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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Asadi: Renegade Or Precursor Of Who Is A Whistleblower Under The Dodd-Frank Act?, Mystica M. Alexander, John O. Hayward, David Missirian
Asadi: Renegade Or Precursor Of Who Is A Whistleblower Under The Dodd-Frank Act?, Mystica M. Alexander, John O. Hayward, David Missirian
Pace Law Review
Whistleblowers have a long and honorable history. From Ralph Nader blowing the whistle on the hazards of GM’s Corvair in Unsafe at Any Speed1 in the 1960’s to Jeffrey Wigand in 1996 exposing the duplicity of the tobacco industry, whistleblowers have put conscience ahead of career and personal success to expose corporate fraud and wrongdoing. Not surprisingly, they have had to endure ridicule and ostracism as well as financial hardship. Legislation has sought to protect them from retribution, often with mixed success. The most recent legislative effort is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) that allows …
Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson
Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson
Jonathan C. Lipson
This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.
First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …
Financial Institution Executive Compensation: The Problem Of Financially Motivated Excessive Risk-Taking, The Regulatory Response, And Common Sense Solutions, Jesse D. Gossett
Financial Institution Executive Compensation: The Problem Of Financially Motivated Excessive Risk-Taking, The Regulatory Response, And Common Sense Solutions, Jesse D. Gossett
Jesse D Gossett
This article addresses the issue of executive compensation at financial institutions as it relates to encouraging excessive risk-taking at these firms. First, I examine the economics of compensation and its relationship to risk-taking at financial firms. Next, I take a critical look at compensation provisions of Dodd-Frank (and to a lesser extent, Sarbanes-Oxley) and describe not only what Dodd-Frank does, but more importantly what it does not do. I then make specific recommendations for rules regulators should adopt under Dodd-Frank for the purpose of using compensation plans as a way of reducing excessive risk at financial institutions. I make these …
How To Sufficiently Consider Efficiency, Competition, And Capital Formation In The Wake Of Business Roundtable, Ian D. Ghrist
How To Sufficiently Consider Efficiency, Competition, And Capital Formation In The Wake Of Business Roundtable, Ian D. Ghrist
Ian D. Ghrist
This article applies ideas from the Law and Economics movement to the D.C. Circuit's 2011 decision in Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission. The article lays out a framework for cost-benefit analysis that, if followed, should increase new rules' chances of surviving the heightened arbitrary and capricious review standard imposed by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.
The Dodd-Frank Act comprises the broadest financial reforms since the 1930s. The Act, however, makes surprisingly few important decisions and instead, almost exclusively defers to agency rulemaking or the creation of a new organization. The Act mandates the promulgation of …
Chevron, Greenwashing, And The Myth Of 'Green Oil Companies', Miriam A. Cherry, Judd F. Sneirson
Chevron, Greenwashing, And The Myth Of 'Green Oil Companies', Miriam A. Cherry, Judd F. Sneirson
All Faculty Scholarship
As green business practices grow in popularity, so does the temptation to “greenwash” one’s business to appear more environmentally and socially responsible than it actually is. We examined this phenomenon in an earlier paper, using BP and the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe as a case study and developing a framework for policing dubious claims of corporate social responsibility. This Article revisits these issues focusing on Chevron, an oil company that claims in its advertisements to care deeply about the environment and the communities in which it operates, even as it faces an $18 billion judgment for polluting the Ecuadorean Amazon and …
Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility And Greenwashing After The Bp Oil Disaster, Miriam A. Cherry, Judd F. Sneirson
Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility And Greenwashing After The Bp Oil Disaster, Miriam A. Cherry, Judd F. Sneirson
All Faculty Scholarship
The explosion of the BP-leased Deepwater Horizon and subsequent oil spill stands as an indictment not just of our national energy priorities and environmental law enforcement; it equally represents a failure of Anglo-American corporate law and what passes for corporate social responsibility in business today. Using BP and the disaster as a compelling case study, this Article examines green marketing and corporate governance and identifies elements of each that encourage firms to engage only superficially in corporate social responsibility yet trumpet those efforts to eager consumers and investors. The Article then proposes reforms and protections designed to increase corporate social …