Law Commons^™

If They Can Raze It, Why Can't I? A Constitutional Analysis Of Statutory And Judicial Religious Exemptions To Historic Preservation Ordinances, Erin Guiffre

Georgetown Law Historic Preservation Papers Series

In 1996, America almost lost a great piece of its history. The Cathedral of Saint Vibiana, located in Los Angeles, was in danger of being destroyed. The "Baroque-inspired Italianate structure" was completed in 1876 by architect Ezra F. Kysor. The cathedral is one of only a few structures from Los Angeles' early history remaining. As an important part of history and a beautiful piece of architecture, the cathedral was listed on California's register of historic places. In 1994, an earthquake damaged part of the building. After an inspection by the building and safety department in 1996, the only portion of …

The Mighty Myths Of Kelo, John R. Nolon

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The press releases of property rights activists and the media’s rapid embrace of their views have perpetuated several myths about the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. New London. In the immediate aftermath of this myth making, the legislatures of several states have adopted restrictions on the use of eminent domain with uncharacteristic speed. Wisely, the New York State Legislature has been more cautious in its reaction.

Legislatively Revising Kelo V. City Of New London: Eminent Domain, Federalism, And Congressional Powers, Bernard W. Bell

Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers

This paper explores Congress’ power to limit state and local authorities’ use of eminent domain to further economic revitalization. More particularly, it examines whether Congress can constrain the discretion to invoke eminent domain which state and local officials appear entitled to under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). The question involves and exploration and assessment of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence regarding federalism and judicial supremacy.

In providing that private property may not be taken for “public use” without just compensation, the Fifth Amendment implicitly precludes government …

Private Property, Development And Freedom, Steven J. Eagle

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

The author asserts that adherence to the rule of law, including property law, is a necessary condition to economic development and human freedom. United States governmental agencies and private institutes have attempted to convey this message to Russia, other states of the former Soviet Union, and former Soviet satellite states, with some success. Finally, and unfortunately, the United States has veered away from the very adherence to the rule of law respecting property which it espouses abroad.

Overcoming Poletown: County Of Wayne V. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, And The Future Of Public Use, Ilya Somin

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

County of Wayne v. Hathcock is an important step forward in public use takings law. The Michigan Supreme Court was right to overturn its notorious 1981 Poletown decision and forbid condemnations that transfer property to private parties solely on the grounds that the new owners will contribute to “economic development.” Poletown was the best known and most widely criticized decision justifying a nearly unlimited condemnation power.

As the Poletown case dramatically demonstrates, the economic development rationale is a virtual blank check for eminent domain abuse for the benefit of private parties. Poletown upheld a condemnation as a result of which …

Property As A Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, Gregory S. Alexander

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

This article examines an apparent paradox in comparative constitutional law. Property rights are not treated as a fundamental right in American constitutional law; they are, however, under the Basic Law (i.e., constitution) of Germany, a social-welfare state that otherwise gives less weight to property. The article uses this apparent paradox as a vehicle for considering the different reasons why constitutions protect property. It explains the difference between the German and American constitutional treatment of property on the basis of the quite different approaches taken in the two systems to the purposes of constitutional protection of property.

The Takings Clause And The Separation Of Powers: An Essay, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The most fundamental environmental problem is this: across our nation there are literally hundreds of millions of acres of important natural resource lands-- farms, forests, wetlands, reservoir watersheds, shore lands, endangered species habitat--lands that have relatively little commercial value in their present natural condition, but which would have much greater commercial value if their natural values were degraded or destroyed. Stated differently, private property often will yield a much greater profit to its owner if it is used in ways that will harm or obliterate important environmental assets and values. For this reason, private owners are understandably tempted to supplant …

Takings And Property Rights Legislation, John R. Nolon

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Over the years, regulatory takings case law has supported land use regulations by cloaking them with a presumption of validity and placing a heavy burden on their challengers of proving either that the regulation fails to substantially advance a legitimate public purpose or that it deprives the owner of all economically beneficial use of the land. Insulated in this way, regulators, on occasion, have transgressed the boundaries of fundamental fairness.

