Law Commons^™

Possible Reliance: Protecting Legally Innocent Johnson Claimants, Keagan Potts

Michigan Law Review

The writ of habeas corpus presents the last chance for innocent defendants to obtain relief from invalid convictions and sentences. The writ constitutes a limited exception to the finality of judgments. Given the role finality plays in conserving judicial resources and deterring criminal conduct, exceptions created by habeas must be principally circumscribed. Since the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause in Johnson v. United States, the federal courts of appeals have attempted to develop a test that protects the writ from abuse by Johnson claimants.

This Note first contributes a new understanding of the …

Segregation In The Galleries: A Reconsideration, Richard Primus

Michigan Law Review Online

When constitutional lawyers talk about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to questions of race, they often men-tion that the spectators’ galleries in Congress were racially segregated when Congress debated the Amendment.1 If the Thirty-Ninth Congress practiced racial segregation, the thinking goes, then it probably did not mean to prohibit racial segregation.2 As an argument about constitutional interpretation, this line of thinking has both strengths and weaknesses. But this brief Essay is not about the interpretive consequences, if any, of segregation in the congressional galleries during the 1860s. It is about the factual claim that the galleries …

Restoring Congress's Role In The Modern Administrative State, Christopher J. Walker

Michigan Law Review

A review of Josh Chafetzm Congress's Constitution: Legislative Authority and Separation of Powers.

"The Essential Characteristic": Enumerated Powers And The Bank Of The United States, Richard Primus

Michigan Law Review

The idea that Congress can legislate only on the basis of its enumerated powers is an orthodox proposition of constitutional law, one that is generally supposed to have been recognized as essential ever since the Founding. Conventional understandings of several episodes in constitutional history reinforce this proposition. But the reality of many of those events is more complicated. Consider the 1791 debate over creating the Bank of the United States, in which Madison famously argued against the Bank on enumerated-powers grounds. The conventional memory of the Bank episode reinforces the sense that the orthodox view of enumerated powers has been …

Shedding Light On The "Going Dark" Problem And The Encryption Debate, John Mylan Traylor

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In an effort to protect the enormous volume of sensitive and valuable data that travels across the Internet and is stored on personal devices, private companies have created encryption software to secure data from criminals, hackers, and terrorists who wish to steal it. The greatest benefit of encryption also creates the biggest problem: Encryption software has become so secure that often not even the government can bypass it. The “Going Dark” problem—a scenario in which the government has obtained the legal authority to search a suspected criminal’s encrypted device but lacks the technical ability to do so—is becoming increasingly common. …

Why Enumeration Matters, Richard A. Primus

Michigan Law Review

The maxim that the federal government is a government of enumerated powers can be understood as a “continuity tender”: not a principle with practical consequences for governance, but a ritual statement with which practitioners identify themselves with a history from which they descend. This interpretation makes sense of the longstanding paradox whereby courts recite the enumeration principle but give it virtually no practical effect. On this understanding, the enumerated-powers maxim is analogous to the clause that Parliament still uses to open enacted statutes: “Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty.” That text might imply that the Queen is …

Congress And The Reconstruction Of Foreign Affairs Federalism, Ryan Baasch, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash

Michigan Law Review

Though the Constitution conspicuously bars some state involvement in foreign affairs, the states clearly retain some authority in foreign affairs. Correctly supposing that state participation may unnecessarily complicate or embarrass our nation’s foreign relations, the Supreme Court has embraced aggressive preemption doctrines that sporadically oust the states from discrete areas in foreign affairs. These doctrines are unprincipled, supply little guidance, and generate capricious results. Fortunately, there is a better way. While the Constitution permits the states a limited and continuing role, it never goes so far as guaranteeing them any foreign affairs authority. Furthermore, the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact …

The Sweeping Domestic War Powers Of Congress, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash

Michigan Law Review

With the Habeas Clause standing as a curious exception, the Constitution seems mysteriously mute regarding federal authority during invasions and rebellions. In truth, the Constitution speaks volumes about these domestic wars. The inability to perceive the contours of the domestic wartime Constitution stems, in part, from unfamiliarity with the multifarious emergency legislation enacted during the Revolutionary War. During that war, state and national legislatures authorized the seizure of property, military trial of civilians, and temporary dictatorships. Ratified against the backdrop of these fairly recent wartime measures, the Constitution, via the Necessary and Proper Clause and other provisions, rather clearly augmented …

