Law Commons^™

The Unconstitutionality Of The Filibuster, Josh Chafetz

Josh Chafetz

This Article, written for the Connecticut Law Review's 2010 "Is Our Constitutional Order Broken?" symposium, argues that the filibuster, as currently practiced, is unconstitutional.

After a brief introduction in Part I, Part II describes the current operation of the filibuster. Although the filibuster is often discussed in terms of "unlimited debate," this Part argues that its current operation is best understood in terms of a sixty-vote requirement to pass most bills and other measures through the Senate.

Part III presents a structural argument that this supermajority requirement for most Senate business is unconstitutional. This Part argues that the words "passed" …

The Limits Of Enumeration, Richard A. Primus

Articles

According to a well-known principle of constitutional interpretation here identified as the “internal-limits canon,” the powers of Congress must always be construed as authorizing less legislation than a general police power would. This Article argues that the internallimits canon is unsound. Whether the powers of Congress would in practice authorize any legislation that a police power would authorize is a matter of contingency: it depends on the relationship between the powers and the social world at a given time. There is no reason why, at a given time, the powers cannot turn out to authorize any legislation that a police …

Passing The Torch But Sailing Too Close To The Wind: Congress’S Role In Authorizing Administrative Branches To Promulgate Regulations That Contemplate Criminal Sanctions, Reem Sadik

Legislation and Policy Brief

The Supreme Court has stated that Congress must simply “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle” to which the agency must conform. If this is done, a court will find the delegation of broad authority to the agency to be constitutional. There is, however, an open issue regarding whether the “intelligible principle” standard applies to delegations of authority that allow for the promulgation of both civil and criminal penalties. In Touby v. United States, the Supreme Court was asked whether “something more than an ‘intelligible principle’ is required” when Congress authorizes an agency to issue regulations that contemplate …

Congress's (Less) Limited Power To Represent Itself In Court: A Comment On Grove And Devins, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In their recent article, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014) Tara Leigh Grove and Neal Devins make the case against congressional litigation in defense of the constitutionality of federal statutes. They conclude that Congress, or a single House of Congress, may not defend the constitutionality of federal statutes in court even when the Executive Branch has decided not to do so but may litigate only in furtherance of Congress’s investigatory and disciplinary powers. Grove and Devins claim that congressional litigation in support of the constitutionality of federal statutes violates two separate but …

Executive Power In The Obama Administration And The Decision To Seek Congressional Authorization For A Military Attack Against Syria: Implications For Theories Of Unilateral Action, Kenneth R. Mayer

Utah Law Review

The primary axiom of the unilateral-powers literature is that the institutional setting and political incentives that confront presidents push them to seek maximum discretion over policy. The straightforward implication is that presidents will seek control (Terry Moe calls it autonomy)—always contentious given the competitive political authority at the heart of separation of powers, but necessary to them given their interests and position in the political system. Empirically, presidents are expected to (and do) act unilaterally, moving first to put their stamp on policy and process, shape institutional structures, and alter the status quo to shift government outputs toward their preferred …

Managing Political Polarization In Congress: A Case Study On The Use Of The Hastert Rule, Holly Fechner

Utah Law Review

This Article discusses the ideological polarization of Congress and of the Republican Party in particular. The rise of the Tea Party widened the ideological spectrum of members of the Republican caucus in Congress, especially in the House. To retain his leadership position and balance the competing factions in his caucus, Speaker Boehner routinely used a political and procedural tool known as the Hastert Rule.9 The Hastert Rule provides that the Speaker of the House will not schedule a bill for a floor vote unless a “majority of the majority” favors the legislation.

Holding The President Accountable To Constitutional Limits, Louis Fisher

Utah Law Review

As with Congress and the judiciary, presidents have access to powers expressly stated in the Constitution and those necessarily implied in those grants. In highly limited circumstances, presidents may also exercise a “prerogative” (i.e., unilateral action), but that authority is frequently misunderstood and subject to abuse. Unlike those in the other branches, presidents lay claim to a host of powers far beyond enumerated and implied powers. In seizing steel mills in 1952 to prosecute the war in Korea, President Harry Truman acted on what he called an “inherent” power that was not subject to judicial or legislative checks. Presidents Richard …

The Bond Court's Institutional Truce, Monica Hakimi

Articles

As many readers are aware, Bond v. United States is a quirky case. The federal government prosecuted under the implementing legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) a betrayed wife who used chemical agents to try to harm her husband’s lover. The wife argued that, as applied to her, the implementing legislation violated the Tenth Amendment. She thus raised difficult questions about the scope of the treaty power and of Congress’s authority to implement treaties through the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Bond Court avoided those questions with a clear statement rule: “we can insist on a clear indication that …

