Law Commons^™

The Constitution As A Source Of Remedial Law, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Equity’s Constitutional Source, Owen W. Gallogly argues that Article III is the source of a constitutional default rule for equitable remedies—specifically, that Article III’s vesting of the “judicial Power” “in Equity” empowers federal courts to afford the remedies traditionally afforded by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the Founding, and to develop such remedies in an incremental fashion. This Response questions the current plausibility of locating such a default rule in Article III, since remedies having their source in Article III would be available in federal but not state courts and would apply to state-law …

Standing Without Injury, Jonathan Adler

Faculty Publications

It is well-established that injury in fact is an essential element of Article III standing, but should it be? Academics have long criticized the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence. These criticisms are now being echoed by federal judges. Judge Kevin Newsom, for one, has suggested existing standing jurisprudence has become ungrounded from constitutional text, incoherent, and administrable. He suggests abandoning injury in fact altogether, and recognizing broad congressional power to authorize causes of action to sue in federal court, subject only to those limits imposed by the executive branch’s obligation to “Take Care” that the laws are faithfully executed. In short, …

Federal Courts: Article I, Ii, Iii, And Iv Adjudication, Laura K. Donohue, Jeremy Mccabe

Catholic University Law Review

The distinction among the several types of federal courts in the United States has gone almost unremarked in the academic literature. Instead, attention focuses on Article III “constitutional” courts with occasional discussion of how they differ from what are referred to as “non-constitutional” or “legislative” courts. At best, these labels are misleading: all federal courts have a constitutional locus. Most (but not all) are brought into being via legislation. The binary approach ignores the full range of adjudicatory bodies, which find root in different constitutional provisions: Article III, Section 1, Article I, Section 8; Article IV, Section 3; Article II, …

Making Privacy Injuries Concrete, Peter Ormerod

Washington and Lee Law Review

In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the doctrine of Article III standing deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over some lawsuits involving intangible injuries. The lower federal courts are carrying out the Supreme Court’s instructions, and privacy injuries have borne the brunt of the Court’s directive. This Article identifies two incoherencies in the Court’s recent intangible injury decisions and builds on the work of privacy scholars to fashion a solution.

The first incoherency is a line-drawing problem: the Court has never explained why some intangible injuries create an Article III injury in fact while others …

Article Iii And The Political Question Doctrine, Scott Dodson

Northwestern University Law Review

Courts and commentators have often sourced the political question doctrine in Article III, a repository of other separation-of-powers doctrines applicable to the federal courts. Rucho v. Common Cause, a blockbuster political question case decided in 2019, explicitly tied the doctrine to Article III. But the historical development of the doctrine undermines the depth of that connection. Further, sourcing the doctrine in Article III leads to some very odd effects, including leaving state courts free to answer federal political questions. This Article argues that the source of the political question doctrine is in substantive law, not in Article III. Such …

Federalism Limits On Non-Article Iii Adjudication, F. Andrew Hessick

Pepperdine Law Review

Although Article III of the Constitution vests the federal judicial power in the Article III courts, the Supreme Court has created a patchwork of exceptions permitting non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate various disputes. In doing so, the Court has focused on the separation of powers, concluding that these non-Article III adjudications do not unduly infringe on the judicial power of the Article III courts. But separation of powers is not the only consideration relevant to the lawfulness of non-Article III adjudication. Article I adjudications also implicate federalism. Permitting Article I tribunals threatens the role of state courts by expanding federal …

The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.

This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …

Federal Magistrate Court Of Appeals: Whether Magistrate Judge Disposition Of Section 2255 Motions Under Consent Jurisdiction Is Statutorily And Constitutionally Permissible, Corey J. Hauser

Washington and Lee Law Review

For decades the Supreme Court has balanced the tension between judicial efficiency and adherence to our constitutional system of separation of powers. As more cases were filed in federal courts, Congress increased the responsibilities and power given to magistrate judges. The result is magistrate judges wielding as much power as district judges. With post-conviction relief under § 2255, magistrate judges take on a whole new role— appellate judge—reviewing and potentially overturning sentences imposed by district judges.

