Law Commons^™

Tort Theory And The Restatement, In Retrospect, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This is my third paper on the Restatement (Third) of Torts. In my first paper, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, I offered a positive economic theory of the tort doctrine that had been presented in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles, and also an optimistic vision of how positive theoretical analysis could be integrated with the Restatement project. In my second paper, The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common Law, I set out the utilitarian-economic theory of how the common law litigation process could generate optimal (efficient, wealth-maximizing) rules and compared …

The New Public Nuisance: Illegitimate And Dysfunctional, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Leslie Kendrick’s defense of the new public nuisance fails to come to terms with legitimacy objections to such actions based on the rule of law and norms of democratic accountability. Nor is the new public nuisance a “second best” solution to widespread social problems. These actions rest on joint ventures between prosecutors and personal-injury lawyers that are likely to generate over- and under-deterrence and risk runaway liability.

Cardozo And Uncertainty In The Common Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship

Benjamin Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial Process is best understood as one of the most successful contributions to this category of work defending the common law on the basis of its process. In the book, Cardozo offers a spirited and principled defense of the judicial process, all in an effort to highlight the manner in which judges manage the seemingly pervasive uncertainty of the common law method in the discharge of their duties. All the same, it is obvious that he considered the project to be necessarily incomplete. Just a few years after the publication of the Judicial Process …

Public Nuisance As Risk Regulation, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Public nuisance has always been defined in terms of the object of protection – the community, the public, or perhaps even the state as a whole. Public nuisance in this regard has been juxtaposed to private nuisance, which protects individual persons and their use and enjoyment of land. Commentary on public nuisance has thus long been concerned with defining (without notable success) what it means to advance a public as opposed to a private right.

In this paper, I offer a different take on the function of public nuisance. The common law is designed to provide redress for actual harm, …

Relying On Restatements, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship

Restatements of the Law occupy a unique place in the Americanlegal system. For nearly a century, they have played a prominent and influential role as legal texts that courts routinely rely on in a wide variety of fields. Despite their ubiquitous and pervasive use by courts, Restatements are not formal sources of law. While they resemble statutes in their form and structure, Restatements are produced entirely by a private organization of experts set up to clarify and simplify the law and thus lack the force of law on their own. And yet, courts treat them as formal and authoritative sources …

Restatements Of Statutory Law: The Curious Case Of The Restatement Of Copyright, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Peter S. Menell

Faculty Scholarship

For nearly a century, the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatements of the Law have played an important role in the American legal system. And in all of this time, they refrained from restating areas of law dominated by a uniform statute despite the proliferation and growing importance of such statutes, especially at the federal level. This omission was deliberate and in recognition of the fundamentally different nature of the judicial role and of lawmaking in areas governed by detailed statutes compared to areas governed by the common law. Then in 2015, without much deliberation, the ALI embarked on the task …

The Common Law Inside A Social Hierarchy: Power Or Reason?, Katharine B. Silbaugh

Faculty Scholarship

Anita Bernstein argues that the common law gives women, too, the right to say no to what they do not want. She demonstrates that the common law is a far-reaching defense of condoned self-regard, a system that allows individuals to place their own interests above the interests of others, particularly when seeking to exclude others. She, therefore, places in the common law a right to protection from rape and a near-absolute right to expel a pregnancy. Bernstein reasons that women’s exclusion from the common law right to say no was a mistake produced by their absence from the judiciary. This …

Finding Law, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

That the judge's task is to find the law, not to make it, was once a commonplace of our legal culture. Today, decades after Erie, the idea of a common law discovered by judges is commonly dismissed -- as a "fallacy," an "illusion," a "brooding omnipresence in the sky." That dismissive view is wrong. Expecting judges to find unwritten law is no childish fiction of the benighted past, but a real and plausible option for a modern legal system.

This Essay seeks to restore the respectability of finding law, in part by responding to two criticisms made by Erie and …

The Supreme Court's Regulatory Takings Doctrine And The Perils Of Common Law Constitutionalism, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

My objective in this lecture is to take seriously the observation that constitutional law in the United States, as expounded by its Supreme Court, bears far more resemblance to common law than to textual interpretation. We live under a written Constitution. But the main body of that Constitution, including the first ten amendments we call the Bill of Rights, is very old, having been adopted nearly 230 years ago. As time marches on, judicial interpretations of this venerable text have piled up. Constitutional disputes today are almost always resolved by the courts applying this growing body of precedent. Constitutional law …

Contemplating Masterpiece Cakeshop, Terri R. Day

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Law Of Interpretation, William Baude, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

How should we interpret legal instruments? How do we identify the law they create? Current approaches largely fall into two broad camps. The standard picture of interpretation is focused on language, using various linguistic conventions to discover a document's meaning or a drafter's intent. Those who see language as less determinate take a more skeptical view, urging judges to make interpretive choices on policy grounds. Yet both approaches neglect the most important resource available: the already applicable rules of law.

