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Full-Text Articles in Law

Commentary On Marriage Grants: Article Iii & Same-Sex Marriage, Neal Devins, Tara Leigh Grove Sep 2019

Commentary On Marriage Grants: Article Iii & Same-Sex Marriage, Neal Devins, Tara Leigh Grove

Tara L. Grove

No abstract provided.


Rights Dynamism, Timothy Zick Sep 2019

Rights Dynamism, Timothy Zick

Timothy Zick

No abstract provided.


Q: Will The Supreme Court Intervention In Florida Fail The Test Of Time?, Ira Glasser, Alan J. Meese Sep 2019

Q: Will The Supreme Court Intervention In Florida Fail The Test Of Time?, Ira Glasser, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Marriage Grants: Article Iii & Same-Sex Marriage, Neal Devins, Tara Leigh Grove Sep 2019

Commentary On Marriage Grants: Article Iii & Same-Sex Marriage, Neal Devins, Tara Leigh Grove

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.


Embracing Race-Conscious College Admissions Programs: How Fisher V. University Of Texas At Austin Redefines "Affirmative Action" As A Holistic Approach To Admissions That Ensures Equal, Not Preferential, Treatment, Nancy L. Zisk Jun 2019

Embracing Race-Conscious College Admissions Programs: How Fisher V. University Of Texas At Austin Redefines "Affirmative Action" As A Holistic Approach To Admissions That Ensures Equal, Not Preferential, Treatment, Nancy L. Zisk

Nancy L. Zisk

In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the United States Supreme Court affirmed well-established Supreme Court doctrine that race may be considered when a college or university decides whom to admit and whom to reject, as long as the consideration of race is part of a narrowly tailored holistic consideration of an applicant's many distinguishing features. The Court's latest decision heralds a new way of thinking about holistic race-conscious admissions programs. Rather than considering them as "affirmative action" plans that prefer any one applicant to the disadvantage of another, they should be viewed as the Court has described …


Sexuality And Sovereignty: The Global Limits And Possibilities Of A Lawrence, Sonia K. Katyal Oct 2017

Sexuality And Sovereignty: The Global Limits And Possibilities Of A Lawrence, Sonia K. Katyal

Sonia Katyal

No abstract provided.


Prisoner's Rights And The Correctional Scheme: The Legal Controversy And Problems Of Implementation - A Symposium - Introduction, Donald W. Dowd Jun 2017

Prisoner's Rights And The Correctional Scheme: The Legal Controversy And Problems Of Implementation - A Symposium - Introduction, Donald W. Dowd

Donald W. Dowd

No abstract provided.


Constitutional Borrowing, Robert L. Tsai Nov 2016

Constitutional Borrowing, Robert L. Tsai

Robert L Tsai

Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter. It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. The authors' examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law …


Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations And The Poor, Bertrall L. Ross, Su Li Dec 2015

Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations And The Poor, Bertrall L. Ross, Su Li

Bertrall L Ross

Which classes are considered suspect under equal protection doctrine? The answer determines whether courts will defer to legislatures and other government actors when they single out a group for special burdens, or intervene to protect that group from such treatment. Laws burdening suspect classes receive the strictest scrutiny possible—and under current doctrine, whether a class is suspect turns largely on whether the court views the group as possessing political power.

But how do courts know when a class lacks political power? A liberal plurality of the Supreme Court initially suggested that political power should be measured according to a group’s …


The Respectable Dignity Of Obergefell V. Hodges, Yuvraj Joshi Oct 2015

The Respectable Dignity Of Obergefell V. Hodges, Yuvraj Joshi

Yuvraj Joshi

In declaring state laws that restrict same-sex marriage unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy invoked “dignity” nine times—to no one’s surprise. References in Obergefell to “dignity” are in important respects the culmination of Justice Kennedy’s elevation of the concept, dating back to the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In Casey, “dignity” expressed respect for a woman’s freedom to make choices about her pregnancy. Casey laid the foundation for Lawrence v. Texas, which similarly respected the freedom of choice of homosexual persons. Yet, starting in United States v. Windsor and continuing in Obergefell, the narrative began to change. Dignity veered …


The High Price Of Poverty: A Study Of How The Majority Of Current Court System Procedures For Collecting Court Costs And Fees, As Well As Fines, Have Failed To Adhere To Established Precedent And The Constitutional Guarantees They Advocate., Trevor J. Calligan Jul 2015

The High Price Of Poverty: A Study Of How The Majority Of Current Court System Procedures For Collecting Court Costs And Fees, As Well As Fines, Have Failed To Adhere To Established Precedent And The Constitutional Guarantees They Advocate., Trevor J. Calligan

Trevor J Calligan

No abstract provided.


