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Full-Text Articles in Law

Foreword: Elected Branch Influences In Constitutional Decisionmaking, Neal Devins Sep 2019

Foreword: Elected Branch Influences In Constitutional Decisionmaking, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.


Will, Judgment, And Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter And The Mistranslation Of The Due Process Clause, Alan J. Meese Sep 2019

Will, Judgment, And Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter And The Mistranslation Of The Due Process Clause, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.


Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study, Frederick W. Dingledy Sep 2019

Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study, Frederick W. Dingledy

Frederick W. Dingledy

No abstract provided.


Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins Sep 2019

Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

Members of Congress largely acquiesce to judicial supremacy both on constitutional and statutory interpretation questions. Lawmakers, however, do not formally embrace judicial supremacy; they rarely think about the courts when enacting legislation. This Article explains why this is so, focusing on why lawmakers have both strong incentive to acquiesce to judicial power and little incentive to advance a coherent view of congressional power. In particular, lawmakers are interested in advancing favored policies, winning reelection, and gaining personal power within Congress. Abstract questions of institutional power do not interest lawmakers and judicial defeats are seen as opportunities to find some other …


How Not To Challenge The Court, Neal Devins Sep 2019

How Not To Challenge The Court, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.


Correspondence: The Stuff Of Constitutional Law, Neal Devins Sep 2019

Correspondence: The Stuff Of Constitutional Law, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.


The Return Of The Unprovided-For Case, Michael S. Green Sep 2019

The Return Of The Unprovided-For Case, Michael S. Green

Michael S. Green

No abstract provided.


Constitutional Avoidance And The Roberts Court, Neal Devins Sep 2019

Constitutional Avoidance And The Roberts Court, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.


Congress As Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred On The Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, Neal Devins Sep 2019

Congress As Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred On The Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.


Against Mix-And-Match Lawmaking, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl Sep 2019

Against Mix-And-Match Lawmaking, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

No abstract provided.


The Declaration Of Independence And Constitutional Interpretation, Alexander Tsesis Jun 2019

The Declaration Of Independence And Constitutional Interpretation, Alexander Tsesis

Alexander Tsesis

This Article argues that the Reconstruction Amendments incorporated the human dignity values of the Declaration of Independence. The original Constitution contained clauses, which protected the institution of slavery, that were irreconcilable with the normative commitments the nation had undertaken at independence. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments set the country aright by formally incorporating the Declaration of Independence's principles for representative governance into the Constitution.

The Declaration of Independence provides valuable insights into matters of human dignity, privacy, and self-government. Its statements about human rights, equality, and popular sovereignty establish a foundational rule of interpretation. While the Supreme Court has …


The Authors' Reply To Commentaries On, And Criticisms Of The Militia And The Right To Arms, Or, How The Second Amendment Fell Silent, H. Richard Uviller, William G. Merkel Mar 2019

The Authors' Reply To Commentaries On, And Criticisms Of The Militia And The Right To Arms, Or, How The Second Amendment Fell Silent, H. Richard Uviller, William G. Merkel

William G. Merkel

No abstract provided.


Justice O'Conner's Dilemma: The Baseline Question, Suzanna Sherry Oct 2018

Justice O'Conner's Dilemma: The Baseline Question, Suzanna Sherry

Suzanna Sherry

No abstract provided.


In Defense Of Judicial Supremacy, Erwin Chemerinsky Oct 2017

In Defense Of Judicial Supremacy, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

“Judicial supremacy” is the idea that the Supreme Court should be viewed as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and that we should deem its decisions as binding on the other branches and levels of government, until and unless constitutional amendment or subsequent decision overrules them. This is desirable because we want to have an authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and the Court is best suited to play this role. Under this view, doctrines which keep federal courts from enforcing constitutional provisions—such as denying standing for generalized grievances, the political question doctrine, and the state secrets doctrine—are misguided and should …


The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is A Constitutional Expansion Of Rights, Erwin Chemerinsky Jun 2017

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is A Constitutional Expansion Of Rights, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

No abstract provided.


