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The Constitution's Accommodation Of Social Change, Philip A. Hamburger
The Constitution's Accommodation Of Social Change, Philip A. Hamburger
Michigan Law Review
Did the framers and ratifiers of the United States Constitution think that changes in American society would require changes in the text or interpretation of the Constitution? If those who created the Constitution understood or even anticipated the possibility of major social alterations, how did they expect constitutional law - text and interpretation - to accommodate such developments?
The effect of social change upon constitutional law was an issue the framers and ratifiers frequently discussed. For example, when AntiFederalists complained of the Constitution's failure to protect the jury trial in civil cases, Federalists responded that a change of circumstances might, …
"Let Congress Do It": The Case For An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall
"Let Congress Do It": The Case For An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall
Michigan Law Review
The sporadic way that various members of the Supreme Court and the legal community treat the principle of stare decisis is increasingly striking. At times, the rule of stare decisis appears to be trotted out in defense of decisions that were actually reached on quite independent grounds. At other times, the dictates of the rule appear to be casually ignored when other factors call for the overruling of a precedent. It is tempting, therefore, to dismiss the rule of stare decisis as a mere rhetorical device, much like the question of whether a Supreme Court nominee's judicial philosophy is an …
Principles, Politics, And Constitutional Law, Mark Tushnet
Principles, Politics, And Constitutional Law, Mark Tushnet
Michigan Law Review
The contrast in Senator Thurmond's performance in hearings concerning Judge Bork, whose nomination he supported, and Justice Marshall, whose nomination he opposed, suggests the apparently cynical view that one's position on the proper scope of senatorial inquiry during a nomination depends upon one's position on the merits of the nomination. Much has been written, usually provoked by controversial nominations, about the proper scope of senatorial inquiry. The press of immediate controversy, however, diverts attention from more fundamental issues about the nature of constitutional government, to which I devote this essay.