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The Administrative State's Jury Problem, Richard Lorren Jolly Dec 2023

The Administrative State's Jury Problem, Richard Lorren Jolly

Washington Law Review

This Article argues that the administrative state’s most acute constitutional fault is its routine failure to comply with the Seventh Amendment. Properly understood, that Amendment establishes an independent limitation on congressional authority to designate jurisdiction to juryless tribunals, and its dictate as to “Suits at common law” refers to all federal legal rights regardless of forum. Agencies’ use of binding, juryless adjudication fails these requirements and must be reformed. But this does not mean dismantling the administrative state; it is possible (indeed, necessary) to solve the jury problem while maintaining modern government. To that end, this Article advances a structural …


Did The Supreme Court In Transunion V. Ramirez Transform The Article Iii Standing Injury In Fact Test?: The Circuit Split Over Ada Tester Standing And Broader Theoretical Considerations, Bradford Mank Jan 2023

Did The Supreme Court In Transunion V. Ramirez Transform The Article Iii Standing Injury In Fact Test?: The Circuit Split Over Ada Tester Standing And Broader Theoretical Considerations, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Some commentators have criticized the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and especially the Court’s 2021 decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez for limiting Congress’ authority to confer standing by statute. For example, in his article, Injury in Fact Transformed, Professor Cass Sunstein argues that TransUnion is a “radical ruling” that uses the injury in fact standing requirement to limit the authority of Congress to enact only statutes that address harms that have a close relationship to traditional or common law harms. By contrast, Professor Ernst Young argues that the Supreme Court’s injury in fact doctrine is …


A Survey Of The Literature On Federal Appellate Practice And Procedure, Thomas E. Baker Jan 2023

A Survey Of The Literature On Federal Appellate Practice And Procedure, Thomas E. Baker

FIU Law Review

This is a survey of the literature related to appellate practice and procedure before the United States Courts of Appeals for the benefit of lawyers and judges and scholars. It is reproduced with permission from THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 3d ed. 2023) available at: https://www.fjc.gov/content/379899/primer-jurisdiction-us-courts-appeals-third-edition). This origin explains the scattered references in the entries to “this Primer.”


Do Seven Members Of Congress Have Article Iii Standing To Sue The Executive Branch?: Why The D.C. Circuit’S Divided Decision In Maloney V. Murphy Was Wrongly Decided In Light Of Two Prior District Court Decisions And Historical Separation Of Powers Jurisprudence, Bradford Mank Jan 2022

Do Seven Members Of Congress Have Article Iii Standing To Sue The Executive Branch?: Why The D.C. Circuit’S Divided Decision In Maloney V. Murphy Was Wrongly Decided In Light Of Two Prior District Court Decisions And Historical Separation Of Powers Jurisprudence, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

The D.C. Circuit’s divided decision in Maloney v. Murphy granting standing to minority party members of the House Oversight Committee appears questionable in light of two prior district court decisions in Waxman and Cummings that had denied standing in similar circumstances. Most importantly, Maloney is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent regarding standing for individual members of Congress. In Raines v. Byrd, the Supreme Court held that individual members of Congress generally do not have standing to enforce institutional congressional interests such as whether a statute is constitutional, but that one or both Houses of Congress must sue as an institution. …


Making Privacy Injuries Concrete, Peter Ormerod Jan 2022

Making Privacy Injuries Concrete, Peter Ormerod

Washington and Lee Law Review

In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the doctrine of Article III standing deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over some lawsuits involving intangible injuries. The lower federal courts are carrying out the Supreme Court’s instructions, and privacy injuries have borne the brunt of the Court’s directive. This Article identifies two incoherencies in the Court’s recent intangible injury decisions and builds on the work of privacy scholars to fashion a solution.

The first incoherency is a line-drawing problem: the Court has never explained why some intangible injuries create an Article III injury in fact while others …


Brief Of Complex Litigation Law Professors As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondent, Myriam E. Gilles Mar 2021

Brief Of Complex Litigation Law Professors As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondent, Myriam E. Gilles

Amicus Briefs

The amici are law professors who teach and write in the field of federal civil procedure and complex litigation. Amici share an interest in presenting this Court with an impartial view on the function of the class action and its relationship to the law of Article III justiciability to inform the question presented in this case.