This practice raises two concerns. First, did Congress intend to statutorily give magistrate judges this power? The prevailing interpretation is that § 2255 motions …

Stand In The Place Where Data Live: Data Breaches As Article Iii Injuries, Jason Wasserman

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

Every day, another hacker gains unauthorized access to information, be it credit card data from grocery stores or fingerprint records from federal databases. Bad actors who orchestrate these data breaches, if they can be found, face clear criminal liability. Still, a hacker’s conviction may not be satisfying to victims whose data was accessed, and so victims may seek proper redress through lawsuits against compromised organizations. In those lawsuits, plaintiff-victims allege promising theories, including that the compromised organization negligently caused the data breach or broke an implied contract to protect customers’ personal information.

However, many federal courts see a data breach …

"Questions Involving National Peace And Harmony" Or "Injured Plaintiff Litigation"? The Original Meaning Of "Cases" In Article Iii Of The Constitution, Haoshan Ren, Margaret Wood, Clark D. Cunningham, Noor Abbady, Ute Römer, Heather Kuhn, Jesse Egbert

Georgia State University Law Review

If a federal official is deliberately violating the Constitution, is it possible no federal court has the power to halt that conduct? Federal judges have been answering “yes” for more than a century— dismissing certain kinds of lawsuits alleging unconstitutional conduct by ruling the lawsuits were not “cases” as meant in the phrase “[t]he Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases” in Article III, Section Two, of the Constitution.

For example, in July 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed a lawsuit that the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia brought against President Donald …

Ethical Considerations For Attorneys Researching Jurors On The Internet, Anthony M. Lapinta

Journal of Race, Gender, and Ethnicity

No abstract provided.

The Constitutionality Of Nationwide Injunctions, Alan M. Trammell

Scholarly Articles

Opponents of nationwide injunctions have advanced cogent reasons why courts should be skeptical of this sweeping remedy, but one of the arguments is a red herring: the constitutional objection. This Essay focuses on the narrow question of whether the Article III judicial power prohibits nationwide injunctions. It doesn’t.

This Essay confronts and dispels the two most plausible arguments that nationwide injunctions run afoul of Article III. First, it shows that standing jurisprudence does not actually speak to the scope-of-remedy questions that nationwide injunctions present. Second, it demonstrates that the Article III judicial power is not narrowly defined in terms of …

The Constitutionality Of Nationwide Injunctions, Alan M. Trammell

University of Colorado Law Review

Opponents of nationwide injunctions have advanced cogent reasons why courts should be skeptical of this sweeping remedy, but one of the arguments is a red herring: the constitutional objection. This Essay focuses on the narrow question of whether the Article III judicial power prohibits nationwide injunctions. It doesn't.

This Essay confronts and dispels the two most plausible arguments that nationwide injunctions run afoul of Article III. First, it shows that standing jurisprudence does not actually speak to the scope-of-remedy questions that nationwide injunctions present. Second, it demonstrates that the Article III judicial power is not narrowly defined in terms of …

Standing For Nothing, Robert Mikos

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A growing number of courts and commentators have suggested that states have Article III standing to protect state law. Proponents of such "protective" standing argue that states must be given access to federal court whenever their laws are threatened. Absent such access, they claim, many state laws might prove toothless, thereby undermining the value of the states in our federal system. Furthermore, proponents insist that this form of special solicitude is very limited-that it opens the doors to the federal courthouses a crack but does not swing them wide open. This Essay, however, contests both of these claims, and thus, …

Standing To Appeal At The Federal Circuit: Appellants, Appellees, And Intervenors, Matthew J. Dowd, Jonathan Stroud

Catholic University Law Review

The America Invents Act of 2011 created three administrative patent review regimes that have flooded the rechristened Patent Trial and Appeal Board with almost 7,000 new matters in just under five years. The flood of matters—primarily, inter partes reviews (IPRs)—has led to more than 1,000 appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit from administrative proceedings, eclipsing any other forum of origin. With the flood of administrative appeals, questions of first instance on appellate standing have arisen, resulting in a handful of important panel decisions.

