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Full-Text Articles in Law

Term Limits On Original Intent--An Essay On Legal Debate And Historical Understanding, Polly J. Price Jan 1996

Term Limits On Original Intent--An Essay On Legal Debate And Historical Understanding, Polly J. Price

Faculty Articles

This Essay is divided into five Parts. Part I sets the stage for the historical debate by evaluating the text of the Qualifications Clauses as well as the limited evidence of what the Framers and the ratifiers thought about these provisions. Part II shows that many states, immediately after the federal Constitution was ratified, behaved as though the Qualifications Clauses did not prevent them from adding qualifications for congressional office-holding. Part III compares this early evidence of state behavior with a debate in Congress after the Civil War concerning the meaning of the Qualifications Clauses. Part IV returns to the …


Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause And Cure, Gary S. Lawson Jan 1996

Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause And Cure, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Legal indeterminacy--the extent to which any particular legal theory cannot provide knowable answers to concrete problems is one of the principal themes of modern jurisprudence. Indeterminacy plays an important role in debates concerning interpretation, the nature of legal obligation, and the character and possibilities of the rule of law. Indeterminacy looms particularly large in debates concerning originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation. Some scholars insist that originalism resolves too few problems to be of much use, while others argue that originalism's indeterminacy is often overstated.


Originalism And Indeterminacy, Thomas B. Mcaffee Jan 1996

Originalism And Indeterminacy, Thomas B. Mcaffee

Scholarly Works

Perhaps the most universal objection to originalism is that it is impossible; that is, the materials relied upon by originalists simply do not yield determinant answers to any worthwhile questions. This indeterminacy objection lacks significant force for at least three reasons. First, the claim that the interpretive materials are always indeterminate vastly overstates the extent and importance of the uncertainties involved; consequently, originalism's critics understate the importance of the originalist canon as a tool for reducing the degree of indeterminacy in constitutional interpretation. Once it becomes clear that originalist methodology can provide some definitive answers, even if significant indeterminacy remains, …


A Nonoriginalist Perspective On The Lessons Of History, Michael C. Dorf Jan 1996

A Nonoriginalist Perspective On The Lessons Of History, Michael C. Dorf

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Judicial Restraint And Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez And Seminole Tribe Decisions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 1996

Judicial Restraint And Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez And Seminole Tribe Decisions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The Senate hearings considering Elena Kagan’s Supreme Court nomination called new attention to the Constitution's Commerce Clause. That concern might seem odd, given the typical lack of strong grassroots concern over the commerce power. But the 2010 election year is different. One characteristic of the largely conservative "Tea Party" movement is a wish to roll back Constitutional time to the regime envisioned by its founders. As the New York Times reported in early July, 2010, members of the movement believe that the “commerce clause in particular has been pushed beyond recognition.” Members of the movement imagine that Congressional power over …


A Text Is Just A Text, Paul F. Campos Jan 1996

A Text Is Just A Text, Paul F. Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.


The Relevance Of The Framers’ Intent, Randy E. Barnett Jan 1996

The Relevance Of The Framers’ Intent, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Ever since the revival of interest in originalism that occurred in the 1980s, critics have 'charged that for a variety of reasons it is impractical, if not impossible, to determine the Framers' intentions. In addition, they argue that we today should not be bound by the intentions of a few men who lived and died over two-hundred years ago. In sum, adherence to original intent is rejected as being impractical, unjust, or both.

In this article, the author argues that we cannot assess either the practicality or the justice of discerning original intent without first asking why it is we …