The Paradox Of Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Claims, Thomas B. Bennett Jan 2021

The Paradox Of Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Claims, Thomas B. Bennett

Faculty Publications

Standing doctrine is supposed to ensure the separation of powers and an adversary process of adjudication. But recently, it has begun serving a new and unintended purpose: transferring federal claims from federal to state court. Paradoxically, current standing doctrine assigns a growing class of federal claims - despite Congressional intent to the contrary - to the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts. Even then, only in some states, and only to the extent authorized by state law.

This paradox arises at the intersection of three distinct areas of doctrine:

(1) a newly sharpened requirement of concrete injury under Article III that …


Federal Magistrate Court Of Appeals: Whether Magistrate Judge Disposition Of Section 2255 Motions Under Consent Jurisdiction Is Statutorily And Constitutionally Permissible, Corey J. Hauser Oct 2020

Federal Magistrate Court Of Appeals: Whether Magistrate Judge Disposition Of Section 2255 Motions Under Consent Jurisdiction Is Statutorily And Constitutionally Permissible, Corey J. Hauser

Washington and Lee Law Review

For decades the Supreme Court has balanced the tension between judicial efficiency and adherence to our constitutional system of separation of powers. As more cases were filed in federal courts, Congress increased the responsibilities and power given to magistrate judges. The result is magistrate judges wielding as much power as district judges. With post-conviction relief under § 2255, magistrate judges take on a whole new role— appellate judge—reviewing and potentially overturning sentences imposed by district judges.

This practice raises two concerns. First, did Congress intend to statutorily give magistrate judges this power? The prevailing interpretation is that § 2255 motions …


The Constitutionality Of Nationwide Injunctions, Alan M. Trammell Jan 2020

The Constitutionality Of Nationwide Injunctions, Alan M. Trammell

Scholarly Articles

Opponents of nationwide injunctions have advanced cogent reasons why courts should be skeptical of this sweeping remedy, but one of the arguments is a red herring: the constitutional objection. This Essay focuses on the narrow question of whether the Article III judicial power prohibits nationwide injunctions. It doesn’t.

This Essay confronts and dispels the two most plausible arguments that nationwide injunctions run afoul of Article III. First, it shows that standing jurisprudence does not actually speak to the scope-of-remedy questions that nationwide injunctions present. Second, it demonstrates that the Article III judicial power is not narrowly defined in terms of …


Proponents' Standing To Defend Their Ballot Initiatives: Post-Hollingsworth Work-Arounds?, Nat Stern, John S. Caragozian Jan 2017

Proponents' Standing To Defend Their Ballot Initiatives: Post-Hollingsworth Work-Arounds?, Nat Stern, John S. Caragozian

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.


“Spooky Action At A Distance”: Intangible Injury In Fact In The Information Age, Seth F. Kreimer Feb 2016

“Spooky Action At A Distance”: Intangible Injury In Fact In The Information Age, Seth F. Kreimer

All Faculty Scholarship

Two decades after Justice Douglas coined “injury in fact” as the token of admission to federal court under Article III, Justice Scalia sealed it into the constitutional canon in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. In the two decades since Lujan, Justice Scalia has thrown increasingly pointed barbs at the permissive standing doctrine of the Warren Court, maintaining it is founded on impermissible recognition of “Psychic Injury.” Justice Scalia and his acolytes take the position that Article III requires a tough minded, common sense and practical approach. Injuries in fact must be "tangible" "direct" "concrete" "de facto" realities in time and …


Psychological Harm And Constitutional Standing, Rachel Bayefsky Jan 2016

Psychological Harm And Constitutional Standing, Rachel Bayefsky

Brooklyn Law Review

When do psychological or emotional harms count as “injury-in-fact” for the purposes of satisfying Article III standing requirements, and when should they? Courts have wrestled with whether to grant standing, for example, to family members of a man killed by the police who argued that as relatives of the deceased, they had suffered emotional pain; members of an animal-welfare organization who claimed they had undergone “sleeplessness, depression, and anger” when they were unable to visit an elephant at the zoo; and members of a Catholic organization who challenged a city resolution criticizing the Catholic Church’s stance on adoption by same-sex …


The Prudential Third Party Standing Of Family-Owned Corporations, Matthew I. Hall, Benjamin Means Jan 2014

