Law Commons^™

Insubstantial Questions And Federal Jurisdiction: A Footnote To The Term-Limits Debate, Jonathan L. Entin

Nevada Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Federalism And The Protection Of Rights: The Modern Ninth Amendment’S Spreading Confusion, Thomas B. Mcaffee

Scholarly Works

Blindness to a basic understanding of the framers' design of our federal structure is largely responsible for the confusion that surrounds our understanding of the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment reads: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justices Black and Stewart explained in separate dissenting opinions that the Ninth Amendment's reference to the other rights “retained by the people” alluded to the collective and individual rights the people “retained” by virtue of granting limited, enumerated powers to the national government. …

Taking Liberties With The First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, And The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Jay S. Bybee

Scholarly Works

In 1993 Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which provided that government, including the United States and the states, “shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” except where the government can demonstrate that the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and is “the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.”

Unfortunately, whatever consistency RFRA might bring to the substance of church-state relations comes at the expense of clarity in federal-state relations. This is unfortunate because the First Amendment does not address church-state relations; it concerns …

Advising The President: Separation Of Powers And The Federal Advisory Committee Act, Jay S. Bybee

Scholarly Works

This Article examines the tensions between Congress, the judiciary, and the President over presidential use of advisory committees. It argues that courts, in attempting to avoid difficult constitutional questions, have misread the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”). Properly construed, FACA violates separation of powers by limiting the terms on which the President can acquire information from nongovernmental advisory committees.

The author argues that the President does have the power to consult with outside advisers, and that FACA unconstitutionally infringes upon that power. FACA fails to draw a distinction between congressionally created advisory committees and presidentially created advisory committees, and assumes …