The Market For Legal Education And Freedom Of Association: Why The "Solomon Amendment" Is Constitutional And Law Schools Are Not Expressive Associations, Andrew P. Morriss Jul 2015

The Market For Legal Education And Freedom Of Association: Why The "Solomon Amendment" Is Constitutional And Law Schools Are Not Expressive Associations, Andrew P. Morriss

Andrew P. Morriss

This term the Supreme Court will confront the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, which mandates equal access for military recruiters at universities that accept federal funding. The Third Circuit previously held the statute unconstitutional. This Article argues that the Court should reverse and uphold the statute because the lower court failed to consider the cartelized nature of legal education and so assumed that law schools are "expressive associations" entitled to assert First Amendment claims; the court also failed to give proper deference to Congress's exercise of its Article I power to raise and support armies and over-valued law faculties' interest …


Constitutional Borrowing, Robert Tsai Mar 2015

Constitutional Borrowing, Robert Tsai

Robert L. Tsai

Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter. It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. The authors' examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law …


The Separation Of The Religious And The Secular: A Foundational Challenge To First Amendment Theory, Laura Underkuffler Feb 2015

The Separation Of The Religious And The Secular: A Foundational Challenge To First Amendment Theory, Laura Underkuffler

Laura S. Underkuffler

No abstract provided.


Toward A New Separation Of Church And State: Implications For Analogies To Last Year's Supreme Court Decision In Hobby Lobby By This Year's Decision In Obergefell V. Hodges, Vincent Samar Jan 2015

Toward A New Separation Of Church And State: Implications For Analogies To Last Year's Supreme Court Decision In Hobby Lobby By This Year's Decision In Obergefell V. Hodges, Vincent Samar

Vincent J. Samar

No abstract provided.


Deselecting Biased Juries, Scott W. Howe Dec 2014

Deselecting Biased Juries, Scott W. Howe

Scott W. Howe

Critics of peremptory-challenge systems commonly contend that they inevitably inflict “inequality harm” on many excused persons and should be abolished. Ironically, the Supreme Court fueled this argument with its decision in Batson v. Kentucky by raising and endorsing the inequality claim sua sponte and then purporting to solve it with an approach that preserved peremptories. This Article shows, however, that the central problem is something other than inequality harm to excused persons. The central problem is the harm to disadvantaged litigants when their opponents use peremptories to secure a one-sided jury. This problem can arise often—whenever a venire is slanted …


Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper Methodology When Due Process And Equal Protection Intersect, Sharon E. Rush Oct 2014

Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper Methodology When Due Process And Equal Protection Intersect, Sharon E. Rush

Sharon E. Rush

This Article suggests that there is Proper Methodology that courts apply when reviewing cases at the intersection of due process and equal protection. Briefly, courts operate under a rule that heightened review applies if either a fundamental right or a suspect class is involved in a case, and that rational basis review applies if neither is involved (the "Rule"). Two primary exceptions to the Rule exist, and this Article identifies them as the "Logical" and "Ill Motives" Exceptions. The Logical Exception applies when a court need not apply heightened review because a law fails rational basis review. The Ill Motives …


Solving Batson, Tania Tetlow Mar 2014

Solving Batson, Tania Tetlow

Tania Tetlow

The Supreme Court faced an important ideological choice when it banned the racial use of peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky. It could either ground the rule in equality rights designed to protect potential jurors from stereotyping, or it could base the rule on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an “impartial jury” drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. By choosing Equal Protection analysis, the Court turned away from the defendant and the fair functioning of the criminal justice system and instead focused on protecting potential jurors. The Court thus built fatal error into the Batson rule, a …


The State As Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, And Judicial Distrust Of The Legislative Record, Bertrall L. Ross Dec 2013

The State As Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, And Judicial Distrust Of The Legislative Record, Bertrall L. Ross

