Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
Shareholder Voting In Proxy Contests For Corporate Control, Uncontested Director Elections And Management Proposals, Randall Thomas, Patrick C. Tricker
Shareholder Voting In Proxy Contests For Corporate Control, Uncontested Director Elections And Management Proposals, Randall Thomas, Patrick C. Tricker
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This paper surveys the empirical literature on shareholder voting, specifically on votes related to contested and uncontested director elections and on management proposals. While much of current theory depicts shareholder votes as an ineffective control on the boards decision making, the empirical literature paints a more nuanced picture. When a proxy contest breaks out, shareholders wield immense influence. These contests tend to have significant benefits for the corporation, including facilitating a change in management, reducing unnecessary liquidity, and prompting the payout of dividends. Even in uncontested director elections, shareholders decisions to vote for or withhold their vote reflect the company's …
Quieting The Shareholders' Voice, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri
Quieting The Shareholders' Voice, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.