Construction, Originalist Interpretation And The Complete Constitution, Richard Kay Dec 2016

Construction, Originalist Interpretation And The Complete Constitution, Richard Kay

Richard Kay

 In recent years, the literature of constitutional originalism has adopted a new concept, “constitutional construction.” This Essay critically examines that concept. Contrary to some claims, the difference between “interpretation” and “construction” is not well established in common law adjudication. Furthermore, contemporary descriptions of constitutional construction tend to leave some ill-defined discretion in the hands of constitutional decision-makers. Finally, the Essay disputes the claim that constitutional construction is indispensable because the constitutional text is incomplete, that failing to provide a decision-rule for many—indeed for most—constitutional disputes. The Constitution would indeed be incomplete if interpreted according to the “new” or “public …


Uniformity In Constitutional Interpretation And The Background Right To Effective Democratic Governance, Donald L. Beschle Jun 2015

Uniformity In Constitutional Interpretation And The Background Right To Effective Democratic Governance, Donald L. Beschle

Donald L. Beschle

No abstract provided.


Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, Bertrall L. Ross Dec 2014

Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, Bertrall L. Ross

Bertrall L Ross

Administrative agencies engage in constitutionalism. They resolve questions of statutory meaning and scope that implicate constitutional questions. Even when agencies do not consciously set out to weigh in on constitutional

questions, by interpreting and applying statutes that rest on constitutional values, agencies elaborate constitutional meaning.

Should courts and theorists embrace or resist administrative

constitutionalism? For those who believe that the courts are the exclusive and final interpreters of the Constitution, it seems natural to oppose it. Thus, over the past forty years, the Supreme Court has resisted administrative constitutionalism. When agencies elaborate constitutional meaning in their interpretation of statutes, the …


The Illusory Eighth Amendment, John F. Stinneford Dec 2014

The Illusory Eighth Amendment, John F. Stinneford

John F. Stinneford

Although there is no obvious doctrinal connection between the Supreme Court’s Miranda jurisprudence and its Eighth Amendment excessive punishments jurisprudence, the two are deeply connected at the level of methodology. In both areas, the Supreme Court has been criticized for creating “prophylactic” rules that invalidate government actions because they create a mere risk of constitutional violation. In reality, however, both sets of rules deny constitutional protection to a far greater number of individuals with plausible claims of unconstitutional treatment than they protect. This dysfunctional combination of over- and underprotection arises from the Supreme Court’s use of implementation rules as a …


Lost Fidelities, Barry Cushman Nov 2013

Lost Fidelities, Barry Cushman

Barry Cushman

No abstract provided.


Linking The Questions: Judicial Supremacy As A Matter Of Constitutional Interpretation, Tabatha Abu El-Haj Dec 2011

Linking The Questions: Judicial Supremacy As A Matter Of Constitutional Interpretation, Tabatha Abu El-Haj

Tabatha Abu El-Haj

This Article explains that what has been missing from the debate between advocates of popular constitutionalism and defenders of judicial supremacy is any account of the practice of constitutional interpretation. Without a clear sense of what constitutional interpretation involves, we cannot assess the prevailing assumption that the Supreme Court is uniquely positioned to interpret the Constitution or explore an expertise-based justification for its claim to finality. The Article, therefore, revisits the debate about judicial supremacy by starting, not with history or politics, but with constitutional interpretation itself.

Having explored the practice of constitutional interpretation, it concludes that the Supreme Court …


Originalism In Practice, Lawrence Rosenthal Dec 2011

Originalism In Practice, Lawrence Rosenthal

Lawrence Rosenthal

Originalism is in ascendance. Both in judicial opinions and in the legal academy, arguments for the interpretation of the Constitution based on its original meaning are increasingly prominent. The scholarly literature to date, however, has focused on theory. Supporters and opponents debate the theoretical merits of originalism, but rarely test their views on the merits of originalism by reference to the realities of constitutional adjudication. In science, a theory gains acceptance if it makes testable predictions that are later borne out. Whatever its theoretical merit, originalism deserves recognition as genuinely distinctive and useful approach to constitutional adjudication only if, in …


I Am Textualism, Stephen Durden Dec 2010

I Am Textualism, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This essay, consisting of merely 1100 words, satirizes textualism, particularly as applied to the Constitution. Inspired by the idea of something being all things to all people in order to win converts, the essay demonstrates that because textualism has so many different definitions that it in fact has no meaning other than the meaning given by each textualist. Each textualist embraces his or her own version of textualism. Textualists battle to define true textualism. Given the different versions of textualism, each textualist faces the Textualist Conundrum. As each textualist seeks to embraceor prove a purer form of textualism the textualist …


Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules Or Predilective Tools, Stephen Durden Jan 2010

Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules Or Predilective Tools, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

Justice Scalia proclaims homage to the “dead” Constitution. Justice Brennan honors the “living” Constitution. Others believe in “a partially living and partially dead Constitution.” But, whichever moniker selected, constitutional analysis remains (to the interpreter) personal; however, personal does not necessarily mean irrational or even singular (i.e., that no one else agrees with the interpretation). Rather, personal means that no matter how narrow the interpretational method, an interpreter of the Constitution inevitably makes personal choices when using any interpretational method - choices not required by, or perhaps even inconsistent with, the chosen interpretational method. This Article uses canons of construction to …


Partial Textualism, Stephen Durden Jan 2010

Partial Textualism, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This Article seeks to demonstrate that plain meaning textualists do not apply plain meaning textualism to the entire Constitution. Instead, plain meaning textualists indulge their personal predilections and apply the doctrine of “partial textualism,” which selectively applies plain meaning textualism to only part of, rather than the entire, Constitution. Partial textualism destroys any possible fairness value to plain meaning textualism. Indeed, such an approach is entirely inconsistent with the goals of plain language textualism. Through examining the Takings Clause, this Article demonstrates that a plain meaning textualist will commonly apply plain meaning textualism to a part of the Constitution that …


Evolving Away From Evolving Standards Of Decency, John F. Stinneford Dec 2009

Evolving Away From Evolving Standards Of Decency, John F. Stinneford

John F. Stinneford

No abstract provided.


Legacy Of Slaughterhouse. Bradwell, And Cruikshank In Constitutional Interpretation, Wilson Huhn Jan 2009

Legacy Of Slaughterhouse. Bradwell, And Cruikshank In Constitutional Interpretation, Wilson Huhn

Wilson R. Huhn

The Slaughterhouse Cases, Bradwell v. Illinois, and Cruikshank v. United States, which were all decided between 1873 and 1876, were the first cases in which the Supreme Court interpreted the 14th Amendment. The reasoning and holdings of the Supreme Court in those cases have affected constitutional interpretation in ways which are both profound and unfortunate. The conclusions that the Court drew about the meaning of the 14th Amendment shortly after its adoption were contrary to the intent of the framers of that Amendment and a betrayal of the sacrifices which had been made by the people of that period. In …


Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections Are More Equal Than Others, Stephen Durden Jan 2008

Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections Are More Equal Than Others, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This Article challenges the validity of plain language textualism, an allegedly superior method of constitutional interpretation based solely on the “plain language” of the Constitution. First, this Article demonstrates that, notwithstanding the ebb and flow of support for this interpretive method, both the Supreme Court and its individual Justices often seek to “plainly” define various provisions in the Constitution. What matters most to this Article is not whether any individual “plain language” interpretation of a constitutional provision seems reasonable or even best, but rather whether the use of “plain language” is consistent with the expressed and unexpressed objectives and purposes …


Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow Dec 2007

Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow

Donald J. Kochan

Conflicts created by concurrences and pluralities in court decisions create confusion in law and lower court interpretation. Rule of law values require that individuals be able to identify controlling legal principles. That task is complicated when pluralities and concurrences contribute to the vagueness or uncertainty that leaves us wondering what the controlling rule is or attempting to predict what it will evolve to become. The rule of law is at least handicapped when continuity or confidence or confusion infuse our understanding of the applicable rules. This Article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States to …


Sign Amortization Laws: Insight Into Precedent, Property, And Public Policy, Stephen Durden Jan 2007

Sign Amortization Laws: Insight Into Precedent, Property, And Public Policy, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This Article will (1) briefly overview Takings Clause jurisprudence; (2) state a paradigmatic fact pattern; (3) review how the Takings Clause has been applied to sign amortization codes by the United States Supreme Court; (4) review paradigmatic cases from Florida courts and federal courts with Florida jurisdiction; (5) discuss the precedential value of these cases; (6) discuss Lingle and whether it requires an overturning of this precedent; and (7) discuss whether failure to overturn these cases serves the purpose of precedential jurisprudence.