Bertrall L Ross

More than ever, the constitutionality of laws turns on judicial review of an underlying factual record, assembled by lawmakers. Some scholars have suggested that by requiring extensive records, the Supreme Court is treating lawmakers like administrative agencies. The assumption underlying this metaphor is that if the state puts forth enough evidence in the record to support the law, its action will survive constitutional scrutiny. What scholars have overlooked, however, is that the Court is increasingly questioning the credibility of the record itself. Even in cases where

the state produces adequate evidence to support its action, the Court sometimes invalidates the …


¿Con La Misma Vara? Los Altibajos De La Igual Protección De Las Leyes En Las Opiniones Del Juez Federico Hernández Denton, Jorge R. Roig Dec 2013

¿Con La Misma Vara? Los Altibajos De La Igual Protección De Las Leyes En Las Opiniones Del Juez Federico Hernández Denton, Jorge R. Roig

Jorge R Roig

La carrera del juez presidente Federico Hernández Denton como juez del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico abarca cuatro distintas décadas durante las cuales la sociedad puertorriqueña ha experimentado dramáticos cambios. Desde los intentos por eliminar el hostigamiento sexual y la violencia doméstica hasta el desarrollo de los derechos civiles de los individuos y las parejas homosexuales; desde el cierre de las urbanizaciones adineradas y el enclaustre de la clase media hasta los despidos masivos en el gobierno y la constitucionalización de las escoltas de los ex gobernadores; los cambios experimentados por los puertorriqueños no nos han tocado a todos por …


E Pluribus Unum: Liberalism's March To Be The Singular Influence On Civil Rights At The Supreme Court, Aaron J. Shuler Jan 2013

E Pluribus Unum: Liberalism's March To Be The Singular Influence On Civil Rights At The Supreme Court, Aaron J. Shuler

Aaron J Shuler

Rogers Smith writes that American political culture can best be understood as a blend of liberal, republican and illiberal ascriptive ideologies. The U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has largely reflected this thesis. While the Court moved away from permitting laws that explicitly construct hierarchies in the 20th century and made tepid references to egalitarian principles during the Warren Court, liberalism has prevailed in the majority of the Court’s decisions. Gains in civil rights through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process clauses were achieved primarily through liberal notions of de-regulation, a market economy and individual freedom. Conversely, State …


Antidiscrimination Law And The Multiracial Experience: A Reply To Nancy Leong, Tina F. Botts Dec 2012

Antidiscrimination Law And The Multiracial Experience: A Reply To Nancy Leong, Tina F. Botts

Tina F Botts

Misunderstanding the concept of race as based in biology is the root error of Professor Nancy Leong's recommendation of a switch to "perceived race" in antidiscrimination law in order to protect multiracial persons from illegal racial discrimination. Once race is understood as socio-historically constructed and context-dependent rather than as rooted in biology, antidiscrimination law need only add multiracial persons to the categories of specially protected groups in order to protect multiracial persons from illegal discrimination.


Race, Law And Justice: The Rehnquist Court And The American Dilemma , Paul Butler, Richard D. Kahlenberg, Roger Pilon, Robert S. Chang, David Kairys, Jamin B. Raskin, Charles J. Cooper, Phil Tajitsu Nash, Jeffret\Y Rosen, Adrienne D. Davis, Alexandra Natapoff, Katheryn K. Russell, Angela Jordan Newton, Burton Wechsler, Mark Hager, Clarence Page, Brenda Wright, Stuart Ishimaru, Frank R. Parker, Frank H. Wu Aug 2012

Race, Law And Justice: The Rehnquist Court And The American Dilemma , Paul Butler, Richard D. Kahlenberg, Roger Pilon, Robert S. Chang, David Kairys, Jamin B. Raskin, Charles J. Cooper, Phil Tajitsu Nash, Jeffret\Y Rosen, Adrienne D. Davis, Alexandra Natapoff, Katheryn K. Russell, Angela Jordan Newton, Burton Wechsler, Mark Hager, Clarence Page, Brenda Wright, Stuart Ishimaru, Frank R. Parker, Frank H. Wu

Jamin Raskin

No abstract provided.


