Law Commons^™

Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate Managers Lifetime Tenure?, Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas, Wei Jiang

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Dual-class voting systems have been widely employed in recent initial public offerings by large tech companies, but have been roundly condemned by institutional investors and the S&P 500. As an alternative, commentators have proposed adoption of tenure voting systems, where investor voting rights increase with the length of time that they hold shares. In furtherance of this proposal, some Silicon Valley investors have requested that the SEC permit the creation of a new stock exchange where all of the companies will be required to use tenure voting systems.

Is tenure voting a better choice than dual-class stock for both corporate …

Understanding The (Ir)Relevance Of Shareholder Votes On M&A Deals, Randall S. Thomas, James D. Cox, Tomas J. Mondino

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Has corporate law and its bundles of fiduciary obligations become irrelevant? Over the last thirty years, the American public corporation has undergone a profound metamorphosis, transforming itself from a business with dispersed ownership to one whose ownership is highly concentrated in the hands of sophisticated financial institutions. Corporate law has not been immutable to these changes so that current doctrine now accords to a shareholder vote two effects: first, the vote satisfies a statutory mandate that shareholders approve a deal, and second and significantly, the vote insulates the transaction and its actors from any claim of misconduct incident the approved …