this analysis, it appears that an ordinary person at the time the Constitution was adopted would most likely have read the phrase “dispose of” in the Property Clause to mean sell, give away, bestow, or put into another’s hand or power.
Next, this Note investigates the historical and philosophical understandings of state sovereignty …
Macro-Judging And Article Iii Exceptionalism, Merritt E. Mcalister
Macro-Judging And Article Iii Exceptionalism, Merritt E. Mcalister
UF Law Faculty Publications
Over the last half-century, the federal courts have faced down two competing crises: an increase in small, low-value litigation thought unworthy of Article III attention and an increase in the numbers and complexity of “big” cases thought worthy of those resources. The choice was what to prioritize and how, and the answer the courts gave was consistent across all levels of the federal judiciary. Using what this Article calls “macro-judging,” Article III judges entrenched their own power and autonomy to focus on the work they deemed most “worthy” of their attention, while outsourcing less “important” work to an array of …
Lessons Of The Plague Years, Barry Sullivan
Lessons Of The Plague Years, Barry Sullivan
Faculty Publications & Other Works
The COVID-19 pandemic has challenged governments of every description across the globe, and it surely would have tested the mettle of any American administration. But the pandemic appeared in the United States at a particularly inopportune time. January 2020 marked the beginning of a presidential election year in a deeply polarized country. President Donald Trump was a controversial figure, beginning the fourth year of a highly idiosyncratic administration. He was both a candidate for re-election and the subject of an ongoing impeachment proceeding. In these circumstances, the pandemic quickly became politicized. President Trump's response to the COVID-19 pandemic has often …
The False Promise Of Jurisdiction Stripping, Daniel Epps, Alan M. Trammell
The False Promise Of Jurisdiction Stripping, Daniel Epps, Alan M. Trammell
Scholarly Articles
Jurisdiction stripping is seen as a nuclear option. Its logic is simple: By depriving federal courts of jurisdiction over some set of cases, Congress ensures those courts cannot render bad decisions. To its proponents, it offers the ultimate check on unelected and unaccountable judges. To its critics, it poses a grave threat to the separation of powers. Both sides agree, though, that jurisdiction stripping is a powerful weapon. On this understanding, politicians, activists, and scholars throughout American history have proposed jurisdiction-stripping measures as a way for Congress to reclaim policymaking authority from the courts.
The conventional understanding is wrong. Whatever …
Alexander Hamilton And Administrative Law: How America’S First Great Public Administrator Informs And Challenges Our Understanding Of Contemporary Administrative Law, Rodger D. Citron
Scholarly Works
Alexander Hamilton’s recognition and reputation have soared since the premiere of “Hamilton,” Lin-Manuel Miranda’s musical about him in 2015. For lawyers, Hamilton’s work on the Federalist Papers and service as the nation’s first Treasury Secretary likely stand out more than other aspects of his extraordinary life. Politics and economics were fundamental concerns addressed by the Framers in a number of ways, including what we now refer to as administrative law—the laws and procedures that guide government departments (or, as we say today, agencies). Indeed, “Hamilton” reminds us that questions of administration and administrative law have been with us since the …
Without Limit: Why Texas's Criminal Statutes Of Limitations Violate The State Constitution's Separation Of Powers Clause, Andrew Warthen
Without Limit: Why Texas's Criminal Statutes Of Limitations Violate The State Constitution's Separation Of Powers Clause, Andrew Warthen
St. Mary's Law Journal
No abstract provided.
States Of Emergency: Covid-19 And Separation Of Powers In The States, Richard Briffault
States Of Emergency: Covid-19 And Separation Of Powers In The States, Richard Briffault
Faculty Scholarship
No event in recent years has shone a brighter spotlight on state separation of powers than the COVID-19 pandemic. Over a more than two-year period, governors exercised unprecedented authority through suspending laws and regulations, limiting business activities and gatherings, restricting individual movement, and imposing public health requirements. Many state legislatures endorsed these measures or were content to let governors take the lead, but in some states the legislature pushed back, particularly — albeit not only—where the governor and legislative majorities were of different political parties. Some of these conflicts wound up in state supreme courts.
