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Full-Text Articles in Law
In Search Of A Substantive Republic, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain
In Search Of A Substantive Republic, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain
Faculty Scholarship
The publication of Michael J. Sandel's Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy is a long-awaited and important event in political and constitutional theory. In 1982, through his first book, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,1 Sandel emerged as a leading communitarian or civic republican critic of liberalism. That book became prominent, not because its criticisms of liberalism were dispositive, but because it eloquently and elegantly captured discontent with liberalism and evoked yearnings for an alternative. Since then, Sandel has occupied a position on the American intellectual landscape as a placeholder for a *510 communitarian or civic …
On Reading Recipes -- And Constitutions, Gary S. Lawson
On Reading Recipes -- And Constitutions, Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
Modem theories of constitutional interpretation typically make the truth of propositions about constitutional meaning depend, at least to some degree, on the extent to which those propositions (1) lead to politically legitimate results' and/or (2) cohere with modem constitutional practice.2 That is, such theories generally maintain that correct interpretations of the Constitution must provide normative grounds to apply those interpretations in real cases, must be consistent with at least a substantial amount of real-world constitutional decisionmaking, or both.
Original Meaning Without Originalism, James E. Fleming
Original Meaning Without Originalism, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
Is it possible for a constitutional theorist to give due regard to original meaning in constitutional interpretation without being an originalist? Narrow originalists, such as Robert H. Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia, have asserted that it is not.' On their view, it is hypocritical for anyone who is not a narrow originalist to make recourse to original meaning-a clear case of the devil quoting scripture. Their view is bogus. Nevertheless, constitutional theorists who are not narrow originalists have not paid sufficient attention to how arguments based on original meaning function in constitutional law. One of the many virtues of Michael …
Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution, James E. Fleming
Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
What is the question of fidelity a question about? The topic of our Symposium, "Fidelity in Constitutional Theory," raises two fundamental questions: Fidelity to what? and What is fidelity? The short answer to the first-fidelity to the Constitution-poses a further question: What is the Constitution? For example, does the Fourteenth Amendment embody abstract moral principles or enact relatively concrete historical rules? And does the Constitution presuppose a political theory of majoritarian democracy or one of constitutional democracy? The short answer to the second-being faithful to the Constitution in interpreting it-leads to another question: How should the Constitution be interpreted?' Does …
Common Law Elements Of The Section 1983 Action, Jack M. Beermann
Common Law Elements Of The Section 1983 Action, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the role of the common law in Supreme Court interpretation and application of § 1983, which grants a cause of action for violations of constitutional rights committed "under color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage."' I argue that the common law has served primarily to narrow the reach of § 1983, and that this is inappropriate in light of the broad statutory language and the absence of good evidence that the enacting Congress intended a narrower application than the statutory language indicates.
A Worthy Champion For Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The United States In Parens Patriae, Larry Yackle
A Worthy Champion For Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The United States In Parens Patriae, Larry Yackle
Faculty Scholarship
When the Clinton Administration announced its intention to challenge Proposition 209, the new prohibition on affirmative action in California, the Justice Department declined to say whether the United States would formally intervene in the lawsuit already under way or merely file an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs. Casual observers may have assumed that the Administration considered the form of its participation to raise further political and strategic considerations. That was undoubtedly true. It was also true, however, that Justice Department lawyers faced a legal question as well. According to the precedents on point, the United States required an authorizing statute …