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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Tax And Corporate Governance: The Influence Of Tax On Managerial Agency Costs, David M. Schizer
Tax And Corporate Governance: The Influence Of Tax On Managerial Agency Costs, David M. Schizer
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter examines the influence of tax on managerial agency costs, with particular emphasis on public companies in the United States. Focusing on “C-corporations,” this chapter first considers why tax is an imperfect vehicle for mitigating managerial agency costs. It then discusses how tax influences the compensation of managers, both in ways policy makers intended, and in ways they did not. The chapter also considers how tax affects management decisions about capital structure, hedging, and acquisitions. In addition, this chapter explores the tax system’s influence on the ability and incentives of shareholders to monitor management. This chapter then concludes with …
Majority Control And Minority Protection, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani
Majority Control And Minority Protection, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter examines legal issues concerning majority control and minority protection in firms with concentrated ownership governance structures, with particular emphasis on the tradeoff between the goals of protecting minority shareholders and allowing controllers to pursue their vision and how corporate law should balance these conflicting goals. Focusing primarily on Delaware corporate law, it suggests that holding a control block allows majority shareholders to pursue their idiosyncratic vision in the manner they see fit, even against minority investors’ objections. Idiosyncratic vision refers to the subjective value that entrepreneurs attach to their business idea or vision, and this chapter considers its …
Convergence And Persistence In Corporate Law And Governance, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Convergence And Persistence In Corporate Law And Governance, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter discusses the question of “convergence or persistence” in corporate law and governance. It first considers efforts to measure convergence directly by focusing on the evolution of law-on-the-books governance provisions before analyzing capital market evidence on convergence, with particular emphasis on capital market indicators such as the decline in “cross-listings” onto US stock exchanges by firms from jurisdictions with weaker investor protection and the increase in initial public offerings (IPOs) on emerging market stock markets. The chapter proceeds by reviewing evidence of divergence, especially “divergence within convergence,” and the failure of the European Union to produce more convergent corporate …