Federalism And Phantom Economic Rights In Nfib V. Sibelius, Matthew Lindsay

All Faculty Scholarship

Few predicted that the constitutional fate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act would turn on Congress’ power to lay and collect taxes. Yet in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court upheld the centerpiece of the Act — the minimum coverage provision (MCP), commonly known as the “individual mandate” — as a tax. The unexpected basis of the Court’s holding has deflected attention from what may prove to be the decision’s more constitutionally consequential feature: that a majority of the Court agreed that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to penalize people who decline to purchase health insurance. …

The Filibuster And The Framing: Why The Cloture Rule Is Unconstitutional And What To Do About It, Dan T. Coenen

Scholarly Works

The U.S. Senate’s handling of filibusters has changed dramatically in recent decades. As a result, the current sixty-vote requirement for invoking cloture of debate does not produce protracted speechmaking on the Senate floor, as did predecessors of this rule in earlier periods of our history. Rather, the upper chamber now functions under a “stealth filibuster” system that in practical effect requires action by a supermajority to pass proposed bills. This Article demonstrates why this system offends a constitutional mandate of legislative majoritarianism in light of well-established Framing-era understandings and governing substance-over-form principles of interpretation. Having established the presence of a …

A Pragmatic Republic, If You Can Keep It, William R. Sherman

Michigan Law Review

These things we know to be true: Our modern administrative state is a leviathan unimaginable by the Founders. It stands on thin constitutional ice, on cracks between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It burdens and entangles state and local governments in schemes that threaten federalism. And it presents an irresolvable dilemma regarding democratic accountability and political independence. We know these things to be true because these precepts animate some of the most significant cases and public law scholarship of our time. Underlying our examination of administrative agencies is an assumption that the problems they present would have been bizarre …

The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley

Articles

The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …

Enacted Legislative Findings And The Deference Problem, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The constitutionality of federal legislation sometimes turns on the presence and sufficiency of congressional findings of predicate facts, such as the effects of conduct on interstate commerce, state discrimination justifying the abrogation of sovereign immunity, or market failures justifying intrusions on free speech. Sometimes a congressional committee makes these findings in legislative history. Other times, Congress recites its findings in a statutory preamble, thus enacting its findings as law. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not distinguished between enacted and unenacted findings in deciding how much deference to accord congressional findings. This is striking because the difference between enactedness and unenactedness …

The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley

Articles

The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …

Interpreting Acronyms And Epithets: Examining The Jurisprudential Significance (Or Lack Thereof), Brian Christopher Jones

Brian Christopher Jones

Given the rise in short title sophistication and their prominent use as evidence in U.S. v. Windsor, this essay argues that acronym short titles are a relatively unexplored interpretive phenomenon. Examining how acronyms should be approached in jurisprudence, the essay further explains how many titles are designed around a symbolic epithet, thus calling into question the interpretative value of such titles. Additionally, the essay touches on the recent NY and D.C. decisions regarding the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection system, and how the USA PATRIOT acronym may have played a symbolic (psycholinguistic) role.

The Supreme Court Chipping Away At Title Vii: Strengthening It Or Killing It?, Henry L. Chambers, Jr.

Law Faculty Publications

Whether the Court's chipping away at Title VII is an attempt to make Title VII into a 21st century diamond, or an attempt to make it a 21st century pile of diamond dust, or merely an attempt to interpret Title VII consistent with its text is a matter of opinion. This Article explores how the Court is interpreting and reinterpreting Title VII and necessarily considers whether the Court's reinterpretation will likely reinvigorate or damage Title VII' s broad goal of workplace equality. This Article tentatively considers what may be next for Title VII. Part I briefly discusses Title VII's scope. …

The Aba, The Section Of Civil Rights And Social Justice, The Constitution, And The Supreme Court, Stephen Wermiel

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.

