Law Commons^™

The Man Behind The Torture, David Cole

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

No abstract provided.

The Defense Of Torture, David Luban

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

No abstract provided.

Why Preemption Proponents Are Wrong, Brian Wolfman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The basic idea of federal preemption is easily stated: It is a constitutionally mandated principle that demands that federal law trumps state law when the two conflict or in the rare instances when a federal law is so comprehensive that there’s no role left for state law to fill. But in practice, courts have often had difficulty applying the principle.

For plaintiff lawyers, preemption is an ever-present worry. When your client has been injured by a defective car, truck, medical device, boat, tobacco product, pesticide, or mislabeled drug, or has been victimized by a bank or other lending institution, the …

What’S International Law Got To Do With It? Transnational Law And The Intelligence Mission, James E. Baker

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The United States faces an immediate and continuous threat of terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. The intelligence function and national security law, including international law--or more accurately transnational law--are central to addressing this threat. Indeed, international law is more relevant today in addressing this threat than it was before September 11. Part II of this article describes a continuum of contemporary threats to U.S. national security, with a focus on nonstate terrorism. Part III addresses the role of intelligence and national security law, and in particular law addressed to process, in combating these threats. Part …

Originalism And The Natural Born Citizen Clause, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The enigmatic phrase "natural born citizen" poses a series of problems for contemporary originalism. New originalists, like Justice Scalia, focus on the public meaning of the constitutional text, but the notion of a "natural born citizen" was likely a term of art, derived from the idea of a "natural born subject" in English law--a category that most likely did not extend to persons, like John McCain, who were born outside sovereign territory. But the constitution speaks of "citizens" and not "subjects," introducing uncertainties and ambiguities that might (or might not) make McCain eligible for the presidency.

What was the original …

National Security And Environmental Laws: A Clear And Present Danger?, Hope M. Babcock

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Without question, life in the United States has changed significantly since September 11, 2001. The attacks launched from within the United States in broad daylight against non-military targets and innocent civilians, followed by the intentional dispersal of the biological agent anthrax, ushered in an era of uncertainty and fear in this country unlike any in recent memory. The visible manifestations of this fear are still with us--concrete barriers and the closing of public spaces around public buildings, heightened security at airports and train stations subjecting people to invasive searches of their persons and belongings, the sudden, seemingly random appearance of …

Corporations And Commercial Speech, Ronald Collins, Mark Lopez, Tamara Piety, David C. Vladeck

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Even though we are discussing a case that was not decided on the merits, Nike v. Kasky is an important case because it crystallizes two of the essential critiques about the commercial speech doctrine, critiques that have run through this doctrine from before its advent in 1976 to today. The fundamental debate Nike triggered over what constitutes "commercial speech" and how strictly commercial speech should be regulated is still being played out - not just in the academy, but also in the courts on a day-to-day basis. So this is a timely and important topic.

It Depends On What The Meaning Of "False" Is: Falsity And Misleadingness In Commercial Speech Doctrine, Rebecca Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

While scholarship regarding the Supreme Court's noncommercial speech doctrine has often focused on the level of protection for truthful, non-misleading commercial speech, scholars have paid little attention to the exclusion of false or misleading commercial speech from all First Amendment protection. Examining the underpinnings of the false and misleading speech exclusion illuminates the practical difficulties that abolishing the commercial speech doctrine would pose. Through a series of fact patterns in trademark and false advertising cases, this piece demonstrates that defining what is false or misleading is often debatable. If commercial speech were given First Amendment protection, consumer protection and First …

Domain And Forum: Public Space, Public Freedom, Rebecca Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The particular problems of content and viewpoint discrimination rarely surface in copyright, though some people have argued that fair use implicates them. Nonetheless, one important lesson for copyright from public forum doctrine is that First Amendment law can take some - though not many - speech-related options off the table. In this brief comment, I argue that analogies between copyright law and public forum doctrine highlight important shared commitments to free and robust public discourse, but also substantial practical barriers to judicial enforcement of those commitments.

