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Full-Text Articles in Law
Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction Under The Antitrust Laws, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction Under The Antitrust Laws, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The Ninth Circuit may soon consider whether challenges to antitrust activity that occurs abroad must invariably be addressed under the rule of reason, which will make criminal prosecution difficult or impossible.
When antitrust cases involve foreign conduct, the courts customarily appraise its substantive antitrust significance only after deciding whether the Sherman Act reaches the activity. Nevertheless, "jurisdictional" and "substantive" inquiries are not wholly independent. Both reflect two sound propositions: that Congress did not intend American antitrust law to rule the entire commercial world and that Congress knew that domestic economic circumstances often differ from those abroad where mechanical application of …
Price-Fixing: Hefty Penalties On Big-Biz Cartels Will Provide Level Playing Field To Small Businesses, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
Price-Fixing: Hefty Penalties On Big-Biz Cartels Will Provide Level Playing Field To Small Businesses, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
Cartels are illegal in India, as they are almost everywhere. They are subject to heavy fines. Why, then, do businesses frequently try to fix prices? Because doing so usually is profitable. On average cartels raise prices by more than 20%, and probably face less than a 25% chance of being caught and convicted. Based upon a sample of 75 international cartels, the authors calculate that the expected profits from price fixing almost always exceed the penalties. No wonder businesses often try to fix prices.
Transplanting Antitrust In China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, And State Control, Wentong Zheng
Transplanting Antitrust In China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, And State Control, Wentong Zheng
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article examines the compatibility of Western antitrust models as incorporated in China's first comprehensive antitrust law – the Antimonopoly Law ("AML") – with China's local conditions. It identifies three forces that shape competition law and policy in China: China's current transitional stage, China's market structures, and pervasive state control in China's economy. This Article discusses how these forces have limited the applicability of Western antitrust models to China in three major areas of antitrust: cartels, abuse of dominant market position, and merger review. Specifically, it details how these forces have prevented China from pursuing a rigorous anti-cartel policy, how …