Law Commons^™

To Thine Own Ceo Be True: Tailoring Ceo Compensation To Individual Personality And Circumstances, William O. Fisher

Law Faculty Publications

Eight-figure compensation. Cash. Restricted stock. Options. Performance shares. And more. Companies shower their CEOs with pay in large amounts, delivered in multiple ways, and dependent on complex and intricate formulae. It is all intended to motivate the top officers to make decisions that will best benefit their companies. Common sense tells us that the value of a complicated, multifaceted pay package- and hence its ability to motivate- will depend on the psychological characteristics and financial circumstances of the particular executive being paid. Economic theory and empirical studies confirm this intuition. Yet, companies generally ignore these vital factors. Substantive and disclosure …

The Way We Pay Now: Understanding And Evaluating Performance-Based Executive Pay, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last ten years, performance-based equity pay, and particularly performance shares, have displaced stock options as the primary instrument for compensating executives of large, public companies in the U.S. This article examines that transformation, analyzing the structure and incentive properties of these newly important instruments and evaluating the benefits and risks from an investor’s perspective. Notable observations include the following: Although technically “stock” instruments, performance shares mimic the incentive characteristics of options. But performance shares avoid the tax, accounting, and other constraints that have led to uniform grants of non-indexed, at the money options. Performance share plans can be …

The Diminishing Returns Of Incentive Pay In Executive Compensation Contracts, Gregg D. Polsky, Andrew Lund

Scholarly Works

For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We argue, however, that in light of evolving corporate governance mechanisms, the marginal net benefit of incentive-laden pay packages is both smaller than appreciated and getting smaller over time. As a result, the assumption that higher proportions of incentive pay are beneficial is no longer warranted.

A number of corporate governance mechanisms have evolved to duplicate …

The Economic Impact Of Backdating Of Executive Stock Options, M. P. Narayanan, Cindi A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun

Michigan Law Review

This Article discusses the economic impact of legal, tax, disclosure, and incentive issues arising from the revelation of dating games with regard to executive option grant dates. It provides an estimate of the value loss incurred by shareholders of firms implicated in backdating and compares it to the potential gain that executives might have obtained through backdating. Using a sample of firms that have already been implicated in backdating, we find that the revelation of backdating results in an average loss to shareholders of about 7%. This translates to about $400 million per firm. By contrast, we estimate that the …

Reverse Monitoring: On The Hidden Role Of Employee Stock-Based Compensation, Sharon Hannes

Michigan Law Review

This Article develops a new understanding of equity-based compensation schemes, such as employee stock option plans. Current literature views such schemes as a measure aimed at motivating the recipient employees to work harder for the firm. Under that view, this method of remuneration either complements or substitutes for other measures used to monitor the performance of the recipient employees. In contrast, this Article proposes that recipient employees be viewed as potential monitors of other employees and that stock options (or similar types of compensation) motivate them to fulfill this task. This view has many applications and can shed light on …

Some Observations On The Stock Option Backdating Scandal Of 2006, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

The corporate stock option backdating scandal has dominated business page headlines during the summer of 2006. The SEC is currently investigating more than seventy-five companies with respect to the timing and pricing of stock options granted during the boom years of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the number of firms caught up in the scandal seems to increase every day. This essay contributes to our understanding of the backdating phenomenon by analyzing the economics of backdating and the characteristics of the firms under investigation. Its main points are the following: First, given the high volatilities of the stocks …

Corporate Responsibility: Ensuring Independent Judgment Of The General Counsel - A Look At Stock Options, Z. Jill Barclift

Faculty Scholarship

Recent corporate scandals and allegations of corporate fraud in public companies have most people asking how things went so wrong. When looking to assess blame for corporate malfeasance, many ask, “Where were the lawyers?” In several high-profile corporate fraud investigations, outside and in-house lawyers were criticized for not doing more to prevent corporate executives from violating the law, and several general counsels were charged with criminal misconduct by state and federal authorities. Why would the general counsel of a public corporation risk his or her career, reputation, and criminal prosecution to assist executives in perpetuating corporate fraud? The answer may …

Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, Randall Thomas, John E. Core, Wayne Guay

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this paper, we review Pay Without Performance by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. The book develops and summarizes the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the U.S., and offers a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing, and systemic reform is needed. This review summarizes the book in some detail and offers some counter-arguments. The book's thesis is that executive compensation practices are bad for shareholders (not "optimal") because they are the product of "managerial power." Managerial power arises because boards of directors at public companies …

Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

High levels of executive compensation have triggered an intense debate over whether compensation results primarily from competitive pressures in the market for managerial services or from managerial overreaching. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have advanced the debate with their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, which forcefully argues that current compensation levels are best explained by managerial rent-seeking, not by arm's-length bargaining designed to create the optimum pay and performance nexus. This paper expresses three sorts of reservations with their analysis and advances its own proposals. First, enhancing shareholder welfare is not, as a …

Market Symmetry And The Tax Efficiency Of Equity Compensation, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

At first blush, the deferral of employee income recognition associated with equity compensation appears to provide a tax advantage in a rising market but an offsetting disadvantage in a declining market. Merton Miller and Myron Scholes argued, however, that this apparent symmetry is misleading and that employees can hedge to ensure tax efficiency despite market uncertainty. This article demonstrates that the effect of employee hedging is fairly small, but that a combination of factors, including capital loss limitations, the possibility of employee-favorable ex post adjustments to equity compensation arrangements, and employee hedging, do cause compensatory stock grants and nonqualified options …

Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This paper examines internal pay disparities in American public corporations and argues that wide gaps between the top and bottom of the pay scale can, in certain circumstances, directly and adversely affect firm value, that corporate boards should be informed about these effects, and that they should, in some cases, reduce internal pay differentials to address them. In support of this thesis, it analyzes numerous empirical studies that have shown that wide disparities in corporate pay scales can adversely affect firm value. These studies demonstrate that, at many types of organizations, as internal pay differentials grow, employees and lower level …

Governance Failures Of The Enron Board And The New Information Order Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Analysis of the corporate governance crisis that manifested itself in the United States at the turn of the millennium requires separating its various strands. The Enron Corporation ("Enron") debacle and the dot corn bubble and collapse, for example, share some common elements but in other ways they are quite different. In both cases investors became aggressively enamored of an unsustainable business model. In the dot com case it was the belief that an innovator in a rapidly growing market could attain powerful first mover advantages that would produce an eventual cascade of profits, so that a current and increasing stream …

An Arm's Length Struggle: To Include Or Not To Include Stock Options In Cost Sharing Arrangements And Non-Integral Service Agreements, Kenneth Blackburn

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Tax Constraints On Indexed Options, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

Indexed stock option grants reward executives for outperforming a benchmark, such as the market as a whole or competitors in the same industry. These options offer superior incentives by limiting the influence of factors beyond an executive's control, such as general market and industry conditions. Yet indexed options are almost never used. Professor Saul Levmore seeks to explain this puzzle with norms. This comment on his article argues that tax plays a larger role in this puzzle than he acknowledges, although tax is not a complete explanation. Accounting and Professor Levmore's norms-based account are then briefly considered.

Teaching Corporate Law From An Option Perspective, Peter H. Huang

Publications

No abstract provided.

Stock Options And Other Executive Incentive Arrangements, Charles W. Steadman

Vanderbilt Law Review

The immense economic expansion and changes of the post-war period have generated numerous problems. In American business a major product of this is to be found in the difficulty of developing and maintaining the reservoir of executive talent at levels sufficiently high that managerial functions can continue to be performed with an advanced degree of efficiency. The shortage of qualified executives has been widely reported. The competition for those available is intense and increasing.

Unfortunately, it would seem that at the very time the need is greatest the normal incentives for an individual to assume major executive status have been …