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Full-Text Articles in Law
Why The Supreme Court Lied About Plessy, David S. Bogen
Why The Supreme Court Lied About Plessy, David S. Bogen
David S. Bogen
This article examines the citation in Plessy of a dozen cases that the Court said held racial segregation statutes in transport to be constitutional. It argues that none of those twelve cases upheld a segregation statute, but were largely decisions upholding decisions by the carrier under the common law. Justice Brown knew that the cases did not uphold segregation statutes, but he went ahead and used them to bury opposition under the weight of precedent. He knew that he was unlikely to be challenged, and he believed that the common law and the Constitution involved the same principles. The conflation …
Counsel And Confrontation, Todd E. Pettys
Counsel And Confrontation, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
Responding to the Court’s recent reworking of its confrontation jurisprudence, I argue that, under the Anglo-American common-law principles that the Confrontation Clause now incorporates, defendants are not entitled to an attorney’s assistance when interrogating witnesses prior to trial. Although the Assistance of Counsel Clause and the Due Process Clauses will pick up the slack in many cases, I contend that there are other instances in which the Constitution now leaves unrepresented defendants responsible for cross-examining witnesses on their own. I suggest that legislative reform may be necessary to ameliorate the new constitutional landscape’s deficiencies.
The Original Meaning Of The Constitution's “Executive Vesting Clause”—Evidence From Eighteenth Century Drafting Practice, Robert G. Natelson
The Original Meaning Of The Constitution's “Executive Vesting Clause”—Evidence From Eighteenth Century Drafting Practice, Robert G. Natelson
Robert G. Natelson
Advocates of presidential power from the days of George Washington at least to the time of George W. Bush have claimed that the Constitution’s so-called “Executive Vesting Clause,” the first sentence of Article II, not only designates the President as chief executive, but also confers broad authority. Some commentators support that view, while others maintain that the President’s powers are limited to those enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution. This study addresses the previously-overlooked question of which interpretation is more consistent with contemporaneous drafting customs. It concludes that treating the “Executive Vesting Clause” as a mere designation is consistent with those …
The Original Meaning Of The Privileges And Immunities Clause, Robert G. Natelson
The Original Meaning Of The Privileges And Immunities Clause, Robert G. Natelson
Robert G. Natelson
This article explains the meaning of the U.S. Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, as the Founders understood it. It explains that the terms "privileges" and "immunities" had well-understood content in 18th century law---as benefits created by government. The Clause protects states from discriminating against visitors as to the benefits of citizenship (such as access to the courts), but does not address "natural rights" such as freedom of speech and religion.
Full Faith And Credit In The Early Congress, Stephen E. Sachs
Full Faith And Credit In The Early Congress, Stephen E. Sachs
Stephen E. Sachs
After more than 200 years, the Full Faith and Credit Clause remains poorly understood. The Clause first issues a self-executing command (that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given"), and then empowers Congress to prescribe the manner of proof and the "Effect" of state records in other states. But if states must accord each other full faith and credit-and if nothing could be more than full-then what "Effect" could Congress give state records that they wouldn't have already? And conversely, how could Congress in any way reduce or alter the faith and credit that is due? This Article seeks to …
The Assault On Classical Legal Thought In Colombia (1886-1920), Jorge Gonzalez-Jacome
The Assault On Classical Legal Thought In Colombia (1886-1920), Jorge Gonzalez-Jacome
Jorge Gonzalez-Jacome
The topic of this paper is the tensions among classical legal thought (CLT) and other modes of legal thought in Colombia between 1886 and 1920. My main claim is that, during this period, CLT was attacked by a version of traditionalism and by a social-based legal thought. The former was evident in the constitutional discussions around the 1886 Colombian Constitution, while the latter became apparent in the interpretation of the Civil Code in areas such as property, contracts and torts. My goal is to tell a story that gives a sense of the fall of CLT as a process crossed …
Legacy Of Slaughterhouse. Bradwell, And Cruikshank In Constitutional Interpretation, Wilson Huhn
Legacy Of Slaughterhouse. Bradwell, And Cruikshank In Constitutional Interpretation, Wilson Huhn
Wilson R. Huhn
The Slaughterhouse Cases, Bradwell v. Illinois, and Cruikshank v. United States, which were all decided between 1873 and 1876, were the first cases in which the Supreme Court interpreted the 14th Amendment. The reasoning and holdings of the Supreme Court in those cases have affected constitutional interpretation in ways which are both profound and unfortunate. The conclusions that the Court drew about the meaning of the 14th Amendment shortly after its adoption were contrary to the intent of the framers of that Amendment and a betrayal of the sacrifices which had been made by the people of that period. In …