Law Commons^™

Recovering The Tort Remedy For Federal Official Wrongdoing, Gregory Sisk

Notre Dame Law Review

As the Supreme Court weakens the Bivens constitutional tort cause of action and federal officers avoid liability for unlawful behavior through qualified immunity, we should recollect the merit of the common-law tort remedy for holding the federal government accountable for official wrongdoing. For more than a century after ratification of the Constitution, federal officers who trespassed on the rights of American citizens could be held personally liable under common-law tort theories, but then routinely were indemnified by the government.

The modern Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) roughly replicates the original regime for official wrongdoing by imposing liability directly on the …

The Inconsistent Originalism Of Judge-Made Remedies Against Federal Officers, Stephen I. Vladeck

Notre Dame Law Review

Professor Carlos V´azquez and I have explained in depth why the Supreme Court’s evisceration of damages remedies for constitutional violations by federal officers is analytically and historically incoherent. And I have written elsewhere about the extent to which modern constitutional remedies doctrine has turned a remarkably blind eye to foundational principles of federalism—paying little more than lip service to the robust availability of common-law damages (and habeas) remedies against federal officers in state courts from the Founding through the Civil War—and, at least for damages, well into the twentieth century. I don’t mean to rehash (or relitigate) either argument here. …

Judicial Autonomy V. Executive Authority: Which Prevails In The Case Of A Postcommutation Collateral Attack?, Vincent A. Marrazzo

Notre Dame Law Review

An inmate with a commuted sentence will sometimes collaterally attack his already commuted sentence. This raises the question: Does an act of executive clemency divest the courts of authority to hear the collateral attack? In other words, does clemency moot the issues involved in the collateral attack? While multiple circuit courts have weighed in on this question, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have developed the most robust discussions, disagreeing about whether federal courts may hear these cases. The Fourth Circuit has held that a collateral attack postcommutation is moot as the “President’s commutation order simply closes the judicial door.” In …

Lessons For Bivens And Qualified Immunity Debates From Nineteenth-Century Damages Litigation Against Federal Officers, Andrew Kent

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay was written for a symposium marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. As the current Court has turned against Bivens—seemingly confining it to three specific contexts created by Bivens and two follow-on decisions in 1979 and 1980—scholars and litigants have developed a set of claims to respond to the Court’s critique. The Court now views the judicially created Bivens cause of action and remedy as a separation-of-powers foul; Congress is said to be the institution which should weigh the costs and benefits …

Going Rogue: The Supreme Court's Newfound Hostility To Policy-Based Bivens Claims, Joanna C. Schwartz, Alexander Reinert, James E. Pfander

Notre Dame Law Review

In Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), the Supreme Court held that a proposed Bivens remedy was subject to an exacting special factors analysis when the claim arises in a “new context.” In Ziglar itself, the Court found the context of the plaintiffs’ claims to be “new” because, in the Court’s view, they challenged “large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions of confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners.” Bivens claims for damages caused by unconstitutional policies, the Court suggested, were inappropriate.

This Essay critically examines the Ziglar Court’s newfound hostility to policy-based Bivens claims. We show that an …

Was Bivens Necessary?, Ann Woolhandler, Michael G. Collins

Notre Dame Law Review

Some federal common-law skeptics have provided criteria for keeping federal common law in check. Although not specifically addressing Bivensactions, Professor Nelson has argued that when engaged in federal common lawmaking, federal courts should see themselves as more tied to custom, general principles of the common law, and precedent, rather than seeing themselves as engaged in a freewheeling search for the best policy. This methodology makes federal common law less subject to criticism as usurping the lawmaking roles of other government actors. Professor Merrill has argued that federal common law needs to be specifically intended by the framers of a …

Bivens And The Ancien Régime, Carlos M. Vázquez

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay considers the relevance for Bivens claims of the Court’s shift to a nouveau régime to address the implication of private rights of action under statutes. Part I describes and assesses the Court’s reasons for shifting to the nouveau régime in the statutory context. Part II explains why the Court’s shift to a nouveau régime for implying damage remedies under federal statutes does not justify a similar shift with respect to constitutional remedies. The Constitution’s omission of specific remedies for violation of the Constitution’s substantive provisions does not reflect the Founders’ belief that such remedies are unnecessary to give …

Stare Decisis As Authority And Aspiration, Randy J. Kozel

Notre Dame Law Review

The doctrine of stare decisis remains a defining feature of American law despite challenges to its legitimacy and efficacy. Even so, there is space between the role that stare decisis currently plays and the potential that it offers. The gap is evident in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. Though the Justices continue to underscore the fundamental status of stare decisis, the Court’s opinions sometimes seem quick to depart from precedents whose reasoning has fallen out of favor.