The Sum Of All Delegated Power: A Response To Richard Primus, The Limits Of Enumeration, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

In his provocative article, The Limits of Enumeration, Richard Primus rejects what he calls the “internal-limits canon” and challenges the assumption that the powers of Congress do not add up to a general police power, such that “there are things Congress cannot do, even without reference to affirmative prohibitions like those in the Bill of Rights.” Primus does not claim that federal power actually does amount to a general police power, only that it might. His principal claim is that nothing in the theoretical nature of enumerated power requires an a priori limit on the aggregate scope of delegated authority. …

The President And Congress: Separation Of Powers In The United States Of America, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

Although the framers of the Australian Constitution adopted many features of the United States Constitution, they rejected the separation of legislative and executive power in favour of responsible government in a parliamentary system like that of the United Kingdom. In doing so, Australians depended on existing conventions about the nature of responsible government instead of specification of its attributes in constitutional text. The United States Constitution contains detailed provisions about separation of powers, but unwritten conventions have produced some central features of American government. This article reviews conventions developed by Congress that constrain Presidents in the domestic sphere with regard …

Reviving Legislative Generality, Evan C. Zoldan

Marquette Law Review

The Supreme Court does not recognize a constitutional principle disfavoring special legislation, that is, legislation that singles out identifiable individuals for benefits or harms that are not applied to the rest of the population. As a result, both Congress and state legislatures routinely enact special legislation despite the fact that it has been linked to a variety of social harms, including corruption and the exacerbation of social inequality. But the Court’s weak protections against special legislation, and the resulting harms, are not inevitable. Instead, special legislation can be limited by what may be called a value of legislative generality, that …

Self-Help And The Separation Of Powers, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

Self-help doctrines pervade the law. They regulate a legal subject's attempts to cure or prevent a perceived wrong by her own action, rather than through a mediated process. In their most acute form, these doctrines allow subjects to take what international lawyers call countermeasures – measures that would be forbidden if not pursued for redressive ends. Countermeasures are inescapable and invaluable. They are also deeply concerning, prone to error and abuse and to escalating cycles of vengeance. Disciplining countermeasures becomes a central challenge for any legal regime that recognizes them.

How does American constitutional law meet this challenge? This Article …

Congress's Treaty-Implementing Power In Historical Practice, Jean Galbraith

All Faculty Scholarship

Historical practice strongly influences constitutional interpretation in foreign affairs law, including most questions relating to the treaty power. Yet it is strikingly absent from the debate presently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court over whether Congress can pass legislation implementing U.S. treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause, even if this legislation would otherwise lie outside its enumerated powers. Drawing on previously unexplored sources, this piece considers the historical roots of Congress’s power to implement U.S. treaties between the Founding and the seminal case of Missouri v. Holland in 1920. It shows that time after time, members of Congress relied …

Overrides: The Super-Study, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Overrides should be of interest to a far larger group of scholars than statutory interpretation enthusiasts. We have, in overrides, open inter branch encounters between Congress and the Courts far more typically found in the shadows of everyday Washington politics. Interestingly, Christiansen and Eskridge posit the court-congress relationship as more triadic than dyadic given the role played by agencies. One of their more interesting conclusions is that agencie are the big winners in the override game: agencies were present in seventy percent of the override cases and the agency view prevailed with Congress and against the Supreme Court in three-quarters …

Bond V. United States: Concurring In The Judgment, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Bond v. United States presented the deep constitutional question of whether a treaty can increase the legislative power of Congress. Unfortunately, a majority of the Court managed to sidestep the constitutional issue by dodgy statutory interpretation. But the other three Justices—Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—all wrote important concurrences in the judgment, grappling with the constitutional issues presented. In particular, Justice Scalia’s opinion (joined by Justice Thomas), is a masterpiece, eloquently demonstrating that Missouri v. Holland is wrong and should be overruled: a treaty cannot increase the legislative power of Congress.

Viva Conditional Federal Spending!, Samuel R. Bagenstos

Articles

From the rise of the New Deal through the constitutional litigation over the Affordable Care Act (ACA), conditional federal spending has been a major target for those who have sought to limit the scope of federal power. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, as the Supreme Court narrowed Congress's power to regulate private primary conduct and state conduct in the last twenty years,' conditional spending looked like the way Congress might be able to circumvent the limitations imposed by the Court's decisions. Thus, members of Congress quickly sought to blunt the impact of the Court's decision to …

Election Law's Lochnerian Turn, Ellen D. Katz

Articles

This panel has been asked to consider whether "the Constitution [is] responsible for electoral dysfunction."' My answer is no. The electoral process undeniably falls well short of our aspirations, but it strikes me that we should look to the Supreme Court for an accounting before blaming the Constitution for the deeply unsatisfactory condition in which we find ourselves.

The Constitution And Legislative History, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this article, the author provides an extended analysis of the constitutional claims against legislative history, arguing that, under textualists’ own preference for constitutional text, the use of legislative history should be constitutional to the extent it is supported by Congress’s rulemaking power, a constitutionally enumerated power.

This article has five parts. In part I, the author explains the importance of this question, considering the vast range of cases to which this claim of unconstitutionality could possibly apply—after all, statutory interpretation cases are the vast bulk of the work of the federal courts. She also explains why these claims should …