The Prudential Third Party Standing Of Family-Owned Corporations, Matthew I. Hall, Benjamin Means

Scholarly Works

On November 26, 2013, the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether for-profit corporations or their shareholders have standing to challenge federal regulations that implement the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). At issue in the two cases consolidated for appeal, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties, are regulations mandating that employers with fifty or more employees offer health insurance that includes coverage for all contraceptives approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The plaintiffs assert that providing certain types of contraceptive care would be contrary to their religious beliefs and allege, therefore, that the mandate violates the Religious …


Judge Posner’S 'Practical' Theory Of Standing: Closer To Justice Breyer’S Approach To Standing Than Justice Scalia’S, Bradford Mank Jan 2012

Judge Posner’S 'Practical' Theory Of Standing: Closer To Justice Breyer’S Approach To Standing Than Justice Scalia’S, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

In American Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit questioned three different grounds articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court for the constitutional doctrine of standing in federal courts and instead argued that the “solidest grounds” for the doctrine of standing are “practical.” In part because of his self-described “pragmatic” approach to legal reasoning, Judge Posner’s maverick views may have led Republican presidents to pass him over for being nominated to the Supreme Court in favor of less brilliant but more predictable conservative judges. Judge Posner’s pragmatic or practical approach to standing …


Giving Notice: An Argument For Notification Of Putative Plaintiffs In Complex Litigation, Marjorie A. Silver Aug 2011

Giving Notice: An Argument For Notification Of Putative Plaintiffs In Complex Litigation, Marjorie A. Silver

Marjorie A. Silver

Professor Silver advocates recognition of an inherent judicial power to send or authorize notice of pending litigation to potentially interested persons with unfiled claims. Recognizing such a judicial power is consistent with recent legal developments establishing a role for judges in expediting and managing federal litigation. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only explicitly provide for notice to potential parties in Rule 23 class action litigation, Professor Silver demonstrates that a more general judicial power to notify putative plaintiffs is consistent with the federal rules and the Constitution. She also shows that the first amendment values support a judicial …


Cy Pres Relief And The Pathologies Of The Modern Class Action: A Normative And Empirical Analysis, Samantha Zyontz, Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian Jul 2010

Cy Pres Relief And The Pathologies Of The Modern Class Action: A Normative And Empirical Analysis, Samantha Zyontz, Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian

Faculty Scholarship

Since the mid 1970s, federal courts have taken the doctrine of cy pres relief from the venerable law of trusts and adapted it for use in the modern class action proceeding. In its original context, cy pres was utilized as a means of judicially designating a charitable recipient when, for whatever reason, it was no longer possible to fulfill the original goal of the maker of the trust. The purpose of cy pres was to provide “the next best relief” by finding a recipient who would resemble the original donor’s recipient as much as possible. In the context of class …


Giving Notice: An Argument For Notification Of Putative Plaintiffs In Complex Litigation, Marjorie A. Silver Jan 1991

Giving Notice: An Argument For Notification Of Putative Plaintiffs In Complex Litigation, Marjorie A. Silver

Scholarly Works

Professor Silver advocates recognition of an inherent judicial power to send or authorize notice of pending litigation to potentially interested persons with unfiled claims. Recognizing such a judicial power is consistent with recent legal developments establishing a role for judges in expediting and managing federal litigation. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only explicitly provide for notice to potential parties in Rule 23 class action litigation, Professor Silver demonstrates that a more general judicial power to notify putative plaintiffs is consistent with the federal rules and the Constitution. She also shows that the first amendment values support a judicial …


Organizational Standing In Environmental Litigation, Jeanne A. Compitello Jan 1990

Organizational Standing In Environmental Litigation, Jeanne A. Compitello

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Tightening The Reigns On Pendent And Ancillary Jurisdiction, David Lawyer Jan 1985

Tightening The Reigns On Pendent And Ancillary Jurisdiction, David Lawyer

Seattle University Law Review

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution makes this principle clear by the statement that "judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties . . . and . . . to all controversies . . . between Citizens of different States . . ."' One might argue that "judicial power" under Article III is not the same thing as jurisdiction. But the exercise of jurisdiction in situations in which a federal court does not have judicial power would …