Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
Accusers As Adjudicators In Agency Enforcement Proceedings, Andrew N. Vollmer
Accusers As Adjudicators In Agency Enforcement Proceedings, Andrew N. Vollmer
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Largely because of the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Withrow v. Larkin, the accepted view for decades has been that a federal administrative agency does not violate the Due Process Clause by combining the functions of investigating, charging, and then resolving allegations that a person violated the law. Many federal agencies have this structure, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Trade Commission.
In 2016, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Pennsylvania, a judicial disqualification case that, without addressing administrative agencies, nonetheless raises a substantial question about one aspect of the combination of functions at agencies. …
Congressional Control Of Agency Privilege, Mark A. Luscombe
Congressional Control Of Agency Privilege, Mark A. Luscombe
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This note seeks to provide an introductory and largely historical analysis of "agency privilege:" the refusal of federal executive officials to furnish information and documents to congressional bodies absent the invocation of a claim of privilege by the President. After a brief survey of the origins of agency privilege in part I, the history and nature of the competing interests of congressional investigations and autonomy of executive departments and agencies will be discussed in part II. Part III explores the constitutional basis of the claim and analyzes other justifications proffered in specific circumstances. Part IV weighs the merits of various …