A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congressional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-ofpowers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks standing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors. Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant information, casting votes, and (even when no vote …

A Pragmatic Republic, If You Can Keep It, William R. Sherman

Michigan Law Review

These things we know to be true: Our modern administrative state is a leviathan unimaginable by the Founders. It stands on thin constitutional ice, on cracks between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It burdens and entangles state and local governments in schemes that threaten federalism. And it presents an irresolvable dilemma regarding democratic accountability and political independence. We know these things to be true because these precepts animate some of the most significant cases and public law scholarship of our time. Underlying our examination of administrative agencies is an assumption that the problems they present would have been bizarre …

Legislative Diplomacy, Ryan M. Scoville

Michigan Law Review

A traditional view in legal scholarship holds that the U.S. Constitution assigns the president exclusive power to carry on official diplomatic communications with foreign governments. But in fact, Congress and its members routinely engage in communications of their own. Congress, for example, receives heads of state and maintains official contacts with foreign parliaments. And individual members of the House and Senate frequently travel overseas on congressional delegations (“CODELs”) to confer with foreign leaders, investigate problems that arise, promote the interests of the United States and constituents, and even represent the president. Moreover, many of these activities have occurred ever since …

Preemption And Textualism, Daniel J. Meltzer

Michigan Law Review

In the critically important area of preemption, the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation differs from the approach it follows elsewhere. Whether in politically salient matters, like challenges to Arizona’s immigration laws, or in more conventional cases, such as those in which state tort liability overlaps with federal regulation, the Court’s preemption decisions reflect a highly purposive approach to reading statutes, most notably through the application of “obstacle preemption” analysis. Recently, however, Justice Thomas has objected to the Court’s failure in preemption cases to respect its more textualist approach to issues of statutory interpretation, and he has urged that obstacle …

Preemption And Choice-Of-Law Coordination, Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Larry E. Ribstein

Michigan Law Review

The doctrine treating federal preemption of state law has been plagued by uncertainty and confusion. Part of the problem is that courts purport to interpret congressional intent when often Congress has never considered the particular preemption question at issue. This Article suggests that courts deciding preemption cases should take seriously a commonly articulated rationale for the federalization of law: the need to coordinate applicable legal standards in order to facilitate a national market or to otherwise provide clear guidance to parties regarding the laws that apply to their conduct. In situations where federal law can serve a coordinating function but …

Limited War And The Constitution: Iraq And The Crisis Of Presidential Legality, Bruce Ackerman, Oona Hathaway

Michigan Law Review

We live in an age of limited war. Yet the legal structure for authorizing and overseeing war has failed to address this modern reality. Nowhere is this failure more clear than in the recent U.S. conflict in Iraq. Congress self-consciously restricted the war's aims to narrow purposes-expressly authorizing a limited war. But the Bush Administration evaded these constitutional limits and transformed a well-defined and limited war into an open-ended conflict operating beyond constitutional boundaries. President Obama has thus far failed to repudiate these acts of presidential unilateralism. If he continues on this course, he will consolidate the precedents set by …

Once More Unto The Breach: American War Power And A Second Legislative Attempt To Ensure Congressional Input, Jonathan T. Menitove

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Once again embroiled in an unpopular overseas armed conflict, the United States faces difficult questions concerning the constitutional use of military force. Records from the Constitutional Convention suggest the Framers intended to lodge America's power to go to war with the Congress. While American presidents' early use of military force displays deference to the legislature, more recent military actions illustrate the executive's dominance in making war. Notwithstanding a few early court decisions in Congress 's favor, the judiciary has been unhelpful in restoring the constitutional Framers' vision for the administration of the war power Congress, therefore, has been forced to …

Nothing Improper? Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Partisan Motivation, And Pretextual Justification In The U. S. Attorney Removals, David C. Weiss