Using Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents as a case study, this Article explains how the Court can invigorate the doctrine …

A Scapegoat Theory Of Bivens, Katherine M. Crocker

Notre Dame Law Review

Some scapegoats are innocent. Some warrant blame, but not the amount they are made to bear. Either way, scapegoating can allow in-groups to sidestep social problems by casting blame onto out-groups instead of confronting such problems—and the in-groups’ complicity in perpetuating them—directly.

This Essay suggests that it may be productive to view the Bivens regime’s rise as countering various exercises in scapegoating and its retrenchment as constituting an exercise in scapegoating. The earlier cases can be seen as responding to social structures that have scapegoated racial, economic, and other groups through overaggressive policing, mass incarceration, and inequitable government conduct more …

The Compensation Constraint And The Scope Of The Takings Clause, Thomas W. Merrill

Notre Dame Law Review

The idea I wish to explore in this Essay is whether the established methods for determining just compensation can shed light on the meaning of other issues that arise in litigation under the Takings Clause. Specifically, is it possible to “reverse engineer” the Takings Clause by reasoning from settled understandings about how to determine just compensation in order to reach certain conclusions about when the Clause applies, what interests in private property are covered by the Clause, and what does it mean to take such property? The proposed exercise is positive or descriptive in nature rather than normative. The hypothesis …

Who Has The Right?: Analysis Of Second Amendment Challenges To 18 U.S.C. § 922(G)(4), Alexandra T. Cline

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note argues that courts should decide challenges to § 922(g)(4) solely under the first step of the test, based on the notion that individuals subject to § 922(g)(4) fall outside the scope of Second Amendment protection. Thus, under the two-part test, the law would not burden conduct protected by the Amendment, rendering step two unnecessary for at least the vast majority of § 922(g)(4) challenges. This Note provides three independent ways in which courts could deem § 922(g)(4) outside the purview of the Second Amendment, and each should be considered a permissible approach.

The first Part of this Note …

Valuation Blunders In The Law Of Eminent Domain, Richard A. Epstein

Notre Dame Law Review

In dealing with the valuation problem, I will bracket these estimation issues in order to look to different and disturbing types of difficulties in the valuation enterprise. The law of eminent domain starts with the implicit assumption that the government is in general a good actor whose motives and laudable and whose behavior does not need excessive judicial oversight. Hence the general norm of judicial deference often applies to valuation decisions. In the cases that I shall review, as well as others, a general pattern emerges, whereby all doubtful valuation questions that arise dealing with key problems are at best …

The Catholic Church And The Paycheck Protection Program: Assessing Nondiscrimination After Trinity Lutheran And Espinoza, Elizabeth Totzke

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note argues the inclusion of houses of worship and the subsequent dispersal of PPP funds to the Catholic Church was explicitly constitutional. Applying the lens of the Supreme Court’s recently announced nondiscrimination principle, this Note considers the ramifications of the SBA’s official policy and explores the constitutional justification for the SBA’s ad hoc PPP policy. In fact, under the nondiscrimination principle, this Note concludes that the SBA’s policy shift was not just constitutionally permissible, but probably constitutionally required.

The Power Of Interpretation: Minimizing The Construction Zone, John O. Mcginnis, Michael B. Rappaport

Notre Dame Law Review

One of the most important conceptual innovations within modern originalism is the distinction between a zone of interpretation and a zone of construction. When constitutional provisions have a determinate meaning, decisions find that meaning occurs within the interpretation zone. But when the original meaning of a constitutional provision is indeterminate, decisions are based on something other than the original meaning and occur within the construction zone.

This Article represents the first sustained challenge to the importance of the distinction. It argues that a variety of techniques enhance the power of interpretation to resolve uncertainties and thus greatly reduce the size …