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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Fault Principle As The Chameleon Of Contract Law: A Market Function Approach, Stefan Grundmann Jun 2009

The Fault Principle As The Chameleon Of Contract Law: A Market Function Approach, Stefan Grundmann

Michigan Law Review

This Article begins with a comparative law survey showing that all legal systems do not opt exclusively for fault liability or strict liability in contract law, but often adopt a more nuanced approach. This approach includes intermediate solutions such as reversing the burden of proof, using a market ("objective") standard of care, distinguishing between different types of contracts, and providing a "second chance" to breaching parties. Taking this starting point seriously and arguing that it is highly unlikely that all legal systems err, this Article argues that the core question is how and when each liability regime should prevail or …


The Chinese Regulatory Licensing Regime For Pharmaceutical Products: A Law And Economics Analysis, Qing Zhang Jan 2009

The Chinese Regulatory Licensing Regime For Pharmaceutical Products: A Law And Economics Analysis, Qing Zhang

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

China's pharmaceutical market has expanded dramatically in the past twenty years and is expected to become the largest in the world by the year 2050. However, entry to the market remains difficult for many international pharmaceutical manufacturers due to the country's costly and complicated regulatory licensing requirements. This Article provides an overview of the regulatory licensing regime for pharmaceutical products in China. Then, the Article evaluates three key features of the regulatory licensing regime through a law and economics approach. These features include the use of licensing, as contrasted with alternative regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms; the standards to be met …


Administrative Governance As Corporate Governance: A Partial Explanation For The Growth Of China's Stock Markets, David A. Caragliano Jan 2009

Administrative Governance As Corporate Governance: A Partial Explanation For The Growth Of China's Stock Markets, David A. Caragliano

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Note argues that during the first decade of stock market development (roughly 1990-2000) Chinese institutions, which emphasized administrative direction and control, functioned in lieu of legal and financial institutions. Preexisting modes of administrative governance introduced incentives that mitigated information asymmetry problems inherent in initial public offerings (IPOs) and contributed to enhanced market valuation during the post-IPO phase. The author focuses on two sui generis Chinese institutions employed during this time period: the quota system for equity share issuance and the Special Treatment (ST) system for underperforming issuers. In short, the thesis is that administrative governance substituted for corporate governance.


London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2009

London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

In the United States, state corporate law determines most questions of internal corporate governance - the role of directors; the allocation of authority between directors, managers, and shareholders; etc. - while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders - annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate effect on corporate governance outcomes.


London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2009

London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Jurisdictional competition in corporate law has long been a staple of academic-and sometimes, political-debate in the United States. State corporate law, by long-standing tradition in the United States, determines most questions of internal corporate governance-the role of boards of directors, the allocation of authority between directors, managers and shareholders, etc.-while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders-annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate impact on corporate governance outcomes.