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Full-Text Articles in Law
Is The Supreme Court Disabling The Enabling Act, Or Is Shady Grove Just Another Bad Opera?, Robert J. Condlin
Is The Supreme Court Disabling The Enabling Act, Or Is Shady Grove Just Another Bad Opera?, Robert J. Condlin
Faculty Scholarship
After seventy years of trying, the Supreme Court has yet to agree on whether the Rules Enabling Act articulates a one or two part standard for determining the validity of a Federal Rule. Is it enough that a Federal Rule regulates “practice and procedure,” or must it also not “abridge substantive rights”? The Enabling Act seems to require both, but the Court is not so sure, and the costs of its uncertainty are real. Among other things, litigants must guess whether the decision to apply a Federal Rule in a given case will depend upon predictable ritual, judicial power grab, …
Mdc Rests. V. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 76 (Oct. 27, 2016), Alysa Grimes
Mdc Rests. V. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 76 (Oct. 27, 2016), Alysa Grimes
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries
To “provide” health benefits under the Minimum Wage Amendment, an employer need only offer to employees (rather than enroll them in) a qualifying health benefit plan. Tips are not included in an employee’s gross taxable income for calculating maximum health benefit plan premiums.
On Viewing The Courts As Junior Partners Of Congress In Statutory Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating The Scholarship Of Daniel J. Meltzer, Richard H. Fallon Jr
On Viewing The Courts As Junior Partners Of Congress In Statutory Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating The Scholarship Of Daniel J. Meltzer, Richard H. Fallon Jr
Notre Dame Law Review
In this Essay, written in tribute to Dan Meltzer, I shall attempt to explicate his views regarding statutory interpretation in general, thematic terms. In doing so, I shall register my agreement with virtually all of Dan’s conclusions and frequently echo his practically minded arguments in support of them. But I shall also advance arguments—with which I cannot be entirely sure he would have agreed—that seek to show that his position reflected theoretical insights about how language works, not only in law, but also more generally in life. By seeking simultaneously to defend Dan’s views and to build on them, this …
Is Textualism Required By Constitutional Separation Of Powers?, Ofer Raban
Is Textualism Required By Constitutional Separation Of Powers?, Ofer Raban
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
This article examines the often-heard claim that textualism in statutory interpretation is mandated by constitutional separation of powers. The claim is examined using both the formalist and the functionalist approaches to separation of powers doctrine under the Federal Constitution. As we shall see, these doctrinal inquiries quickly devolve into examinations of the purposes and justification of textualism, and of separating the three branches of government. The article concludes not only that standing constitutional doctrine fails to support the textualist claim, but also that, as a matter of fact, textualism is a judicial philosophy that runs counter to the most basic …
Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo
Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article offers a new perspective on Presidents’ use of signing statements. Following the dichotomy reflected in the literature, I will analyze signing statements raising constitutional objections and those offering interpretive guidance for ambiguous provisions separately. With respect to constitutional interpretation of statutes by the executive branch, Presidents have long asserted the authority and obligation to consider constitutionality when executing statutes. The widespread acceptance of the President’s power to construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems and to refuse to defend the constitutionality of or to enforce statutes in appropriate cases confirms the propriety of this conclusion. If these fairly uncontroversial …
Is The Constitution Special?, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Is The Constitution Special?, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
“[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.” If there was such a danger when Chief Justice John Marshall wrote those words, there is none today. Americans regularly assume that the Constitution is special, and legal professionals treat it differently from other sources of law. But what if that is wrongheaded? In this Article, we identify and question the professional practice of constitutional exceptionalism. First, we show that standard arguments from text, structure, and history work differently in constitutional law. Second, we examine the possible justifications for such distinctive interpretation among lawyers, and we find them …
The Presidential Statutory Stretch And The Rule Of Law, Peter M. Shane
The Presidential Statutory Stretch And The Rule Of Law, Peter M. Shane
University of Colorado Law Review
No abstract provided.
Is The Constitution Special?, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Is The Constitution Special?, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
"[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.” If there was such a danger when Chief Justice John Marshall wrote those words, there is none today. Americans regularly assume that the Constitution is special, and legal professionals treat it differently from other sources of law. But what if that is wrongheaded? In this Article, we identify and question the professional practice of constitutional exceptionalism. First, we show that standard arguments from text, structure, and history work differently in constitutional law. Second, we examine the possible justifications for such distinctive interpretation among lawyers, and we find them …