Law Commons^™

Congress, The Court, And The Constitution: Hearing Before The Subcommittee On The Constitution Of The Committee On The Judiciary, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, Charles T. Canady, Robert C. Scott, Louis Fisher, David P. Currie, Neal Devins, Neil Kinkopf, Nadine Strossen, Matthew J. Franck, Robert L. Clinton, Henry J. Hyde, Melvin L. Watt

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Bush, Obama And Beyond: Observations On The Prospect For Fact Checking Executive Department Threat Claims Before The Use Of Force, Leslie Gielow Jacobs

Leslie Gielow Jacobs

This piece looks at the recurring problem of inflated threat claims offered by executive branch actors to persuade the Nation to consent to the use of force. It sets out the experience of the Bush Administration’s use of incorrect threat claims to persuade the country to consent to the use of force in Iraq as a backdrop to evaluating the President Obama’s use of threat claims to support the continuing use of force in Afghanistan. Although comparison of threat advocacy by the Bush and Obama administrations must be imperfect, it allows for some observations about the extent to which the …

The Rehnquist Revolution, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

[Excerpt] "When historians look back at the Rehnquist Court, without a doubt they will say that its greatest changes in constitutional law were in the area of federalism. Over the past decade, and particularly over the last five years, the Supreme Court has dramatically limited the scope of Congress’ powers and has greatly expanded the protection of state Sovereign Immunity. Virtually every area of law, criminal and civil, is touched by these changes. Since I began teaching constitutional law in 1980, the most significant differences in constitutional law are a result of the Supreme Court’s revival of federalism as a …

The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia

Anthony J. Bellia

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations. As we have recently argued, the Court followed the law of nations because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous questions of war and peace. Although we focused primarily on the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered rested on an important, …

A Quantum Congress, Jorge R. Roig

Jorge R Roig

The Unconstitutionality Of The Filibuster, Josh Chafetz

Josh Chafetz

This Article, written for the Connecticut Law Review's 2010 "Is Our Constitutional Order Broken?" symposium, argues that the filibuster, as currently practiced, is unconstitutional.

After a brief introduction in Part I, Part II describes the current operation of the filibuster. Although the filibuster is often discussed in terms of "unlimited debate," this Part argues that its current operation is best understood in terms of a sixty-vote requirement to pass most bills and other measures through the Senate.

Part III presents a structural argument that this supermajority requirement for most Senate business is unconstitutional. This Part argues that the words "passed" …

Avoiding Constitutional Questions As A Three-Branch Problem, William K. Kelley

William K. Kelley

This article criticizes the cardinal rule of statutory construction known as the avoidance canon - that statutes must be interpreted to avoid raising serious constitutional questions - as failing to respect the proper constitutional roles of both Congress and the Executive. It argues that the avoidance canon in practice cannot be grounded in legislative supremacy, which is the common justification for it offered by the Supreme Court, because it assumes without foundation that Congress would always prefer not to come close to the constitutional line in enacting statutes. Instead, the avoidance canon creates pressure for courts to adopt statutory meanings …

A Twentieth Amendment Parable, John C. Nagle

John Copeland Nagle

The twentieth amendment receives virtually no attention in modern American constitutional law. Adopted in 1933, the primary purpose of the amendment was to eliminate lame-duck Congresses. The proponents of the amendment argued that lame-ducks were subject to nefarious influences and that allowing lame-duck legislation contradicted the voice of the people in the most recent election. But the text of the twentieth amendment simply moved the date on which the newly elected President and Congress took office from March to January, and does not expressly prohibit lame-duck legislation. The framers of the amendment could not conceive of Congress meeting during the …

Book Review Of Arnold H. Leibowitz, An Historical-Legal Analysis Of The Impeachments Of Presidents Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, And William Clinton: Why The Process Went Wrong, Jeffrey B. Morris

Jeffrey B. Morris

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court Section 1983 Decisions: (October 2001 Term), Martin A. Schwartz

Martin A. Schwartz

No abstract provided.

A Read-The-Bill Rule For Congress, Hanah Volokh

Hanah M. Volokh

In this Article, I argue that legislators have a duty to read the text of proposed legislation before voting to enact it. A Read the Bill political movement has formed in response to recent high-profile instances of rushed legislation. Putting aside partisan concerns, a rushed legislative process creates real problems because it forces legislators to vote on bills without having the time to properly evaluate the new legal rules that are being imposed on citizens If a rule or norm of reading the bill can slow the legislative process enough to provide for thorough consideration of proposed legislation, it would …

Lawmakers As Lawbreakers, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov

Dr. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov

How would Congress act in a world without judicial review? Canlawmakers be trusted to police themselves? This Article examinesCongress’s capacity and incentives to enforce upon itself “the law ofcongressional lawmaking”—a largely overlooked body of law that iscompletely insulated from judicial enforcement. The Article exploresthe political safeguards that may motivate lawmakers to engage inself-policing and rule-following behavior. It identifies the majorpolitical safeguards that can be garnered from the relevant legal,political science, political economy, and social psychology scholarship,and evaluates each safeguard by drawing on a combination oftheoretical, empirical, and descriptive studies about Congress. TheArticle’s main argument is that the political safeguards that …

Congress' Power Is Properly Vested, Alan E. Garfield

Alan E Garfield

No abstract provided.