Michigan Law Review

The forced mid-term resignations of nine U.S. Attorneys was an unprecedented event in American history. Nearly one year after the administration executed the removals, the House Judiciary Committee was still reviewing and publicizing emails, memoranda, and other documents in an effort to understand how the firings were effectuated. This Note examines many of those documents and concludes that the removals were likely carried out for partisan reasons. It then draws on the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and separation of powers principles to argue that Congress is constitutionally empowered to enact removal limitations for inferior officers such as U.S. Attorneys so …

Mccain’S Citizenship And Constitutional Method, Peter J. Spiro

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Many things may obstruct John McCain’s path to the White House, but his citizenship status is not among them. The question of his eligibility, given the circumstances of his birth, has already been resolved. That outcome has been produced by actors outside the courts. . . . If non-judicial actors—including Congress, editorialists, leading members of the bar, and the People themselves—manage to generate a constitutional consensus, there isn’t much that the courts can do about it. In cases such as this one, at least, that seems to be an acceptable method of constitutional determination.

Originalism And The Natural Born Citizen Clause, Lawrence B. Solum

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The enigmatic phrase “natural born citizen” poses a series of problems for contemporary originalism. New Originalists, like Justice Scalia, focus on the original public meaning of the constitutional text. The notion of a “natural born citizen” was likely a term of art derived from the idea of a “natural born subject” in English law—a category that most likely did not extend to persons, like Senator McCain, who were born outside sovereign territory. But the Constitution speaks of “citizens” and not “subjects,” introducing uncertainties and ambiguities that might (or might not) make McCain eligible for the presidency.

Why Senator John Mccain Cannot Be President: Eleven Months And A Hundred Yards Short Of Citizenship, Gabriel Chin

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Article II, section 1 of the Constitution provides that “No Person except a natural born Citizen . . . shall be eligible to the Office of President . . . .” A person must be a citizen at birth to be a natural born citizen. Senator McCain was born in the Canal Zone in 1936. Although he is now a U.S. citizen, the law in effect in 1936 did not grant him citizenship at birth. Because he was not born a citizen, he is not eligible to the office of president.

Judicial Compensation And The Definition Of Judicial Power In The Early Republic, James E. Pfander

Michigan Law Review

Article III's provision for the compensation of federal judges has been much celebrated for the no-diminution provision that forecloses judicial pay cuts. But other features of Article Ill's compensation provision have largely escaped notice. In particular, little attention has been paid to the framers' apparent expectation that Congress would compensate federal judges with salaries alone, payable from the treasury at stated times. Article III's presumption in favor of salary-based compensation may rule out fee-based compensation, which was a common form of judicial compensation in England and the colonies but had grown controversial by the time of the framing. Among other …

International Law And Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander In Chief Clause Reconsidered, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth

Michigan Law Review

The Commander in Chief Clause is a difficult, underexplored area of constitutional interpretation. It is also a context in which international law is often mentioned, but not fully defended, as a possible method of interpreting the Constitution. This Article analyzes why the Commander in Chief Clause is difficult and argues that international law helps resolve some of the problems that the Clause presents. Because of weaknesses in originalist analysis, changes over time, and lack of judicial competence in military matters, the Court and commentators have relied on second-order interpretive norms like congressional authorization and executive branch practice in interpreting the …

The Politics Of Preclearance, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Guy-Uriel E. Charles

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Essay examines recent charges of political motivation against the Department of Justice and its enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. These accusations appear well-deserved, on the strength of the Department's recent handling of the Texas redistricting submission and Georgia's voting identification requirement. This Essay reaches two conclusions. First, it is clear that Congress wished to secure its understanding of the Act into the future through its preclearance requirement. Many critics of the voting rights bill worried about the degree of discretion that the legislation accorded the Attorney General. Supporters worried as well, for this degree of discretion might lead …

The Nsa Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis Of Congressional Oversight During An Era Of One-Party Rule, Tara M. Sugiyama, Marisa Perry

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

On December 16, 2005, the New York Times sounded a fire alarm when it revealed that, in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, President George W Bush had issued a secret executive order permitting the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantless surveillance on individuals to unearth nascent terrorist activity. Congress responded to the disclosure of the NSA domestic surveillance program largely by shirking its oversight duties. This Note argues that when a single party controls both the executive and the legislative branches, the fire-alarm model fails to provide sufficient congressional oversight. Short of future elections altering the balance …

