Law Commons^™

The Dialectic Of Obscenity, Brian L. Frye

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Until the 1960s, pornography was obscene, and obscenity prosecutions were relatively common. And until the 1970s, obscenity prosecutions targeted art, as well as pornography. But today, obscenity prosecutions are rare and limited to the most extreme forms of pornography.

So why did obscenity largely disappear? The conventional history of obscenity is doctrinal, holding that the Supreme Court’s redefinition of obscenity in order to protect art inevitably required the protection of pornography as well. In other words, art and literature were the vanguard of pornography.

But the conventional history of obscenity is incomplete. While it accounts for the development of obscenity …

The “New” Presumption Against Preemption, Mary J. Davis

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Is there or isn't there a “presumption against preemption”? The Supreme Court continues to mention it, but then does, or does not, apply it in a way that helps us understand what it is. This Article explores the Court's preemption opinions in the last several decades, particularly its most recent pronouncements, and concludes that, indeed, there is a presumption against preemption. It is a "new" presumption in the sense that it is born of the Court's active preemption docket in the last two decades, which has more narrowly defined both express and implied preemption analysis. The "new" presumption is stronger …

Resorting To External Norms And Principles In Constitutional Decision-Making, Alvin L. Goldman

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Given the very significant role of constitutional law in the American political system and the fact that Supreme Court Justices are appointed through a political process, it is understandable that the appropriate judicial approach to resolving constitutional issues often is the subject of political commentary. Unfortunately, discourse by politicians concerning this issue seldom rises to the deserved level of wisdom. One of President George W. Bush's public mantras is illustrative of political commentary respecting federal judicial appointments: "I'm going to put strict constructionists on the bench." On its face, and as understood by politically naive audiences, the statement appears to …

Choice Programs And Market-Based Separationism, Paul E. Salamanca

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris appears to clear the way for a wide variety of educational and charitable choice plans. In this decision, the Court upheld against Establishment Cause Challenge a formally neutral school choice program that encompassed a wide variety of options in the public and private sector, including private sectarian schools. The Court reasoned that, when the government makes aid available to a broad class of recipients without regard to their religious or non-religious affiliation, and when the recipients have a genuine choice as to whether to obtain that aid from a religious or …

At Loggerheads: The Supreme Court And Racial Equality In Public School Education After Missouri V. Jenkins, Roberta M. Harding

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

June 12th of 1995 marked a somber occasion in the annals of school desegregation litigation. On that day, the United States Supreme Court sent disturbing messages in its opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins. The Court's decision hinders achievement of the objective of school desegregation litigation—providing equal educational opportunities for African-American public school children—and detrimentally impacts other substantive areas of civil rights litigation. This article examines what I believe are several important general consequences of Jenkins's the impairment of a trial judge's discretionary equitable remedial powers; the Court's establishment of a new agenda that sacrifices the interests of African-American …

"I Vote This Way Because I'M Wrong": The Supreme Court Justice As Epimenides, John M. Rogers

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Possibly the most unsettling phenomenon in the Supreme Court's 1988 term was Justice White's decision to vote contrary to his own exhaustively stated reasoning in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. His unexplained decision to vote against the result of his own analysis lends support to those who argue that law, or at least constitutional law, is fundamentally indeterminate. Proponents of the indeterminacy argument sometimes base their position on the allegedly inescapable inconsistency of decisions made by a multi-member court. There is an answer to the inconsistency argument, but it founders if justices sometimes vote, without explanation, on the basis of …