Legal interpretation is neither a subfield of linguistics nor an exercise in policymaking. Rather, it is deeply shaped by preexisting …

Lack Of Marketability And Minority Discounts In Valuing Close Corporation Stock: Elusiveness And Judicial Synchrony In Pursuit Of Equitable Consensus, Stephen J. Leacock

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Common Law Of Contract And The Default Rule Project, Alan Schwartz, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

The common law developed over centuries a small set of default rules that courts have used to fill gaps in otherwise incomplete contracts between commercial parties. These rules can be applied almost independently of context: the market damages rule, for example, requires a court only to know the difference between market and contract prices. When parties in various sectors of the economy write sales contracts but leave terms blank, courts fill in the blanks with their own rules. As a consequence, a judicial rule that many parties accept must be "transcontextual": parties in varied commercial contexts accept the courts' rule …

Towards Universal Fiduciary Principles, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Fiduciary relationships play an important role in civil law and common law jurisdictions. While both legal systems offer similar outcomes in upholding fiduciary law principles, the way they achieve these ends is fundamentally different. In common law jurisdictions, fiduciary law is rooted in the law of property. By contrast, in civil law jurisdictions, fiduciary principles find their source in contract law. This article seeks to reconcile these differences, by identifying universal principles that apply to both systems. The author describes the sources of fiduciary law in the common law and the civil law, then highlights underlying differences between the two …

Apportioning Liability In Maryland Tort Cases: Time To End Contributory Negligence And Joint And Several Liability, Donald G. Gifford, Christopher J. Robinette

Faculty Scholarship

The Article presents a comprehensive proposal for assigning liability in tort cases according to the parties’ respective degrees of fault. The authors criticize the Court of Appeals of Maryland’s recent decision in Coleman v. Soccer Association of Columbia declining to abrogate contributory negligence, particularly the court’s notion that it should not act because of the legislature’s repeated failure to do so. The Article provides a comprehensive analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of comparative fault, including its effect on administrative costs, claims frequency, claims severity, insurance premiums, and economic performance. The authors propose the legislative enactment of comparative fault and …

The Restatement (Second) Of Contracts Reasonably Certain Terms Requirement: A Model Of Neoclassical Contract Law And A Model Of Confusion And Inconsistency, Daniel P. O'Gorman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Law Reform Agenda As Ali Approaches Its Centennial, Lance Liebman

Faculty Scholarship

The American Law Institute and I are happy and proud that the Brooklyn Law School and its Law Review chose to hold an important conference about ALI work, to persuade such an outstanding group of scholars to write such varied and interesting papers, and now to publish their work. I am especially happy because, as I near the end of my service as ALI Director, these papers give me an opportunity to reflect on the projects, perfect and imperfect, that the ALI accomplished (or attempted and failed to accomplish) in our effort to improve the American legal system.

The Role Of Unfair Competition In The Common Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Gideon Parchomovsky

Faculty Scholarship

Does the idea of “unfair competition” present the law with a viable alternative to thinking about the regulation of information and informational resources, independent of the traditional categories of the common law (e.g., property/tort) and the assumptions that these categories entail? In this chapter, we argue that, although the answer to that question is no, unfair competition nevertheless plays an important role in complementing the categories of property and torts as they apply to competitive settings. Specifically, unfair competition allows courts to both broaden and narrow the traditional notions of property and torts – especially as they apply to the …

Constitutional Backdrops, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

The Constitution is often said to leave important questions unanswered. These include, for example, the existence of a congressional contempt power or an executive removal power, the role of stare decisis, and the scope of state sovereign immunity. Bereft of clear text, many scholars have sought answers to such questions in Founding-era history. But why should the historical answers be valid today, if they were never codified in the Constitution's text?

This Article describes a category of legal rules that weren't adopted in the text, expressly or implicitly, but which nonetheless have continuing legal force under the written Constitution. These …

The American Law Institute’S New Principles Of Aggregate Litigation, Sam Issacharoff, Carolyn Kuhl, Francis Mcgovern, Stephanie Middleton, John Beisner

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Common Law And Statute Law In Administrative Law, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The largely statutory appearance of U.S. administrative law be surprising in light of the existence of the federal A Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).1 The APA, including its a amendments, is a relatively comprehensive guide to much of law in the United States. It contains the procedures agencies to follow in both rulemaking and adjudication and provisions on the availability and scope of judicial review of agency action. As includes open meeting and open file requirements as well as negotiated rulemaking and legislative review of agency rules generally held view that federal courts should not make com should act only …

Melms V. Pabst Brewing Co. And The Doctrine Of Waste In American Property Law, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. may be the most important decision ever rendered by an American court concerning the law of waste. Unless your specialty is property law, that might not be enough to stir your interest. The doctrine of waste, after all, does not loom very large in public consciousness these days.

