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Choice As Regulatory Reform: The Case Of Japanese Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt
Choice As Regulatory Reform: The Case Of Japanese Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt
Faculty Scholarship
The fact of a small number of hostile takeover bids in Japan the recent past, together with technical amendments of the Civil Code that would allow a poison pill-like security, raises the question of how a poison pill would operate in Japan should it be widely deployed. This paper reviews the U.S. experience with the pill to the end of identifying what institutions operated to prevent the poison pill from fully enabling the target board to block a hostile takeover. It then considers whether similar ameliorating institutions are available in Japan, and concludes that with the exception of the court …
Marbury V. Madison And European Union "Constitutional" Review, George A. Bermann
Marbury V. Madison And European Union "Constitutional" Review, George A. Bermann
Faculty Scholarship
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison specifically raises the question of the legitimacy of a "horizontal" species of judicial review, that is, review by courts of the exercise of powers by the coordinate branches of government. The same question could be asked with respect to judicial review in the European Union. More particularly, how problematic or contestable has "horizontal" judicial review been within the European Union as a matter of principle? And, irrespective of its contestability, how have the courts of the European Union exercised "horizontal" review? We will find, however, that it is not the "horizontal" …
The Poison Pill In Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, Ronald J. Gilson
The Poison Pill In Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, Ronald J. Gilson
Faculty Scholarship
The coming of hostile takeovers to Japan has been anticipated, and anticipated, and anticipated. Each report of a reduction in the size of crossholdings among Japanese companies and in the size of Japanese bank stockholdings in their clients has given rise to an expectation that now, at last, hostile offers would emerge. It is not surprising that commentators looked forward, optimistically, to the arrival of a potentially disruptive takeover technique. The extended Japanese recession, together with management resistance to internally implemented restructurings and the barriers to externally imposed restructurings, has created the potential for substantial private and social gain from …