Law Commons^™

Free Exercise And The Definition Of Religion: Confusion In The Federal Courts, Mark Strasser

Mark Strasser

The United States Supreme Court has sent mixed messages about what constitutes religion for free exercise purposes. The Court’s failure to offer clear criteria has resulted in widely differing interpretations in the lower courts, resulting in dissimilar treatment of relevantly similar cases. Further, some of the circuit courts employ factors to determine what qualifies as religious that are much more restrictive than the factors employed by the Court.

This article describes some of the differing approaches to defining religion offered in the circuits, noting that one of the approaches adopted across a few circuits not only mischaracterizes the Supreme Court’s …

An Essay On Christian Constitutionalism: Building In The Divine Style, For The Common Good(S), Patrick Mckinley Brennan

Patrick McKinley Brennan

Theocracy is a matter of growing global concern and therefore of renewed academic interest. This paper answers the following question: "What would a Christian constitution, in a predominantly Christian nation, look like?" The paper was prepared for presentation as the Clark Lecture at Rutgers School of Law (Camden), where papers answering the same question with respect to Jewish and Islamic constitutions and cultures, respectively, were also presented. A Christian constitution would not have as its aim the comparatively anodyne -- and ultimately futile -- business of introducing more "Judeo-Christian values" into the life of the typical nation state. The paper …

Equality, Conscience, And The Liberty Of The Church: Justifying The Controversiale Per Controversialius, Patrick Mckinley Brennan

Patrick McKinley Brennan

This paper considers the central normative claim of Martha Nussbaum’s Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality, viz., that the U.S. Constitution’s religion clauses should be construed to provide equal (and extensive) protection to the vulnerable human faculty called conscience. The paper argues that Nussbaum’s argument from Rawlsian political liberalism that leads to her normative constitutional claim amounts, perversely, to an attempt to justify the controversial by the more controversial. The paper goes on to argue that while equality and conscience are concepts that are reasonably contested, Nussbaum illegitimately gives them priority over the also reasonably …