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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
Why The Incompatibility Clause Applies To The Office Of The President, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash
Why The Incompatibility Clause Applies To The Office Of The President, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar
Professor Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash responds to Mr. Seth Barret Tillman's Article and defends the traditional interpretation of the Incompatibility Clause, under which a President is prohibited from simultaneously serving as a congressional representative. The ramifications that would result if a President could also hold a position in the Senate or the House of Representatives, Professor Prakash argues, are too problematic for Mr. Tillman's reading to replace the traditional understanding of the Incompatibility Clause. Therefore, the next President, whether Senator McCain or Senator Obama, would need to resign from the Senate before assuming the Executive Office.
Why Our Next President May Keep His Or Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture On The Constitution’S Incompatibility Clause, Seth Barrett Tillman
Why Our Next President May Keep His Or Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture On The Constitution’S Incompatibility Clause, Seth Barrett Tillman
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar
In this Article, Mr. Seth Barrett Tillman challenges the traditional interpretation of the Incompatibility Clause and argues that the President may serve both as the Chief Executive and as a member of Congress. Mr. Tillman utilizes the text, history, and structure of the Constitution to support his position. He ultimately concludes that whoever serves as the next President -- Senator Obama or Senator McCain -- need not resign from the Senate before assuming the Executive Office.
Reconstructing The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, Brannon P. Denning
Reconstructing The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, Brannon P. Denning
William & Mary Law Review
In this Article, I argue that the alleged incoherence and unpredictability of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD) is rooted in the Supreme Court's search, through the years, for a stable set of rules enabling it to distinguish permissible from impermissible state regulations of interstate commerce and commercial actors. Its lack of success, the Article argues, is due in large part to the Court's inability to settle on the constitutional command the doctrine was to enforce. Historically, the Court would promulgate a set of rules, apply them for a time, then alter or modify them as the rules became unsatisfactory. …
Metaphors And Modalities: Meditations On Bobbit's Theory Of The Constitution, Ian C. Bartrum
Metaphors And Modalities: Meditations On Bobbit's Theory Of The Constitution, Ian C. Bartrum
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
No abstract provided.
Constitution Writing In Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview, Jennifer Widner
Constitution Writing In Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview, Jennifer Widner
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Theocratic Challenge To Constitution Drafting In Post-Conflict States, Ran Hirschl
The Theocratic Challenge To Constitution Drafting In Post-Conflict States, Ran Hirschl
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Some Skepticism About Normative Constitutional Advice, Mark Tushnet
Some Skepticism About Normative Constitutional Advice, Mark Tushnet
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections Are More Equal Than Others, Stephen Durden
Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections Are More Equal Than Others, Stephen Durden
Stephen Durden
This Article challenges the validity of plain language textualism, an allegedly superior method of constitutional interpretation based solely on the “plain language” of the Constitution. First, this Article demonstrates that, notwithstanding the ebb and flow of support for this interpretive method, both the Supreme Court and its individual Justices often seek to “plainly” define various provisions in the Constitution. What matters most to this Article is not whether any individual “plain language” interpretation of a constitutional provision seems reasonable or even best, but rather whether the use of “plain language” is consistent with the expressed and unexpressed objectives and purposes …
Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow
Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow
Donald J. Kochan
Conflicts created by concurrences and pluralities in court decisions create confusion in law and lower court interpretation. Rule of law values require that individuals be able to identify controlling legal principles. That task is complicated when pluralities and concurrences contribute to the vagueness or uncertainty that leaves us wondering what the controlling rule is or attempting to predict what it will evolve to become. The rule of law is at least handicapped when continuity or confidence or confusion infuse our understanding of the applicable rules. This Article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States to …