Irrational War And Constitutional Design: A Reply To Professors Nzelibe And Yoo, Paul F. Diehl, Tom Ginsburg

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Reply proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the argument of the Nzelibe and Yoo paper. Part II considers their principal-agent analysis in the context of the American political system. Part III elaborates on the "democratic peace" literature, demonstrating that it does not support the conclusions that they draw. Part IV addresses the argument that we are in a new strategic situation, such that old rules ought not apply. Part V concludes.

The Case For Federal Anti-Gerrymandering Legislation, Brian O'Neill

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Partisan gerrymandering is a political tradition the United States can no longer afford. Due in part to the effects of partisan gerrymandering, very few congressional elections are meaningfully competitive. This Note argues that partisan gerrymandering damages both the quality of American democracy and the federal system of the United States. This Note concludes that the important federal interests at stake warrant action by Congress to halt partisan gerrymandering. The Note further concludes that any action by Congress should incorporate the principles of federalism by resisting the temptation to micromanage and Congress should instead require state commissions to draft the boundaries …

Of Federalism, Human Rights, And The Holland Caveat: Congressional Power To Iplement Treaties, Ana Maria Merico-Stephens

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Article explores whether the Rehnquist Court's federalism doctrine, as elaborated during this last decade, should or ought to extend to the domestication of discrete provisions of ratified human rights treaties. It explores this question by examining the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and by considering the civil remedy provision of Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) as potential implementing legislation for the equality provisions of the Covenant. In the context of this inquiry, the discussion engages federalism, as developed by the current Court, on its own terms. That is, I do not seek here to defend it …

Eldred's Aftermath: Tradition, The Copyright Clause, And The Constitutionalization Of Fair Use, Stephen M. Mcjohn

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Eldred v. Ashcroft offered the Supreme Court broad issues about the scope of Congress's constitutional power to legislate in the area of intellectual property. In 1998, Congress added twenty years to the term of all copyrights, both existing and future copyrights. But for this term extension, works created during the 1920s and 1930s would be entering the public domain. Now such works will remain under copyright until 2018 and beyond. Eldred v. Ashcroft rejected two challenges to the constitutionality of the copyright extension. The first challenge contended that Congress had exceeded its power to grant copyrights for "limited Times" in …

Foreign Affairs: Presidential Initiative And Congressional Control, David P. Currie

Michigan Law Review

Jefferson Powell is one of our foremost scholars of constitutional history. He is particularly adept at bringing extrajudicial sources to bear on constitutional issues. Owing perhaps in part to his extensive service in the Department of Justice, he has a special facility for the use of executive materials; he is surely our leading academic expert on executive interpretation of the Constitution. In his latest book Professor Powell applies his enviable skills to the recurring, fundamental, and controversial question of the division of authority between the President and Congress in the realm of foreign affairs. As is always the case when …

Constitutional Purpose And Inter-Clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed On Congress By The Copyright Clause, Andrew M. Hetherington

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

The argument that the preamble of the Copyright Clause provides a strict constraint on congressional intellectual property legislation has met with broad support among legal academics, but it is viewed with some skepticism by the judiciary. The Supreme Court did acknowledge in Eldred that intellectual property legislation must, in at least some sense, promote the progress of science, but stressed that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide what does and does not promote progress. The Court specifically rejected a "stringent" form of rational basis review for Copyright Clause enactments proposed in Justice Breyer's dissent, noting that the …

Interpretation And Institutions, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule

Michigan Law Review

Suppose that a statute, enacted several decades ago, bans the introduction of any color additive in food if that additive "causes cancer" in human beings or animals. Suppose that new technologies, able to detect low-level carcinogens, have shown that many potential additives cause cancer, even though the statistical risk is often tiny - akin to the risk of eating two peanuts with governmentally-permitted levels of aflatoxins. Suppose, finally, that a company seeks to introduce a certain color additive into food, acknowledging that the additive causes cancer, but urging that the risk is infinitesimal, and that if the statutory barrier were …