This Essay examines the states’ …
Mutually Intelligible Principles?, Andrew J. Ziaja
Mutually Intelligible Principles?, Andrew J. Ziaja
Pace Law Review
Are the nondelegation, major questions, and political question doctrines mutually intelligible? This article asks whether there is more than superficial resemblance between the nondelegation, major questions, and political question concepts in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), an early nondelegation case that has become focal in recent nondelegation and major questions scholarship and jurisprudence. I argue that the nondelegation and political question doctrines do interact conceptually in Wayman, though not as current proponents of the nondelegation doctrine on the Supreme Court seem to understand it. The major questions doctrine by contrast conscripts the nondelegation …
Macro-Judging And Article Iii Exceptionalism, Merritt E. Mcalister
Macro-Judging And Article Iii Exceptionalism, Merritt E. Mcalister
UF Law Faculty Publications
Over the last half-century, the federal courts have faced down two competing crises: an increase in small, low-value litigation thought unworthy of Article III attention and an increase in the numbers and complexity of “big” cases thought worthy of those resources. The choice was what to prioritize and how, and the answer the courts gave was consistent across all levels of the federal judiciary. Using what this Article calls “macro-judging,” Article III judges entrenched their own power and autonomy to focus on the work they deemed most “worthy” of their attention, while outsourcing less “important” work to an array of …
Is It Time To Bury Barry? Why An Old Change At The Legislature Requires A New Look At Washington's Nondelegation Doctrine, Daniel A. Himebaugh
Is It Time To Bury Barry? Why An Old Change At The Legislature Requires A New Look At Washington's Nondelegation Doctrine, Daniel A. Himebaugh
Washington Law Review Online
Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court of Washington adopted a relaxed version of the nondelegation doctrine in a case called Barry and Barry v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The Barry rule, which only loosely restricts the delegation of policy-making power from the Legislature to other bodies, is now widely applied in Washington State. However, the Barry Court’s reasons for adjusting the nondelegation doctrine were based on an outdated understanding of the Legislature, especially its regular session schedule. While the Legislature’s regular sessions have changed since 1972—becoming longer and more frequent due to constitutional amendment—the Court has not considered how …
Bring On The Chicken And Hot Oil: Reviving The Nondelegation Doctrine For Congressional Delegations To The President, Loren Jacobson
Bring On The Chicken And Hot Oil: Reviving The Nondelegation Doctrine For Congressional Delegations To The President, Loren Jacobson
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
The so-called “nondelegation doctrine” posits that Congress may not transfer its legislative power to another branch of government, and yet Congress delegates its authority routinely not only to the President, but to a whole host of other entities it has created and that are located in the executive branch, including executive branch agencies, independent agencies, commissions, and sometimes even private parties. Recognizing that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives,” the Supreme Court of the United States …
Some Observations On Separation Of Powers And The Wisconsin Constitution, Chad M. Oldfather
Some Observations On Separation Of Powers And The Wisconsin Constitution, Chad M. Oldfather
Marquette Law Review
In recent years the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided several high- profile cases concerning the separation of powers under the state constitution. In the abstract, questions concerning the separation of powers do not seem inherently partisan, largely because the partisan balance of government will shift over time. Yet, as has been the case with many of its recent decisions, the justices’ votes have broken along what most observers regard as partisan lines, and the opinions have featured heated prose including accusations of result orientation and methodological illegitimacy.
Health Choice Or Health Coercion? The Osha Emergency Temporary Standard Covid-19 Vaccination Mandates: Ax Or Vax, Savannah Snyder
Health Choice Or Health Coercion? The Osha Emergency Temporary Standard Covid-19 Vaccination Mandates: Ax Or Vax, Savannah Snyder
Helm's School of Government Conference - American Revival: Citizenship & Virtue
No abstract provided.
