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High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, And The First Amendment, Alan K. Chen, Justin Marceau
High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, And The First Amendment, Alan K. Chen, Justin Marceau
Vanderbilt Law Review
Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment. It is beyond question that some lies-such as perjury and fraud-are simply not covered by the Constitution's free speech clause.' But it is equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about military honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection. Until very recently, however, it has been taken for granted in Supreme Court doctrine and academic writing that any constitutional protection for lies is purely prophylactic-it provides protection to the truth-speaker by also incidentally protecting the liar. What remains unresolved is whether other rationales might also justify First Amendment protection for …
Original Meaning And The Precedent Fallback, Randy J. Kozel
Original Meaning And The Precedent Fallback, Randy J. Kozel
Vanderbilt Law Review
There is longstanding tension between originalism and judicial precedent. With its resolute focus on deciphering the enacted Constitution, the originalist methodology raises questions about whether judges can legitimately defer to their own pronouncements. Numerous scholars have responded by debating whether and when the Constitution's original meaning should yield to contrary precedent. This Article considers the role of judicial precedent not when it conflicts with the Constitution's original meaning but rather when the consultation of text and historical evidence is insufficient to resolve a case. In those situations, deference to precedent can serve as a fallback rule of constitutional adjudication. The …
Statutory Interpretations And The Therapy Of The Obvious, Edward L. Rubin
Statutory Interpretations And The Therapy Of The Obvious, Edward L. Rubin
Vanderbilt Law Review
Arthur Koestler wrote that "the more original a discovery the more obvious it seems afterward."' The same may be said about theories of law, and specifically about Robert Katzmann's new book, Judging Statutes. Judge Katzmann's approach to statutory interpretation seems so plausible and balanced that it is hard to believe that anyone ever believed anything else. In this particular case, however, there is in fact an "anything else." It is, of course, Justice Antonin Scalia's campaign to displace intentionalist or purposivist approaches to interpretation with what has come to be called "textualism," and his related effort to rule out reliance …