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Full-Text Articles in Law
Discrimination Law: The New Franken-Tort, Sandra F. Sperino
Discrimination Law: The New Franken-Tort, Sandra F. Sperino
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
This article was part of the Clifford Symposium in Tort Law. The article discusses how the Supreme Court has used tort law to define certain elements of discrimination law, but has not described all of the elements of this new tort. The article is the first one to try to piece together the new "tort" created by the Supreme Court.
Recovering Forgotten Struggles Over The Constitutional Meaning Of Equality, Helen Norton
Recovering Forgotten Struggles Over The Constitutional Meaning Of Equality, Helen Norton
Publications
No abstract provided.
The Fight For Equal Protection: Reconstruction-Redemption Redux, Kermit Roosevelt Iii, Patricia Stottlemyer
The Fight For Equal Protection: Reconstruction-Redemption Redux, Kermit Roosevelt Iii, Patricia Stottlemyer
All Faculty Scholarship
With Justice Scalia gone, and Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy in their late seventies, there is the possibility of significant movement on the Supreme Court in the next several years. A two-justice shift could upend almost any area of constitutional law, but the possible movement in race-based equal protection jurisprudence provides a particularly revealing window into the larger trends at work. In the battle over equal protection, two strongly opposed visions of the Constitution contend against each other, and a change in the Court’s composition may determine the outcome of that struggle. In this essay, we set out the current state …
Justice And Accountability: Activist Judging In The Light Of Democratic Constitutionalism And Democratic Experimentalism, William H. Simon
Justice And Accountability: Activist Judging In The Light Of Democratic Constitutionalism And Democratic Experimentalism, William H. Simon
Faculty Scholarship
This essay examines the charge that activist judging is inconsistent with democracy in the light of two recent perspectives in legal scholarship. The perspectives – Democratic Constitutionalism and Democratic Experimentalism – suggest in convergent and complementary ways that the charge ignores or oversimplifies relevant features of both judging and democracy. In particular, the charge exaggerates the pre-emptive effect of activist judging, and it implausibly conflates democracy with electoral processes. In addition, it understands consensus as a basis for judicial legitimacy solely in terms of pre-existing agreement and ignores the contingent legitimacy that can arise from the potential for subsequent agreement.