Law Commons^™

No Amendment? No Problem: Judges, “Informal Amendment,” And The Evolution Of Constitutional Meaning In The Federal Democracies Of Australia, Canada, India, And The United States, John V. Orth, John Gava, Arvind P. Bhanu, Paul T. Babie

Pepperdine Law Review

This article considers the way in which judges play a significant role in developing the meaning of a constitution through the exercise of interpretive choices that have the effect of “informally amending” the text. We demonstrate this by examining four written federal democratic constitutions: those of the United States, the first written federal democratic constitution; India, the federal constitution of the largest democracy on earth; and the constitutions of Canada and Australia, both federal and democratic, but emerging from the English unwritten tradition. We divide our consideration of these constitutions into two ideal types, identified by Bruce Ackerman: the “revolutionary” …

Equality, Animus, And Expressive And Religious Freedom Under The American Constitution: Masterpiece Cakeshop And Beyond, Daniel O. Conkle

Books & Book Chapters by Maurer Faculty

Professor Conkle's contribution to this volume, pre-print attached, is the chapter "Equality, Animus, and Expressive and Religious Freedom Under the American Constitution: Masterpiece Cakeshop and Beyond."

CHAPTER ABSTRACT: Does the First Amendment protect religious wedding vendors from anti-discrimination laws that require them to provide goods or services for same-sex weddings? The fundamental question is whether equality or religious freedom should prevail in this setting, but the complexities of American free speech and free exercise law—exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop—have obscured the debate with dubious distinctions and highly contentious rationales and arguments. In this Essay, I present …

Anti-Modalities, David E. Pozen, Adam Samaha

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional argument runs on the rails of “modalities.” These are the accepted categories of reasoning used to make claims about the content of supreme law. Some of the modalities, such as ethical and prudential arguments, seem strikingly open ended at first sight. Their contours come into clearer view, however, when we attend to the kinds of claims that are not made by constitutional interpreters – the analytical and rhetorical moves that are familiar in debates over public policy and political morality but are considered out of bounds in debates over constitutional meaning. In this Article, we seek to identify the …