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Full-Text Articles in Law

New Light On The Decision Of 1789, Sai Prakash Mar 2005

New Light On The Decision Of 1789, Sai Prakash

ExpressO

In the Constitution’s earliest days, members of the House engaged in one of the nation’s most momentous constitutional debates. While deliberating on the Department of Foreign Affairs bill, representatives considered the mechanisms for removing executive officers. The final Act conveyed no removal authority but discussed what would happen when the president removed the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The traditional view of the Decision, voiced by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and William Howard Taft, is that because the Act conveyed no removal authority and laid out what would happen when the president removed, the Act presumed that the president had a …


Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking The Constitution Seriously Outside The Courts, James E. Fleming Mar 2005

Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking The Constitution Seriously Outside The Courts, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Larry Sager and Larry Kramer have written important books that, in quite different ways, call for taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts. Sager's Justice in Plainclothes' and Kramer's The People Themselves2 nonetheless join issue in significant ways, and therefore it is illuminating to analyze them as a pair.

To get a handle on the differences between the two Larrys' books, I have concocted the following fanciful hypothetical. Imagine a law school with a faculty that includes Ronald Dworkin: court-centered constitutional theorist extraordinaire and proponent of a liberal moral reading of the American Constitution.3 Further imagine that the faculty includes …


Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique Of The Sentencing Guidelines, Jackie Gardina Jan 2005

Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique Of The Sentencing Guidelines, Jackie Gardina

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article contends that the federal sentencing guidelines-whether mandatory or discretionary-violate the constitutional separation of powers by impermissibly interfering with a criminal jury's constitutional duty to act as a check against government overreaching. This Article posits that the inclusion of the criminal jury in Article III of the Constitution was intended as an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances. This Article also submits a proposal for restoring the constitutional balance through the creation of a "guideline jury system" within the current guideline structure. The implementation of a guideline jury system would fill the constitutional void created …


Article 9 Of The Constitution Of Japan And The Use Of Procedural And Substantive Heuristics For Consensus, Mark A. Chinen Jan 2005

Article 9 Of The Constitution Of Japan And The Use Of Procedural And Substantive Heuristics For Consensus, Mark A. Chinen

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Article’s purpose is to examine the revision debates through the lens of recent scholarship on constitutional decisionmaking to see what lessons might be drawn about constitutionalism in Japan and elsewhere. In Part I, the author discusses Article 9's text and interpretation and focus on three controversies: first, Japan's ability to use force to defend itself and the related issue of the constitutionality of the Japan Self Defense Force (SDF); second, Japan's ability to engage in collective self-defense, which impacts the state's security relationship with the United States under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement; and finally, Japan's ability to participate …


Discretion As Delegation: The 'Proper' Understanding Of The Nondelegation Doctrine, Gary S. Lawson Jan 2005

Discretion As Delegation: The 'Proper' Understanding Of The Nondelegation Doctrine, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The nondelegation doctrine, as it has been traditionally understood, maintains that the federal Constitution places limits (however modest) on the kind and quantity of discretion that Congress can grant to other actors. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have recently described this doctrine as a "neurotic burden"' on the legal system that "lacks any foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard originalist sources, or in sound economic and political theory.''2 They agree that the Constitution forbids Congress from delegating the formal power to enact legislation through the Article I voting process,3 but they argue that "a statutory grant of authority …


Justice Scalia's Constitution--And Ours, Kermit Roosevelt Iii Jan 2005

Justice Scalia's Constitution--And Ours, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.