While the other regional Courts of Appeals have largely adopted legal tests, standards, …

Justice As Fair Division, Ian Bartrum, Kathryn Nyman, Peter Otto

Pepperdine Law Review

The current hyperpoliticization of the Court grows out of a feedback loop between politicized appointments and politicized decision-making. This Article suggests a change in the internal procedures by which the Court hears and decides particular cases. A three-Justice panel hears and decides each case. Appeal to an en banc sitting of the entire Court would require a unanimous vote of all non-recused Justices. This Article explores several possible approaches in selecting the three-Justice panel. This Article proposes that applying a fair division scheme to the Court’s decision-making process might act to reverse this loop and work to depoliticize the Court …

Consenting To Adjudication Outside The Article Iii Courts, F. Andrew Hessick

Vanderbilt Law Review

Article III confers the judicial power on the federal courts, and it provides the judges of those courts with life tenure and salary guarantees to ensure that they decide disputes according to law instead of popular pressure. Despite this careful arrangement, the Supreme Court has not restricted the judicial power to the Article III courts. Instead, it has held that Article I tribunals-whose judges do not enjoy the salary and tenure guarantees provided by Article III-may adjudicate disputes if the parties consent to the tribunals' jurisdiction. This consent exception provides the basis for thousands of adjudications by Article I judges …

Remedies Symposium: Article Iii, Remedies, And Representation, Andrew Coan, David Marcus

ConLawNOW

As articulated by the United States Supreme Court, the principal purpose of Article III standing is to force decisions affecting large numbers of people into the democratic process where all affected parties are represented. The logical implication of this “representation-centered theory” for the proper scope of injunctive relief is straightforward. That relief must not exceed what is reasonably necessary to remedy the particularized injury that sets the plaintiff or plaintiffs apart from the general population. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this logic. Yet courts and commentators, including the Court itself, routinely ignore it. The most prominent recent examples are …

Statutory Damages And Standing After Spokeo V. Robins, Richard L. Heppner Jr.

Law Faculty Publications

In Spokeo v. Robins, the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts may no longer infer the existence of an injury in fact—and thus constitutional standing—from a statute’s use of a particular remedy, such as a statutory or liquidated damages provision. But Spokeo also directed courts to consider whether Congress intended to identify an intangible harm and elevate it to the status of a “concrete” injury in fact when deciding standing questions. This article argues that courts can and should continue to pay close attention to the structure and language of statutory remedial provisions in making that assessment. The article proposes …

Curbing Remedies For Official Wrongs: The Need For Bivens Suits In National Security Cases, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

State Standing In United States V. Texas: Opening The Floodgates To States Challenging The Federal Government Or Proper Federalism?, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

In United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court by an equally divided vote, 4 to 4, affirmed the decision of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that the State of Texas had Article III standing to challenge in federal court the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) directive establishing a Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) program to grant lawful immigration status to millions of undocumented immigrants. A serious question is whether state standing in this case will open the floodgates to allow states to challenge virtually every federal executive action. On the other hand, …

Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials: Constitutional Implications Of A Neglected History, Randy Beck

Scholarly Works

The Supreme Court concluded twenty-five years ago, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, that uninjured private plaintiffs may not litigate “generalized grievances” about the legality of executive branch conduct. According to the Lujan Court, Congress lacked power to authorize suit by a plaintiff who could not establish some “particularized” injury from the challenged conduct. The Court believed litigation to require executive branch legal compliance, brought by an uninjured private party, is not a “case” or “controversy” within the Article III judicial power and impermissibly reassigns the President’s Article II responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The …

