Law Commons^™

Command And Control: Operationalizing The Unitary Executive, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The concept of the unitary executive is written into the Constitution by virtue of Article II’s vesting of the “executive Power” in the President and not in executive officers created by Congress. Defenders and opponents alike of the “unitary executive” often equate the idea of presidential control of executive action with the power to remove executive personnel. But an unlimitable presidential removal power cannot be derived from the vesting of executive power in the President for the simple reason that it would not actually result in full presidential control of executive action, as the actions of now-fired subordinates would still …

Congressional Meddling In Presidential Elections: Still Unconstitutional After All These Years; A Comment On Sunstein, Gary S. Lawson, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In a prior article, see Jack Beermann & Gary Lawson, The Electoral Count Mess: The Electoral Count Act of 1887 Is Unconstitutional, and Other Fun Facts (Plus a Few Random Academic Speculations) about Counting Electoral Votes, 16 FIU L. REV. 297 (2022), we argued that much of the 1877 Electoral Count Act unconstitutionally gave Congress a role in counting and certifying electoral votes. In 2022, Congress amended the statute to make it marginally more constitutional in some respects and significantly less constitutional in others. In response to a forthcoming article by Cass Sunstein defending the new Electoral Count …

"I'M Leavin' It (All) Up To You": Gundy And The (Sort-Of) Resurrection Of The Subdelegation Doctrine, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In 2000, Cass Sunstein quipped that the conventional nondelegation doctrine, which holds that there are judicially enforceable constitutional limits on the extent to which Congress can confer discretion on other actors to determine the content of federal law, “has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”1 The “one good year,” he said, was 1935, when the Court twice held unconstitutional certain provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act that gave the president power to approve or create codes of conduct for essentially all American businesses, subject only to very vague, and often contradictory, statutory exhortations to pursue …

Obama's Conversion On Same-Sex Marriage: The Social Foundations Of Individual Rights, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This essay explores how presidents who wish to seize a leadership role over the development of rights must tend to the social foundations of those rights. Broad cultural changes alone do not guarantee success, nor do they dictate the substance of constitutional ideas. Rather, presidential aides must actively re-characterize the social conditions in which rights are made, disseminated, and enforced. An administration must articulate a strategically plausible theory of a particular right, ensure there is cultural and institutional support for that right, and work to minimize blowback. Executive branch officials must seek to transform and popularize legal concepts while working …

“Government By Injunction,” Legal Elites, And The Making Of The Modern Federal Courts, Kristin Collins

Faculty Scholarship

The tendency of legal discourse to obscure the processes by which social and political forces shape the law’s development is well known, but the field of federal courts in American constitutional law may provide a particularly clear example of this phenomenon. According to conventional accounts, Congress’s authority to regulate the lower federal courts’ “jurisdiction”—generally understood to include their power to issue injunctions— has been a durable feature of American constitutional law since the founding. By contrast, the story I tell in this essay is one of change. During the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, many jurists considered the federal …

Congress's (Less) Limited Power To Represent Itself In Court: A Comment On Grove And Devins, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In their recent article, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014) Tara Leigh Grove and Neal Devins make the case against congressional litigation in defense of the constitutionality of federal statutes. They conclude that Congress, or a single House of Congress, may not defend the constitutionality of federal statutes in court even when the Executive Branch has decided not to do so but may litigate only in furtherance of Congress’s investigatory and disciplinary powers. Grove and Devins claim that congressional litigation in support of the constitutionality of federal statutes violates two separate but …

Toward A More Democratic Congress?, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

There is considerable talk of failure in the air these days - including constitutional failure, moral failure, political failure and institutional failure - and criticisms of Congress figure prominently in this discourse. First, I shall ask whether talk about Congress being "the broken branch," the topic of the first panel in this symposium, is talk of constitutional failure or failure of some other sort. Second, to link the topic of that panel to the topic of the panel in which I participated, I will ask whether some call Congress the broken branch because it is not adequately or appropriately democratic. …

The Constitution's Congress, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In order to know whether Congress is (as the title of this panel wonders)1 "the broken branch,"'2 one needs a baseline describing how a normallyfunctioning Congress would look.3 Congress is a creation of the Constitution, and so the Constitution seems to be the obvious place to look for this baseline: what sort of people does the Constitution expect to serve in Congress and how does it expect those people to behave once they arrive?

Ordinary Powers In Extraordinary Times: Common Sense In Times Of Crisis Symposium: Extraordinary Powers In Ordinary Times, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution was written, debated, ratified, and implemented in the shadow of crisis. The country was birthed in war. In the aftermath of ratification, opponents of the Constitution could have precipitated a civil war that would have jeopardized the survival of the fledgling national government. I Throughout the founding era, any number of European powers were perceived to pose a serious threat of invasion. 2 Well into the 1800s, especially in certain northeastern states, substantial homegrown support for realignment with England persisted; the possibility of an internal rebellion in those areas was quite real.3 Individuals interested more in power …

Making A Federal Case Of It: Sabri V. United States And The Constitution Of Leviathan, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The popular expression “Don't make a federal case out of it!” only makes sense if federal involvement is something unusual or special that is reserved for matters of urgent national interest. It assumes that a “federal case” is, or at least ought to be, something relatively rare and noteworthy.

For the founding generation, federal involvement in people's affairs, especially through the criminal law, was in fact a relatively rare and noteworthy event. In The Federalist, James Madison told the citizens of New York that the powers of the proposed new national government “will be exercised principally on external objects, as …

A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus And Deference On The Supreme Court, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has struck down federal statutes by a bare majority with unprecedented frequency. This Article shows that five-four decisions regularly overturning acts of Congress are a relatively recent phenomenon, whereas earlier Courts generally exercised judicial review by supermajority voting.

One option is to establish the following rule: The Supreme Court may not declare an act of Congress unconstitutional without a two-thirds majority. The Supreme Court itself could establish this rule internally, just as it has created its nonmajority rules for granting certiorari and holds, or one Justice who would otherwise be the fifth …

Separation Of Political Powers: Boundaries Or Balance, Alan L. Feld

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most significant structural elements of the United States Constitution divides the political power of the government between two discrete political institutions, the Congress and the President, in order to prevent concentration of the full power of the national government in one place. This governmental structure has posed a continuing dilemma of how to allow for the shared decisionmaking necessary to effective government while maintaining the independence of each political branch. As the United States Congress reaches its two hundredth anniversary, questions concerning the relationship between Congress and the President, for a substantial time thought by legal scholars …