Law Commons^™

The Partially Prudential Doctrine Of Mootness, Matthew I. Hall

Scholarly Works

The conventional understanding of mootness doctrine is that it operates as a mandatory bar to federal court jurisdiction, derived from the "cases or controversies" clause of the United States Constitution, Article III. In two crucial respects, however, this Constitutional model - which was first adopted by the Supreme Court less than 45 years ago - fails to account for the manner in which courts actually address contentions of mootness. First, the commonly-applied exceptions to the mootness bar are not derived from the "cases or controversies" clause and cannot be reconciled with the Constitutional account of mootness. Second, courts regularly consider …

Recent Jurisdiction Developments In The New York Court Of Appeals, Jay C. Carlisle

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This article will discuss recent developments in long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR section 302 and two related New York Court of Appeals decisions. Specifically, the article will address Fischbarg v. Doucet, which presents the court's expansive view of long-arm jurisdiction in light of recent technological developments, and Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, in which the court's decision to limit long-arm jurisdiction was rejected by subsequent legislation, signaling a more expansive application of CPLR 302 in the future.

Recent Private International Law Developments Before The Supreme Court Of Canada, Antonin I. Pribetic

Antonin I. Pribetic

A trilogy of interesting cases involving private international law recently wended their way to the Supreme Court of Canada: (1) King v. Drabinsky (an Ontario case addressing the applicability of the Charter in respect of the enforcement of a foreign judgment); (2) Teck Cominco Metals Ltd. v. Lloyd's Underwriters (a British Columbia case involving declaratory relief in the context of parallel proceedings and forum non conveniens); and (3) Yugraneft v. Rexx Management Corporation (an Alberta case which affirmed that the two-year limitation period under s.3 of Alberta's Limitations Act, governs when a party seeks the recognition and enforcement in Alberta …

Comedy Or Tragedy: The Tale Of Diversity Jurisdiction Removal And The One-Year Bar, Michael W. Lewis

Michael W. Lewis

The current laws governing diversity removal are badly broken. They create counterproductive incentives that have increased the workload of federal courts while rewarding deceptive practices on the part of plaintiffs. Defendants have every incentive to remove even low value cases to federal court, on the chance that the vague and uncertain standards governing amount in controversy issues will allow them to succeed. At the same time, the current rules encourage plaintiffs to conceal the true value of their cases for one-year, to prevent removal to federal court, and then to reveal the true value, while using the one-year bar to …

A Call For The End Of The Doctrine Of Realignment, Jacob S. Sherkow

Articles & Chapters

In Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 1941, the Supreme Court established the doctrine of realignment, requiring federal courts to examine the issues in dispute and realign each party as plaintiff or defendant if necessary. Due to the complete diversity requirement, realignment gave the federal courts the ability to both create and destroy diversity jurisdiction. Since 1941, the federal courts have struggled to interpret the central holding in Indianapolis, and have created several competing "tests" for realignment. This confusion has made the doctrine of realignment unworkable. Realignment-along with each of the present tests-encourages jurisdictional abuses by forcing the federal courts to …

Jurisdiction's Noble Lie, Frederic M. Bloom

Publications

This Article makes sense of a lie. It shows how legal jurisdiction depends on a falsehood--and then explains why it would.

To make this novel argument, this Article starts where jurisdiction does. It recounts jurisdiction's foundations--its tests and motives, its histories and rules. It then seeks out jurisdictional reality, critically examining a side of jurisdiction we too often overlook. Legal jurisdiction may portray itself as fixed and unyielding, as natural as the force of gravity, and as stable as the firmest ground. But jurisdiction is in fact something different. It is a malleable legal invention that bears a false rigid …

Ruth Bader Ginsburg And Sensible Pragmatism In Federal Jurisdictional Policy, Tobias Barrington Wolff

All Faculty Scholarship

This article, written as part of a symposium celebrating the work of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the occasion of her fifteenth year on the Supreme Court, examines the strain of sensible legal pragmatism that informs Justice Ginsburg's writing in the fields of Civil Procedure and Federal Jurisdiction. Taking as its point of departure the Supreme Court's decision in City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, in which Ginsburg dissented, the article develops an argument against strict textualism in federal jurisdictional analysis. In its place, the article urges a purposive mode of interpretation that approaches jurisdictional text with a …