Willful [Color-] Blindness: The Supreme Court's Equal Protection Of Ascription, Aaron J. Shuler Jan 2012

Willful [Color-] Blindness: The Supreme Court's Equal Protection Of Ascription, Aaron J. Shuler

Aaron J Shuler

Rogers Smith in his "Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America," warns of novel legal systems reconstituting ascriptive American inequality. The post-Warren Courts' approach to Equal Protection, specifically their unwillingness to consider disparate impact and the difference between invidious and benign practices, betrays an "ironic innocence" as described by James Baldwin to a history of racial discrimination and domination, and a disavowal of a hiearchy that the Court perpetuates.


Inextricably Political: Race, Membership And Tribal Sovereignty, Sarah Krakoff Jan 2012

Inextricably Political: Race, Membership And Tribal Sovereignty, Sarah Krakoff

Sarah Krakoff

Courts address equal protection questions about the distinct legal treatment of American Indian tribes in the following dichotomous way: are classifications concerning American Indians “racial or political?” If the classification is political (i.e. based on federally recognized tribal status or membership in a federally recognized tribe) then courts will not subject it to heightened scrutiny. If the classification is racial rather than political, then courts may apply heightened scrutiny. This article challenges the dichotomy itself. The legal categories “tribe” and “tribal member” are themselves political, and reflect the ways in which tribes and tribal members have been racialized by U.S. …


Religion And Race: The Ministerial Exception Reexamined, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2011

Religion And Race: The Ministerial Exception Reexamined, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This Colloquy piece explores the constitutional relationship between religious exercise and racial discrimination in the context of the "ministerial exception" and the Court's decision to hear arguments in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC.


On Equality: The Anti-Interference Principle, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2010

On Equality: The Anti-Interference Principle, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

This Essay introduces the “Anti-Interference Principle” – a new term on the meaning of equality, or at least one not yet so-named in the equality lexicon – as a necessary foundation for achieving the goal of true equality. Equality has a long-standing place in the discussion of politics and jurisprudence and remains a struggle of definition today. Rather than rehash the mass of scholarship, this Essay seeks to summarize the general equality concept, and propose that the legal discourse on equality center on a requirement that governmental power must protect and respect equal treatment and opportunity, unconstrained, not equal outcomes. …


The Contradiction Between Equal Protection's Meaning And Its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, Derek Black Oct 2010

The Contradiction Between Equal Protection's Meaning And Its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, Derek Black

Derek W. Black

This Article highlights the inherent ambiguities of racial antidiscrimination's core legal language: "equal protection under the law" and "discrimination based on race." It then analyzes how and why the Court has never answered fundamental questions regarding the meaning of these terms. Thus, this Article answers these fundamental questions itself by exploring the original intent behind the Equal Protection Clause. Against this backdrop, this Article reveals how the Court's standard for assessing discrimination claims, the intent doctrine, assumes a meaning for equal protection that is inconsistent with its original meaning. Rather than reflecting equal protection's meaning, the standard lacks any basis …


The Contradiction Between Equal Protection's Meaning And Its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, Derek W. Black Oct 2010

The Contradiction Between Equal Protection's Meaning And Its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, Derek W. Black

Derek W. Black

This Article highlights the inherent ambiguities of racial antidiscrimination's core legal language: "equal protection under the law" and "discrimination based on race." It then analyzes how and why the Court has never answered fundamental questions regarding the meaning of these terms. Thus, this Article answers these fundamental questions itself by exploring the original intent behind the Equal Protection Clause. Against this backdrop, this Article reveals how the Court's standard for assessing discrimination claims, the intent doctrine, assumes a meaning for equal protection that is inconsistent with its original meaning. Rather than reflecting equal protection's meaning, the standard lacks any basis …


How The Diversity Rationale Lays The Groundwork For New Discrimination: Examining The Trajectory Of Equal Protection Doctrine, Michael Helfand Feb 2009

How The Diversity Rationale Lays The Groundwork For New Discrimination: Examining The Trajectory Of Equal Protection Doctrine, Michael Helfand

Michael A Helfand

This Article advocates differentiating between two distinct categories of equal protection cases. The first-what I have termed indicator cases-are instances where courts consider whether there are sufficient factual indications to demonstrate the existence of aprimafacie equal protection violation. The second-violation casesare instances where courts consider, having already determined the existence of an equal protection violation, whether there is a good enough justification for a prima facie equal protection violation. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not differentiated between these two different types of cases. This has led to a string of decisions where the Supreme Court has erroneously looked for justifications …