Evolving Thresholds Of Nuisance And The Takings Clause, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This article reviews the historical tradition in which the common law core of nuisance has been the frequent subject of statutory additions and refinements, providing most of our modern law of land use and environmental protection. Until Lucas, the Takings Clause had not been treated as a charter establishing the courts as boards of revision to rethink and selectively veto legislative determinations in the land use field. Within the scope of “total takings,” however, Lucas has converted the Takings Clause from its original meaning and made it exactly that.

"Taking" The Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests And Judicial Revision Of Legislative Judgments, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Article examines the diversion of the Takings Clause from its historic limited role to that of a charter for courts to second-guess legislative determinations of land-use rights and wrongs. As we shall see, prior to Lucas the Supreme Court and others following its lead have generally not regarded the Takings Clause as a warrant for reaching de novo determinations on land use problems and then substituting such judicial determinations, if different, for those of the legislature. Some notable exceptions in the Claims Court and Federal Circuit will then be considered along with the ostensible Supreme Court authority, a sentence …

Private Property Investment, Lucas And The Fairness Doctrine, John R. Nolon

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

These remarks are not intended to advocate the interests of the new property rights movement. In fact, those advocates will be disappointed by what I say. Rather, I aspire to view the issue of real property regulation as broadly as possible, reaching beyond the jurisprudence of regulatory takings cases into the realms of real estate transactions law and comprehensive land use planning.

What Is Behind The "Property Rights" Debate?, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council' obviously presents issues that range far more broadly than just whether people should be allowed to build on beaches and dunes. Many observers have viewed the case as a splendid opportunity for the Supreme Court to re-establish private owner autonomy in land use decisions - to cut down, perhaps drastically, on elected legislatures' traditional power to protect the environment by regulating uses of land. Behind the "property rights" debate is the question of whether states and communities really ought to have the power that they have traditionally had to control the development and patterns …

Footprints In The Shifting Sands Of The Isle Of Palms: A Practical Analysis Of Regulatory Takings Cases, John R. Nolon

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

It was not until the last day of the term, June 29, 1992, that the Court decided Lucas. By that time, interest could not have been greater. At issue was the validity of a regulation that prohibited all permanent development of the plaintiff's two beachfront lots. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the regulation by a 3-2 margin because it prevented a “great public harm.” The U.S. Supreme Court reversed that determination and remanded the case to determine whether South Carolina's common law of nuisance could prohibit the construction of single-family housing on the lots. The fractured Court delivered an …

Economic Due Process And The Takings Clause, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The discussion which follows will examine the new verbalizations repeatedly employed in Supreme Court takings decisions of the past decade and the Court's enlistment of the just compensation requirement as a basis for undertaking substantive review of legislation. As an introduction, the distinctive historical roles and roots of the substantive due process and just compensation requirements will be reviewed.

Constitutional Limits On The Power To Take Private Property: Public Purpose And Public Use, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The rights/freedoms dichotomy tacitly permeates Supreme Court ‘takings' jurisprudence, and it has an explanatory power which extends to virtually all ‘takings' cases decided by the Court. Its explanatory power does not, however, extend to the relatively few cases which involve the taking of ‘rights' for purely private use, that is rearrangements of existing private property rights, as opposed to takings for use by the government or its designees in some public service function. Because rearranging the existing pattern of private ownership takes ‘rights' and not mere ‘freedoms,’ we might expect, according to the rights/freedoms pattern, that the Court would uniformly …

A Unifying Theory For The Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation And Public Use, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This discussion begins with some remarks concerning the concept of property as a general matter. It will then consider briefly an approach to the problem which, though promising and advanced, nevertheless falls short of achieving an internally consistent, unifying theory. Following this introduction, an attempt will be made to specify the two distinctive conceptual components of property interests on whose difference the cases seem to turn, and then to demonstrate the suitability of this conceptual distinction as the foundation for a coherent theory of the law.

Review Of Private Property And The Constitution By Bruce Ackerman, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.