Law Commons^™

Court Of Appeals Of New York, Local Government Assistance Corp. V. Sales Tax Asset Receivable Corp., Hannah Abrams

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.

First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In Bankruptcy And The Plight Of The Debtor, Timothy R. Tarvin

Timothy R Tarvin

Article Iii And Bankruptcy Code Standing: Preserving A Party’S Right To Object To A Proposed Reorganization Plan, James Scahill

Bankruptcy Research Library

(Excerpt)

In a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, a troubled company can either restructure or liquidate through a confirmed chapter 11 plan. To encourage more participation in reorganization cases, courts have broadly interpreted section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which determines who may object to a plan. Section 1109(b) states that “a party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.” A party wishing to object to …

Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines how a U.S. debt default might occur, how it could be avoided, its potential consequences if not avoided, and how those consequences could be mitigated. To that end, the article differentiates defaults caused by insolvency from defaults caused by illiquidity. The latter, which are potentiated by rollover risk (the risk that the government will be temporarily unable to borrow sufficient funds to repay its maturing debt), are not only plausible but have occurred in the past. Moreover, the ongoing controversy over the federal debt ceiling and the rise of the shadow-banking system make these types of defaults …