Countering Gerrymandered Courts, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Countering Gerrymandered Courts, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
The key insight in Professor Miriam Seifter's outstanding article Countermajoritarian Legislatures is that state legislatures are usually antidemocratic due to partisan gerrymandering, whereas state governors and judiciaries are insulated from gerrymandering by statewide elections (or selection), and thus they should have a more prominent role in framing election law and in enforcing the separation of powers.
This Piece offers afriendly amendment: These observations are true, so long as states do not gerrymander their state supreme courts into antidemocratic districts. The problem is that historically, judicial elections emerged generally as districted elections, and often with regional and partisan politics shaping those …
Impartial Justice: Restoring Integrity To Impeachment Trials, Justin D. Rattey
Impartial Justice: Restoring Integrity To Impeachment Trials, Justin D. Rattey
Pepperdine Law Review
In recent decades, we have witnessed the diminution of the impeachment process by various actors—especially political parties. But the Founders envisioned a vastly different process, one that was insulated from partisanship. In Alexander Hamilton’s words, impeachment trials were assigned to the Senate because the Senate is “a tribunal sufficiently dignified [and] sufficiently independent.” Examples from the most recent impeachment trials of President Donald J. Trump reflect the Senate’s loss of dignity and independence, with Senator McConnell pledging to work with the White House throughout the first impeachment process and senators from both parties conceding that they made up their minds …
Decoding Nondelegation After Gundy: What The Experience In State Courts Tells Us About What To Expect When We're Expecting, Daniel E. Walters
Decoding Nondelegation After Gundy: What The Experience In State Courts Tells Us About What To Expect When We're Expecting, Daniel E. Walters
Faculty Scholarship
The nondelegation doctrine theoretically limits Congress’s ability to delegate legislative powers to the executive agencies that make up the modern administrative state. Yet, in practice, the U.S. Supreme Court has, since the New Deal, shied away from enforcing any limits on congressional delegation. That may change in the near future. In Gundy v. United States, the Court narrowly upheld a delegation, and a dissent signaled deep doubts about the Court’s longstanding “intelligible principle” standard and offered a new framework to replace it. Subsequent events strongly suggest that the Court is poised to move in the direction contemplated by the dissent …
Keeping It Complex With Philip Hunton, John Locke, And The United States Federal Judiciary: On The Merit Of Murkiness In Separation Of Powers Jurisprudence, Michelle M. Kundmueller
Keeping It Complex With Philip Hunton, John Locke, And The United States Federal Judiciary: On The Merit Of Murkiness In Separation Of Powers Jurisprudence, Michelle M. Kundmueller
Political Science & Geography Faculty Publications
This article draws on the resources of a little-known political theorist, Philip Hunton, to explain the function of “murky” jurisprudence in the maintenance of separation of powers over time. In the era immediately before the drafting of the United States Constitution, separation of powers was a touted remedy to tyranny. But if government is thus moderated, a critical question arises: who will judge the precise contours of each institution’s powers? This article addresses this longstanding question by comparing the solutions offered by Philip Hunton, John Locke, and the United States judiciary. I conclude that the judiciary’s decried inability to clarify …
The False Allure Of The Anti-Accumulation Principle, Kevin Stack, Michael Herz
The False Allure Of The Anti-Accumulation Principle, Kevin Stack, Michael Herz
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Today the executive branch is generally seen as the most dangerous branch. Many worry that the executive branch now defies or subsumes the separation of powers. In response, several Supreme Court Justices and prominent scholars assert that the very separation-of-powers principles that determine the structure of the federal government as a whole apply with full force within the executive branch. In particular, they argue that constitutional law prohibits the accumulation of more than one type of power-—legislative, executive, and judicial—-in the same executive official or government entity. We refer to this as the anti-accumulation principle. The consequences of this principle, …
The Electoral Count Mess: The Electoral Count Act Of 1887 Is Unconstitutional, And Other Fun Facts (Plus A Few Random Academic Speculations) About Counting Electoral Votes, Jack Beermann, Gary Lawson
The Electoral Count Mess: The Electoral Count Act Of 1887 Is Unconstitutional, And Other Fun Facts (Plus A Few Random Academic Speculations) About Counting Electoral Votes, Jack Beermann, Gary Lawson
FIU Law Review