Nevertheless, waste has held a peculiar fascination for property theorists. The reason, I think, is that it touches directly on an important line of division in how we think about property. Does property exist primarily to protect the subjective expectations that particular owners have in particular things? …

The Supreme Common Law Court Of The United States, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court's primary role in the history of the United States, especially in constitutional cases (and cases hovering in the universe of the Constitution), has been to limit Congress's ability to redefine and redistribute rights in a direction most people would characterize as liberal. In other words, the Supreme Court, for most of the history of the United States since the adoption of the Constitution, has been a conservative force against change and redistribution. The Court has used five distinct devices to advance its control over the law. First, it has construed rights-creating constitutional provisions narrowly when those …

Transparency And Determinacy In Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense Of Explanatory Economic Analysis, Jody S. Kraus

Faculty Scholarship

Explanatory economic analysis of the common law has long been subject to deep philosophical skepticism for two reasons. First, common law decisions appear to be cast in the language of deontic morality, not the consequentialist language of efficiency. For this reason, philosophers have claimed that explanatory economic analysis cannot satisfy the transparency criterion, which holds that a legal theory's explanation must provide a plausible account of the relationship between the reasoning it claims judges actually use to decide cases and the express reasoning judges provide in their opinions. Philosophers have doubted that the economic analysis has a plausible account of …

Federalism's Fallacy: The Early Tradition Of Federal Family Law And The Invention Of States' Rights, Kristin Collins

Faculty Scholarship

By examining the history of the federal government's role in the regulation of the family, this article joins the work of others who in recent years have begun to piece together the history of the federal government's role in crafting domestic relations law and policy.'⁸ Much of this attention has focused on federal involvement in domestic relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with relatively less consideration given to the pre-Civil War period. Though recent contributions to this field have helped to cure this imbalance, ¹⁹ there remains a strong sense, especially among lawyers and judges, that …

Courts Or Tribunals? Federal Courts And The Common Law, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Every Justice, save perhaps Justice Breyer, has recently subscribed to an opinion raising questions in one or another context about whether federal courts can appropriately exercise common law law-making functions that had, until these questions began to appear, been characteristic of all American courts. To invoke a special class of "federal tribunal" whose actions are not to be confused with those of common law courts suggests broader implications than the long-familiar debates about Erie RR. Co. v. Tompkins, or more recent contentions over when, if ever, it is appropriate to infer privately enforceable judicial remedies in aid of federal statutes; …

Common Law Elements Of The Section 1983 Action, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores the role of the common law in Supreme Court interpretation and application of § 1983, which grants a cause of action for violations of constitutional rights committed "under color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage."' I argue that the common law has served primarily to narrow the reach of § 1983, and that this is inappropriate in light of the broad statutory language and the absence of good evidence that the enacting Congress intended a narrower application than the statutory language indicates.

The Concept Of Property In The Early Common Law, David J. Seipp

Faculty Scholarship

“There is nothing,” wrote William Blackstone, “which so generally strikes the imagination and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property.” Property continues to occupy a place of enormous importance in American legal thought. More than just a staple of the first-year law school curriculum, the concept of property guides the application of constitutional doctrines of due process and eminent domain. A grand division between “property rules” and “liability rules” classifies our common law entitlements. Property is a concept of such longstanding importance in our law, of such great inertial momentum, that it has expanded to include nonphysical …

How Law Can Be Determinate, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This Article, part of a longer study, considers one problem about the objectivity of law. The problem is whether the law as it exists provides determinate answers to many legal questions for judges, other officials, and citizens. I emphasize the word many. This Article does not focus on "hard cases" and then ask whether single correct answers for them exist. It does not inquire whether in some complicated sense all legal questions have determinate answers. This is a treatment of easy legal questions. To most lawyers, it may seem self-evident that many legal questions do have determinate answers; and that …

A Critical Approach To Section 1983 With Special Attention To Sources Of Law, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The Civil Rights Act of 1871¹ ("§ 1983") establishes a tort-like remedy for persons deprived of federally protected rights "under color of law."'² While the statute's broad language provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights, the statute itself provides little or no guidance regarding important subjects such as the measure of damages, the availability of punitive damages, the requirements for equitable relief, the statute of limitations, survival of claims, proper parties, and immunities from suit.³...

...The first part of this article examines the narrowly "legal" analysis of § 1983 in the cases …