Law Commons^™

Solidarity Federalism, Erin F. Delaney, Ruth Mason

Notre Dame Law Review

Studies of federalism, especially in the United States, have mostly centered on state autonomy and the vertical relationship between the states and the federal government. This Article approaches federalism from a different perspective, one that focuses on state solidarity. We explain how solidarity structures found in constitutional federations—including the United States—generate solidarity obligations, such as duties not to harm other states or their citizens. These duties give rise to principles, such as nondiscrimination, that are vital to federalism. Focusing on interstate relations and relations between states and citizens of other states, we argue that affirming both solidarity and autonomy as …

The Collective Right Endures: Pre-Heller Precedent And Our Understanding Of The Modern Second Amendment, William Reach

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Prior to 2008, legal scholars who examined the Second Amendment fell roughly into two camps: those who believed “the right of the people to . . . bear arms” only covered state militias, and those who believed it extended to individual citizens.

After District of Columbia v. Heller conclusively established that the “Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms," discussion of the collective right to bear arms largely receded from public discussion and most litigation surrounding the Second Amendment shifted to define the outer edges of the individual right. But the pre-Heller showdown between these …

Legalization Without Disruption: Why Congress Should Let States Restrict Interstate Commerce In Marijuana, Scott Bloomberg, Robert A. Mikos

Pepperdine Law Review

Over the past twenty-five years, states have developed elaborate regulatory systems to govern lawful marijuana markets. In designing these systems, states have assumed that the Dormant Commerce Clause (“DCC”) does not apply; Congress, after all, has banned all commerce in marijuana. However, the states’ reprieve from the doctrine may soon come to an end. Congress is on the verge of legalizing marijuana federally, and once it does, it will unleash the DCC, with dire consequences for the states and the markets they now regulate. This Article serves as a wake-up call. It provides the most extensive analysis to date of …

A Tipping Point In Ohio: The Primacy Model As A Path To A Consistent Application Of Judicial Federalism, The Honorable Pierre Bergeron

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Enforcing Interstate Compacts In Federal Systems, Michael Osborn

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

The central goal of a federal system is for local government units to retain degrees of independence, specifically over matters of importance to that local unit. A logical corollary to that independence is the ability for local units to negotiate and contract with other local units on matters of importance. Therefore, it is not surprising that almost every federal system allows, either implicitly or explicitly, member states to form binding compacts with other states, the union government, or municipalities.1 Some federal democracies even allow member states to compact with foreign governments. Furthermore, almost every federal constitution includes a provision outlining …

Answering The Call: A History Of The Emergency Power Doctrine In Texas And The United States, P. Elise Mclaren

St. Mary's Law Journal

During times of emergency, national and local government may be allowed to take otherwise impermissible action in the interest of health, safety, or national security. The prerequisites and limits to this power, however, are altogether unknown. Like the crises they aim to deflect, courts’ modern emergency power doctrines range from outright denial of any power of constitutional circumvention to their flagrant use. Concededly, courts’ approval of emergency powers has provided national and local government opportunities to quickly respond to emergency without pause for constituency approval, but how can one be sure the availability of autocratic power will not be abused? …

Recovering The Lost General Welfare Clause, David S. Schwartz

William & Mary Law Review

The General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution enumerates a power to “provide for the common defense and general welfare.” A literal interpretation of this clause (“the general welfare interpretation”) would authorize Congress to legislate for any national purpose, and therefore to address all national problems— for example, the COVID-19 pandemic—in ways that would be precluded under the prevailing understanding of limited enumerated powers. But conventional doctrine rejects the general welfare interpretation and construes the General Welfare Clause to confer the so-called “Spending Power,” a power only to spend, but not to regulate, for …