Law Commons^™

Misreading And Mobility In Constitutional Texts: A Nineteenth Century Case, Iza Hussin

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This article explores the case of the adoption of Southeast Asia's first constitution (Johor, 1895) to articulate a fundamental problem of translation-the ambiguity and multiplicity of law's language. Closer attention to this problem helps raise a number of possibilities for rethinking the relationship between law, language, and mobility: firstly, polyphony, dissonance, and divergence in law's language reveals a plethora of political possibilities, audiences, and actors in the making of law; secondly, these ambiguities and multiplicities are integral to law's mobility; thirdly, rather than transmissions of law from center to periphery, law moves in circulations that are iterative, contingent, and patterned. …

The False Promise Of The Converse-1983 Action, John F. Preis

Indiana Law Journal

The federal government is out of control. At least that’s what many states will tell you. Not only is the federal government passing patently unconstitutional legislation, but its street-level officers are ignoring citizens’ constitutional rights. How can states stop this federal juggernaut? Many are advocating a “repeal amendment,” whereby two-thirds of the states could vote to repeal federal legislation. But the repeal amendment will only address unconstitutional legislation, not unconstitutional actions. States can’t repeal a stop-and-frisk that occurred last Thursday. States might, however, enact a so-called “converse-1983” action. The idea for converse-1983 laws has been around for some time but …

Signing Unconstitutional Laws, William Baude

Indiana Law Journal

It has become fairly common for Presidents to sign laws that they think are unconstitutional, at least in part. Some scholars argue that this is unconstitutional. Others defend it, but on pragmatic grounds, as if one cannot afford to be a constitutional formalist in today’s government.

Both sides are wrong. In a wide range of cases, there is nothing wrong with signing unconstitutional laws. Indeed, it is required. Yet the President must exercise this power responsibly. He must have other constitutional duties that justify signing the remainder of the bill into law, and he must be prepared to use his …

The Future Of Section 2 Of The Voting Rights Act In The Hands Of A Conservative Court, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This Essay argues that the future of the majority-minority district is in peril, as a conservative majority on the Court stands poised to strike down section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. When the Court takes up the constitutionality of Section 2, binding precedent will play a secondary role at best. Instead, the Justices’ policy goals and ideological preferences - namely, their personal disdain for the use of race in public life - will guide the Court’s conclusion. In this vein, Justice Kennedy holds the fate of the Act in his hands. To be clear, this Essay is not trying …

Legislating The Tower Of Babel: International Restrictions On Internet Content And The Marketplace Of Ideas, Michael F. Sutton

Federal Communications Law Journal

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the expression of diverse viewpoints in virtually any medium. Nevertheless, the modern novelty of "borderless" communication via the Internet strains our ideal of keeping government out of the business of regulating speech. This Note reveals the conflict between the First Amendment's national protections and the Internet's lack of national boundaries, while also arguing for international intervention for the protection of free speech. This Author articulates the real danger of "watered-down speech" unless both the FCC and the international community provide regulations and harmonized international standards for online content that reflect First Amendment …

The Dynamic Judicial Opinion, William D. Popkin

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Eskridge's article on Dynamic Statutory Interpretation advances an aggressively pragmatic theory of interpretation but has had more influence among academics than judges because of a failure to attend to the problems of writing a candid, pragmatic and dynamic judicial opinion. This article argues that, although not free from doubt, a candid judicial opinion is preferable, and discusses how to write such an opinion - suggesting that judges rely on the "intent of the statute," not legislative intent; and adopt a personal/exploratory style in presenting their views.

Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, And The Constitution, Daniel J. Meltzer

Indiana Law Journal

Symposium: Paul Bator: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III

Constitutional Limitations On Legislative Procedure In West Virginia, Frank Edward Horack Jr.

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.