The Federal “Claim” In The District Courts: Osborn, Verlinden, And Protective Jurisdiction, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In the title of his influential article, “The Federal ‘Question’ in the District Courts,” Professor Paul Mishkin reminded us that the phrase “federal question” is a misnomer as a description of the “arising under” jurisdiction of the district courts. The purpose of the “arising under” jurisdiction of the district courts is not solely, or even primarily, to resolve disputed questions of federal law, but to provide a hospitable forum for the vindication of federal rights. Such rights can be frustrated by an inhospitable forum not just through the misinterpretation of federal law, but through misinterpretation of state law or through …

Process Theory, Majoritarianism, And The Original Understanding, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Radicals in Robes, Cass Sunstein posits that there are four primary approaches to constitutional interpretation: perfectionism, majoritarianism, minimalism, and fundamentalism.' The purpose of his eloquent and compelling book is twofold: Sunstein argues for minimalism, an approach that he contends makes most sense for America today; and with even greater force, Sunstein argues against fundamentalism, which he finds "wrong, dangerous, radical, and occasionally hypocritical."' The "Radicals in Robes" who are the targets of Sunstein's book are judges who embrace fundamentalism, which, in his view, embodies "the views of the extreme wing of [the] Republican Party."'

In Securing Constitutional Democracy: The …

Trademark Law As Commercial Speech Regulations, Rebecca Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

False advertising law has largely escaped constitutional scrutiny because courts consider false or misleading commercial speech outside the protection of the First Amendment. Even moderate First Amendment protection for truthful commercial speech, however, requires some constitutional policing of the line between truth and falsity. Current enforcement of false advertising law, whether administrative, as with the FDA's regulation of drug-related speech, or judicial, as with Lanham Act suits brought by private parties, is ill-equipped to deal with First Amendment doctrine's very different concerns, rules, and presumptions. This contribution to the symposium will explore some of the ways in which the First …

Original Understanding And The Whether, Why, And How Of Judicial Review, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

For more than one hundred years, legal scholars have endlessly and heatedly debated whether judicial review of federal legislation was part of the original understanding of the Constitution. The stakes of the debate are high. If judicial review was part of the original understanding, then there is a strong argument that the practice is grounded in the majority’s will, just as the Founders’ Constitution is. But if it is not—if, as Alexander Bickel and others have claimed, judicial review was a sleight-of-hand creation of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison—then judicial review is either counter-majoritarian or else must …

Underlying Principles, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In his forthcoming article, Original Meaning and Abortion, Jack Balkin makes the startling disclosure that he is now an originalist. "[C]onstitutional interpretation," he writes, "requires fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text. The task of interpretation is to look to original meaning and underlying principle and decide how best to apply them in current circumstances. I call this the method of text and principle."

In this brief reply, the author cautions that, to remain faithful to the Constitution when referring to underlying principles, we must never forget it is a text …

Due Process Land Use Claims After Lingle, J. Peter Byrne

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Supreme Court held in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. that challenges to the validity of land use regulations for failing to advance governmental interests must be brought under the Due Process Clause, rather than the Takings Clause, and must be evaluated under a deferential standard. This Article analyzes and evaluates the probable course of such judicial review, and concludes that federal courts will resist due process review of land use decisions for good reasons but not always with an adequate doctrinal explanation. However, state courts can use due process review to provide state level supervision of local land use …

Why The Customer Isn’T Always Right: Producer-Based Limits On Rights Accretion In Trademark, Rebecca Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this article the author responds to James Gibson’s article Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, which offers valuable insights into the extra-judicial dynamics that have contributed to the seemingly unending expansion of copyright and trademark rights over the past few decades. Her response focuses on the trademark side of that expansion. The theoretical basis for granting trademark rights is that, if consumers perceive that a mark or other symbol indicates that a single source is responsible for a product or service—whether through physical production, licensing, sponsorship, or other approval—then the law should give effect to …

Affirmative Inaction, Girardeau A. Spann

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Perhaps the most exasperating aspect of racial discrimination in the United States is the self-righteous manner in which it is practiced. After a history of facilitating white exploitation of minority interests, the Supreme Court intimated in Grutter v. Bollinger that time was running out for racial minorities to take advantage of the opportunities for equality that the culture has offered in the form of affirmative action. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion seemed to say that in another twenty-five years, the Court would cease to tolerate such special favors for racial minorities, thereby leaving minorities only a limited amount of time remaining …

Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, And The Case Of Amar's Bill Of Rights, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Championed on the Supreme Court by Justices Scalia and Thomas and championed in academia most prominently by Professor Akhil Amar, textualism has in the past twenty years emerged as a leading school of constitutional interpretation. Textualists argue that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with its original public meaning and, in seeking that meaning, they closely parse the Constitution's words and grammar and the placement of clauses in the document. They have assumed that this close parsing recaptures original meaning, but, perhaps because it seems obviously correct, that assumption has neither been defended nor challenged. This article uses Professor …