Law Commons^™

In Defense Of Judicial Supremacy, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

“Judicial supremacy” is the idea that the Supreme Court should be viewed as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and that we should deem its decisions as binding on the other branches and levels of government, until and unless constitutional amendment or subsequent decision overrules them. This is desirable because we want to have an authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and the Court is best suited to play this role. Under this view, doctrines which keep federal courts from enforcing constitutional provisions—such as denying standing for generalized grievances, the political question doctrine, and the state secrets doctrine—are misguided and should …

Striding Out Of Babel: Originalism, Its Critics, And The Promise Of Our American Constitution, André Leduc

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Article pursues a therapeutic approach to end the debate over constitutional originalism. For almost fifty years that debate has wrestled with the question whether constitutional interpretations and decisions should look to the original intentions, expectations, and understandings with respect to the constitutional text, and if not, what. Building on a series of prior articles exploring the jurisprudential foundations of the debate, this Article characterizes the debate over originalism as pathological. The Article begins by describing what a constitutional therapy is.

The debate about originalism has been and remains sterile and unproductive, and the lack of progress argues powerfully for …

Substitute And Complement Theories Of Judicial Review, David E. Landau

Indiana Law Journal

Constitutional theory has hypothesized two distinct and contradictory ways in which judicial review may interact with external political and social support. One line of scholarship has argued that judicial review and external support are substitutes. Thus, “political safeguard” theorists of American federalism and the separation of powers argue that these constitutional values are enforced through the political branches, making judicial review unnecessary. However, a separate line of work, mostly composed of social scientists examining rights issues, argues that the relationship between courts and outside support is complementary—judges are unlikely to succeed in their projects unless they have sufficient assistance from …

The Cost Of The Text, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe's Is the Constitution Special?explores many facets of constitutional interpretation. I will focus here on their observation that constitutional interpretation is "less textual" than statutory interpretation. I place the expression "less textual" in quotation marks because "textual" could mean many things, such that it would often be problematic to characterize one interpretive exercise as more or less textual than another. In Serkin and Tebbe's view, as I understand it, mainstream constitutional interpretation is "less textual " than statutory decisionmaking in that it is less constrained by the words of particular enacted clauses. As a convenient …

The Constitutional Constant, Richard A. Primus

Articles

According to a conventional view of the Constitution as a precommitment strategy, constitutional rules must remain fixed over time in order for the Constitution to do its work. In practice, however, constitutional rules regularly change over time, even without formal amendment. What is actually constant over time in the American constitutional system is not the content of constitutional law: it is the correspondence between the content of constitutional law and the American people’s (or at least the decision-making class’s) most powerful intuitions about issues of structure and ethos in American government. At any given time, constitutional law reflects those intuitions. …

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is A Constitutional Expansion Of Rights, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

No abstract provided.

Semantic Vagueness And Extrajudicial Constitutional Decisionmaking, Anthony O'Rourke

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Article integrates two scholarly conversations to shed light on the divergent ways in which courts and legislatures implement constitutional texts. First, there is a vast literature examining the different ways in which courts and extrajudicial institutions, including legislatures, implement the Constitution’s textually vague expressions. Second, in recent years legal philosophers have begun to use philosophy of language to elucidate the relationship between vague legal texts and the content of laws. There is little scholarship, however, that uses philosophy of language to analyze the divergent ways in which legislatures and courts implement vague constitutional provisions. This Article argues that many …

Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, Kevin C. Walsh

William & Mary Law Review

This Article introduces the idea of judicial departmentalism and argues for its superiority to judicial supremacy. Judicial supremacy is the idea that the Constitution means for everybody what the Supreme Court says it means in deciding a case. Judicial departmentalism, by contrast, is the idea that the Constitution means in the judicial department what the Supreme Court says it means in deciding a case. Within the judicial department, the law of judgments, the law of remedies, and the law of precedent combine to enable resolutions by the judicial department to achieve certain kinds of settlements. Judicial departmentalism holds that these …

