Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 8 of 8

Full-Text Articles in Law

A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus And Deference On The Supreme Court, Jed Handelsman Shugerman Apr 2003

A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus And Deference On The Supreme Court, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has struck down federal statutes by a bare majority with unprecedented frequency. This Article shows that five-four decisions regularly overturning acts of Congress are a relatively recent phenomenon, whereas earlier Courts generally exercised judicial review by supermajority voting.

One option is to establish the following rule: The Supreme Court may not declare an act of Congress unconstitutional without a two-thirds majority. The Supreme Court itself could establish this rule internally, just as it has created its nonmajority rules for granting certiorari and holds, or one Justice who would otherwise be the fifth …


Affirmative Action In The Workplace: The Significance Of Grutter?, Rebecca Hanner White Jan 2003

Affirmative Action In The Workplace: The Significance Of Grutter?, Rebecca Hanner White

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Supreme Court's 2002 Term Employment Law Cases: Is This Justice Scalia's Court?, Rafael Gely Jan 2003

Supreme Court's 2002 Term Employment Law Cases: Is This Justice Scalia's Court?, Rafael Gely

Faculty Publications

In a recent article,' Erwin Chemerinsky argues that the Supreme Court's constitutional law decisions of the 2002 Term "cannot be explained by any overarching theory or underlying set of interpretative principles." Instead, he argues, "constitutional law is all about value choices made by the Justices." Professor Chemerinsky also argues that given the current composition of the Court, "it is the value choices of the middle" - Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy - that matter the most. Professor Chemerinsky ends his article with the assertion that "[f]or better or worse, this really is the O'Connor Court." In reviewing the cases decided …


Federalism And The Federal Prosecution Of State And Local Corruption, Peter J. Henning Jan 2003

Federalism And The Federal Prosecution Of State And Local Corruption, Peter J. Henning

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Affirmative Action, Race, And The Constitution: From Bakke To Grutter, Robert A. Sedler Jan 2003

Affirmative Action, Race, And The Constitution: From Bakke To Grutter, Robert A. Sedler

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.


A Comment On The Litigation Strategy, Judicial Politics And Political Context Which Produced Grutter And Gratz, Sheryl G. Snyder Jan 2003

A Comment On The Litigation Strategy, Judicial Politics And Political Context Which Produced Grutter And Gratz, Sheryl G. Snyder

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Race Conscious Affirmative Action By Tax Exempt 501(C)(3) Corporations After Grutter And Gratz, David A. Brennen Jan 2003

Race Conscious Affirmative Action By Tax Exempt 501(C)(3) Corporations After Grutter And Gratz, David A. Brennen

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally acts as a legal limit on the permissible bounds of government action. Accordingly, public universities and other government entities are constitutionally prohibited from engaging in acts that violate equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court recently reinforced this point when it ruled, in two related cases, that public universities may consider the race of applicants when making admissions decisions, so long as an applicant's race does not amount to a deciding factor when granting admission. By its very terms, the constitutional limitation imposed by the Equal Protection Clause only directly …


Quo Vadis: The Continuing Metamorphosis Of The Establishment Clause Toward Realistic Substantive Neutrality, Paul E. Salamanca Jan 2003

Quo Vadis: The Continuing Metamorphosis Of The Establishment Clause Toward Realistic Substantive Neutrality, Paul E. Salamanca

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

For years, the rhetoric of substantive neutrality has dominated interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Under this approach, courts and commentators purport to ask whether a public policy under scrutiny is likely to affect religious choices in an unacceptable way. In fact, so broadly has this approach been taken that both separationists and accommodationists resort to it freely, although with radically differing perceptions as to when policy becomes unacceptable. Arguably, however, adherents to this approach have paid insufficient attention to religious behavior per se. Had they paid sufficient attention to this phenomenon, they would have been forced to acknowledge that little …