Adverse Interests And Article Iii, Ann Woolhandler

Northwestern University Law Review

In an important article in the Yale Law Journal, James Pfander and Daniel Birk claim that adverseness is not required by Article III for cases arising under federal law. This Article takes the position that Pfander and Birk have not made the case for reconsidering adversity requirements for Article III cases. Adverseness may be present when there is adversity of legal interests, even when adverse argument is not present. From this perspective, a number of Pfander and Birk’s examples of non-contentious jurisdiction manifested adverseness. In rem-type proceedings such as bankruptcy and prize cases required the determination of adverse interests, …

A House Built On Shifting Sands: Standing Under The Fair Housing Act After Thompson V. North American Stainless, Eric Vanderhoef

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

For decades, the Supreme Court construed standing under the Fair Housing Act broadly; any party could bring suit as long as it met Constitutional Standing requirements. In January 2011, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, the Court restricted standing under Title VII—a statute with similar empowering language to the Fair Housing Act. The Court will address Fair Housing Act standing post-Thompson in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami. This commentary argues that standing under the Fair Housing Act should be restricted. Additionally, it argues that the allegations of the Plaintiff-Respondent, City of Miami, of widespread reductions in tax …

Spokeo Misspeaks, Lauren E. Willis

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Most commentators have critiqued the Supreme Court’s opinion in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins for failing to answer the question presented. But in important ways, the Spokeo opinion does not merely fail to speak—it affirmatively misspeaks. This essay suggests that underlying the Justices’ inability to see how standing law ought to apply to the facts in Spokeo is a failure to appreciate the power that consumer reports have over individuals’ life prospects today. Worse, the Justices’ unawareness of their own ignorance leads them to afford Congress little deference in identifying injuries occurring in our new information society. Their meta-ignorance also induces …

Proponents' Standing To Defend Their Ballot Initiatives: Post-Hollingsworth Work-Arounds?, Nat Stern, John S. Caragozian

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

“Government By Injunction,” Legal Elites, And The Making Of The Modern Federal Courts, Kristin Collins

Faculty Scholarship

The tendency of legal discourse to obscure the processes by which social and political forces shape the law’s development is well known, but the field of federal courts in American constitutional law may provide a particularly clear example of this phenomenon. According to conventional accounts, Congress’s authority to regulate the lower federal courts’ “jurisdiction”—generally understood to include their power to issue injunctions— has been a durable feature of American constitutional law since the founding. By contrast, the story I tell in this essay is one of change. During the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, many jurists considered the federal …

A Non-Contentious Account Of Article Iii's Domestic Relations Exception, James E. Pfander, Emily K. Damrau

Notre Dame Law Review

Scholars and jurists have long debated the origins and current scope of the so-called domestic relations exception to Article III. Rooted in the perception that certain family law matters lie beyond the power of the federal courts, the exception was first articulated in the nineteenth-century decisional law of the Supreme Court and has perplexed observers ever since. Scholarly debate continues, despite the Court’s twentieth-century decision to place the exception firmly on statutory grounds in an effort to limit its potentially disruptive force.

This Article offers a novel, historically grounded account of the domestic relations exception, connecting its origins to the …

Honoring Dan Meltzer—Congressional Standing And The Institutional Framework Of Article Iii: A Comparative Perspective, Vickie C. Jackson

Notre Dame Law Review

In this short Essay, I focus on only one aspect of the broader question of government standing to sue: congressional standing. For one thing, separation of powers problems are more acutely presented in federal level disputes.

Given an increased interest by parts of the Congress, especially the House of Representatives, in seeking to intervene in ongoing litigation, there are pressing new issues in the lower federal courts: U.S. District Court Judge Rosemary Collyer recently upheld congressional standing to challenge an asserted violation of the Appropriations Clause in connection with spending under the Affordable Care Act, while rejecting the House’s standing …

The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia

Anthony J. Bellia

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations. As we have recently argued, the Court followed the law of nations because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous questions of war and peace. Although we focused primarily on the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered rested on an important, …