In Defense Of Judicial Supremacy, Erwin Chemerinsky

William & Mary Law Review

“Judicial supremacy” is the idea that the Supreme Court should be viewed as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and that we should deem its decisions as binding on the other branches and levels of government, until and unless constitutional amendment or subsequent decision overrules them. This is desirable because we want to have an authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and the Court is best suited to play this role. Under this view, doctrines which keep federal courts from enforcing constitutional provisions—such as denying standing for generalized grievances, the political question doctrine, and the state secrets doctrine—are misguided and should …

Judicial Supremacy And Taking Conflicting Rights Seriously, Rebecca L. Brown

William & Mary Law Review

The best arguments in favor of judicial supremacy rely on its essential role of protecting rights in a democracy. The doctrinal technique of strict scrutiny, developed to do the work of judicial supremacy, has been an important tool in our constitutional jurisprudence in the service of rights protection. When the Supreme Court reviews laws that themselves seek to enhance or preserve constitutional rights, however, strict scrutiny does not provide the right approach. Rather, the Court should consider very carefully the rights claims in favor of the statute as well as those launched by a challenger. In such cases of conflicting …

The Annoying Constitution: Implications For The Allocation Of Interpretive Authority, Frederick Schauer

William & Mary Law Review

Constitutional constraints often restrict unwise or immoral official policies and actions, but also often invalidate laws and other official acts that are sound as a matter of both morality and policy. These second-order side constraints—or trumps—on even official acts that are sound as a matter of first-order policy reflect deeper or longerterm values, and they are central to understanding the very idea of constitutionalism. Moreover, once we see the Constitution as restricting not only the unsound and the unwise but also the sound and the wise, we can understand why expecting those whose sound ideas and policies are nevertheless unconstitutional …

Much Ado About Nothing: Signing Statements, Vetoes, And Presidential Constitutional Interpretation, Keith E. Whittington

William & Mary Law Review

During the Bush presidency, presidential signing statements became briefly controversial. The controversy has faded, but the White House continues to issue statements when signing legislation. Those statements frequently point out constitutional difficulties in new statutes and sometimes warn that the executive branch will administer the statutes so as to avoid those constitutional difficulties. This Article argues that the criticisms of signing statements were mostly misguided. Signing statements as such present few problems and offer some benefits to the workings of the American political system. While there might be reason to object to the substantive constitutional positions adopted in any given …

Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins

William & Mary Law Review

Members of Congress largely acquiesce to judicial supremacy both on constitutional and statutory interpretation questions. Lawmakers, however, do not formally embrace judicial supremacy; they rarely think about the courts when enacting legislation. This Article explains why this is so, focusing on why lawmakers have both strong incentive to acquiesce to judicial power and little incentive to advance a coherent view of congressional power. In particular, lawmakers are interested in advancing favored policies, winning reelection, and gaining personal power within Congress. Abstract questions of institutional power do not interest lawmakers and judicial defeats are seen as opportunities to find some other …

Judicial Supremacy Revisited: Independent Constitutional Authority In American Constitutional Law And Practice, Mark A. Graber

William & Mary Law Review

The Supreme Court exercises far less constitutional authority in American law and practice than one would gather from reading judicial opinions, presidential speeches, or the standard tomes for and against judicial supremacy. Lower federal court judges, state court justices, federal and state elected officials, persons charged with administering the law, and ordinary citizens often have the final say on particular constitutional controversies or exercise temporary constitutional authority in ways that have more influence on the parties to that controversy than the eventual Supreme Court decision. In many instances, Supreme Court doctrine sanctions or facilitates the exercise of independent constitutional authority …

The Return Of The Unprovided-For Case, Michael S. Green

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Soft Supremacy, Corinna Barrett Lain

William & Mary Law Review

The debate over judicial supremacy has raged for more than a decade now, yet the conception of what it is we are arguing about remains grossly oversimplified and formalistic. My aim in this symposium contribution is to push the conversation in a more realistic direction; I want those who claim that judicial supremacy is antidemocratic to take on the concept as it actually exists. The stark truth is that judicial supremacy has remarkably little of the strength and hard edges that dominate the discourse in judicial supremacy debates. It is porous, contingent—soft. And the upshot of soft supremacy is this: …

Construction, Originalist Interpretation And The Complete Constitution, Richard Kay

Richard Kay