In this essay, and in light of the controversy that arose in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, we explain the constitutional process for counting electoral votes. In short, every four years, the Twelfth Amendment requires the President of the Senate (usually the Vice President of the United States) to open certificates provided by state presidential electors and count the votes contained therein. The Constitution allows no role for Congress in this process, and thus, the provisions of the Electoral Count Act purporting to grant Congress the power, by concurrent resolution, to reject a state’s electoral votes, is unconstitutional. …
Violence And Nondelegation, Jacob D. Charles, Darrell A. H. Miller
Violence And Nondelegation, Jacob D. Charles, Darrell A. H. Miller
Faculty Scholarship
Debates over delegation are experiencing a renaissance. These debates presuppose an initial distribution of constitutional authority between actors that cannot be redistributed, or that can be redistributed only according to some clear ex ante set of rules. Nondelegation in this sense often arises in debates about separation of powers and intergovernmental delegation, although scholars have begun applying the concept to delegations to private corporations and other private actors. The public delegation doctrine restricts one branch of government from transferring its constitutional authority to another branch, while the private delegation doctrine limits transfer of government power to private entities. In this …
Reasoning V. Rhetoric: The Strange Case Of “Unconstitutional Beyond A Reasonable Doubt”, Hugh D. Spitzer
Reasoning V. Rhetoric: The Strange Case Of “Unconstitutional Beyond A Reasonable Doubt”, Hugh D. Spitzer
Articles
An odd formulation has frequented American constitutional discourse for 125 years: a declaration that courts should not overturn a statute on constitutional grounds unless it is “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” This concept has been thought of as a presumption, a standard, a doctrine, or a philosophy of coordinate branch respect and judicial restraint. Yet it has been criticized because “beyond a reasonable doubt” is at root an evidentiary standard of proof in criminal cases rather than a workable theory or standard for deciding constitutional law cases. This article discusses the history and use of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,” …
House Rules: Congress And The Attorney-Client Privilege, David Rapallo
House Rules: Congress And The Attorney-Client Privilege, David Rapallo
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In 2020, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision in Trump v. Mazars establishing four factors for determining the validity of congressional subpoenas for a sitting president’s personal papers. In an unanticipated move, Chief Justice John Roberts added that recipients of congressional subpoenas have “long been understood” to retain not only constitutional privileges, but common law privileges developed by judges, including the attorney-client privilege. This was particularly surprising since Trump was not relying on the attorney-client privilege and the Court had never treated this common law privilege as overriding Congress’s Article I power to set its own procedures for conducting …
Inspectors General And The Law Of Oversight Independence, Andrew C. Brunsden
Inspectors General And The Law Of Oversight Independence, Andrew C. Brunsden
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
President Trump’s defiance of basic norms threatened the oversight institutions of American democracy. His brazen assault on the prosecutorial and investigative independence of federal law enforcement was well documented. Yet few have thoroughly scrutinized his violations of the oversight independence of internal institutions that monitor the government to promote integrity, transparency, and accountability. This Article examines the independence of Inspectors General (IGs), the internal watchdogs of the Executive Branch, and the President’s attacks on the institution. President Trump breached long-standing independence norms when he fired or replaced IGs in retaliation for their legitimate exercise of oversight duties. Then, in some …
Not A King: President Trump And The Case For Presidential Subpoena Reform, Robert J. Denault
Not A King: President Trump And The Case For Presidential Subpoena Reform, Robert J. Denault
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar
In Trump v. Vance and Trump v. Mazars, the Supreme Court heard two expansive claims of presidential immunity from grand jury and Congressional subpoenas for the personal papers of the president. In both cases, the Court rejected the President’s claims. Despite winning both cases, the grand jury and Congress did not receive evidence relevant to potential misconduct by the President until after he left office—a remarkable feat for a President who did not win a single case or appeal in his effort to block either subpoena.
This Note argues for significant reforms in response to President Trump’s unprecedented success …