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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
There's A Pennoyer In My Foyer: Civil Procedure According To Dr. Seuss, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
There's A Pennoyer In My Foyer: Civil Procedure According To Dr. Seuss, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
Scholarly Works
This is what it purports to be: a Seussian take on civil procedure. It’s a short, fun essay that covers (1) the iron triangle of civil procedure - the role of lawyers, judges, and juries, and (2) prominent civil procedure doctrines, such as personal jurisdiction, Erie, pleading, discovery, and joinder.
The Partially Prudential Doctrine Of Mootness, Matthew I. Hall
The Partially Prudential Doctrine Of Mootness, Matthew I. Hall
Scholarly Works
The conventional understanding of mootness doctrine is that it operates as a mandatory bar to federal court jurisdiction, derived from the "cases or controversies" clause of the United States Constitution, Article III. In two crucial respects, however, this Constitutional model - which was first adopted by the Supreme Court less than 45 years ago - fails to account for the manner in which courts actually address contentions of mootness. First, the commonly-applied exceptions to the mootness bar are not derived from the "cases or controversies" clause and cannot be reconciled with the Constitutional account of mootness. Second, courts regularly consider …
A New Way Forward: A Response To Judge Weinstein, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
A New Way Forward: A Response To Judge Weinstein, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
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This short essay responds to Judge Jack Weinstein's essay, Preliminary Reflections on Administration of Complex Litigations, 2009 Cardozo De Novo 1. In so doing, it also provides a condensed version of my earlier article, Litigating Groups, which analyzes group dynamics within nonclass aggregation. By drawing on the literature of moral and political philosophy as well as social psychology, I contend that, in the face of hard cases, of instability and disunity, plaintiffs who have made promises and assurances to one another can invoke social norms of promise-keeping, social agglomeration, compatibility, and the desire for means-end coherence to achieve consensus, mitigate …
Procedural Adequacy, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
Procedural Adequacy, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
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This short piece responds to Jay Tidmarsh’s article, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 Texas Law Review 1137 (2009). I explore Professor Tidmarsh’s proposed “do no harm” approach to adequate representation in class actions from a procedural legitimacy perspective. I begin by considering the assumption underlying his alternative, namely that in any given class action both attorneys and class representatives tend to act as self-interested homo economicus and we must therefore tailor the adequacy requirement to curb self-interest only in so far as it makes class members worse off than they would be with individual litigation. Adopting the “do no harm” …
Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistence Of The Duty To Sit Doctrine, Jeffrey W. Stempel
Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistence Of The Duty To Sit Doctrine, Jeffrey W. Stempel
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The duty to sit concept or “doctrine”—or at least what I term the “pernicious” version of the concept—emphasizes a judge's obligation to hear and decide cases unless there is a compelling ground for disqualification and creates a situation in which judges are erroneously pushed to resolve close disqualification issues against recusal when the presumption should run in exactly the opposite direction. In close cases, judges should err on the side of recusal in order to enhance public confidence in the judiciary and to ensure that subtle, subconscious, or hard-to-prove bias, prejudice, or partiality does not influence decision-making. The pernicious version …
Playing Forty Questions: Responding To Justice Roberts' Concerns In Caperton And Some Tentative Answers About Operationalizing Judicial Recusal And Due Process, Jeffrey W. Stempel
Playing Forty Questions: Responding To Justice Roberts' Concerns In Caperton And Some Tentative Answers About Operationalizing Judicial Recusal And Due Process, Jeffrey W. Stempel
Scholarly Works
The Chief Justice of the United States would probably have excelled as a negative debater in high school forensics competitions. Good negative debaters are, as my high school English teacher put it, “great point-pickers” in that they frequently challenge affirmative proposals with a series of “what if?” or “how about?” or “what would you do if?” questions designed to leave the affirmative resolution bleeding to death of a thousand cuts. Less charitable observers might call it nit-picking. After reading Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., one can easily imagine him as a high school …