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University Of Baltimore Symposium Report: Debut Of “The Matthew Fogg Symposia On The Vitality Of Stare Decisis In America”, Zena D. Crenshaw-Logal
University Of Baltimore Symposium Report: Debut Of “The Matthew Fogg Symposia On The Vitality Of Stare Decisis In America”, Zena D. Crenshaw-Logal
Zena Denise Crenshaw-Logal
On the first of each two day symposium of the Fogg symposia, lawyers representing NGOs in the civil rights, judicial reform, and whistleblower advocacy fields are to share relevant work of featured legal scholars in lay terms; relate the underlying principles to real life cases; and propose appropriate reform efforts. Four (4) of the scholars spend the next day relating their featured articles to views on the vitality of stare decisis. Specifically, the combined panels of public interest attorneys and law professors consider whether compliance with the doctrine is reasonably assured in America given the: 1. considerable discretion vested in …
Back To The Future: Discovery Cost Allocation And Modern Procedural Theory, Martin H. Redish, Colleen Mcnamara
Back To The Future: Discovery Cost Allocation And Modern Procedural Theory, Martin H. Redish, Colleen Mcnamara
Martin H Redish
It has long been established that as a general rule, discovery costs are to remain with the party from whom discovery has been sought. While courts have authority to "shift" costs in an individual instance, the presumption against such an alteration in traditional practice is quite strong. Yet at no point did the drafters of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ever make an explicit decision to allocate discovery costs in this manner. Nor, apparently, did they (or anyone since) ever explain why such an allocation choice is to be made in the first place. As a result, our …
No Good Deed Goes Unpublished: Precedent-Stripping And The Need For A New Prophylactic Rule, Edward Cantu
No Good Deed Goes Unpublished: Precedent-Stripping And The Need For A New Prophylactic Rule, Edward Cantu
Edward Cantu
This paper addresses the “open secret” that federal appellate courts often strip their opinions of precedential value as a means to forgo fair, principled and/or thorough adjudication of issues raised in appeals. Is there a basis in contemporary constitutional doctrine for a presumption that appellants suffer constitutional injury when courts dispose of their appeals using non-precedential opinions? The author answers “yes.” The argument centers on case law establishing so-called “constitutional prophylactic rules,” which work to “overprotect” a given core right—that is, to create a presumption of constitutional injury without proof of it—when such is the only effective way of protecting …
Pearson, Iqbal, And Procedural Judicial Activism, Goutam U. Jois
Pearson, Iqbal, And Procedural Judicial Activism, Goutam U. Jois
Goutam U Jois
In its most recent term, the Supreme Court decided Pearson v. Callahan and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, two cases that, even at this early date, can safely be called “game-changers.” What is fairly well known is that Iqbal and Pearson, on their own terms, will hurt civil rights plaintiffs. A point that has not been explored is how the interaction between Iqbal and Pearson will also hurt civil rights plaintiffs. First, the cases threaten to catch plaintiffs on the horns of a dilemma: Iqbal says, in effect, that greater detail is required to get allegations past the motion to dismiss stage. …
A Unified Theory Of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, Lumen N. Mulligan
A Unified Theory Of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, Lumen N. Mulligan
Lumen N. Mulligan
Title 28, section 1331 of the United States Code provides the jurisdictional grounding for the majority of cases heard in the federal courts, yet it is not well understood. The predominant view holds that section 1331 doctrine both lacks a focus upon congressional intent and is internally inconsistent. I seek to counter both these assumptions by re-contextualizing the Court’s section 1331 jurisprudence in terms of the contemporary judicial usage of “right” (i.e., clear, mandatory obligations capable of judicial enforcement) and cause of action (i.e., permission to vindicate a right in court). In conducting this reinterpretation, I argue that section 1331 …