Law Commons^™

Caremark'S Butterfly Effect, Angela N. Aneiros, Karen E. Woody

Scholarly Articles

In 1996, the Delaware Court of Chancery detailed the minimum standard for corporate boards of directors (“board”) with regard to corporate compliance programs and monitoring protocols. The landmark Caremark decision held that directors would not face liability for a breach of fiduciary duties unless they failed to implement a system of controls and compliance, or knowingly failed to monitor that system. In order to bring a successful Caremark claim, plaintiffs must prove that the board operated in bad faith by failing to exercise oversight in a sustained or systemic way. The Delaware Court of Chancery opinion noted that the theory …

Business Judgment Rule Or Due Diligence? How To Reduce Vicarious Liability For Spac Directors And Officers, Beau Duty

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporate Law For Good People, Yuval Feldman, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky

All Faculty Scholarship

This article offers a novel analysis of the field of corporate governance by viewing it through the lens of behavioral ethics. It calls for both shifting the focus of corporate governance to a new set of loci of potential corporate wrongdoing and adding new tools to the corporate governance arsenal. The behavioral ethics scholarship emphasizes the large share of wrongdoing generated by "good people" whose intention is to act ethically. Their wrongdoing stems from "bounded ethicality" -- various cognitive and motivational processes that lead to biased decisions that seem legitimate. In the legal domain, corporate law provides the most fertile …

The Diminishing Duty Of Loyalty, Julian Velasco

Washington and Lee Law Review

Fiduciary duties comprise an integral part of corporate law. It is generally understood that directors owe the corporation and its shareholders two fiduciary duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Although both duties are firmly established in corporate law, they are not treated equally. It is generally understood that the duty of loyalty is enforced far more rigorously than the duty of care. The justification for this dichotomy is twofold. First, differential treatment is appropriate because of the relative urgencies of the underlying subject matter: loyalty issues pose greater risks than do care issues. Second, the deference …

Re-Examining The Law And Economics Of The Business Judgment Rule: Notes For Its Implementation In Non-Us Jurisdictions, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The business judgment rule, as it has been traditionally understood, seems to be based on three underlying assumptions that make this rule economically desirable. First, directors are subject to a credible threat of being sued for a breach of the duty of care. Second, the primary role of the corporation is to maximise shareholder value. Third, shareholders want the directors to pursue those investment projects with the highest net present value regardless of their volatility. This article challenges these assumptions and argues that the business judgment rule might not be desirable in some jurisdictions outside the United States and even …

A Rule-Based Method For Comparing Corporate Laws, Lynn M. Lopucki

UF Law Faculty Publications

Part I explains the processes for specifying a Scenario. It introduces the Scenario that will serve as the illustration in the remainder of this Article—a comparison of the liability of directors for the exercise of poor judgment in a Delaware corporation with the corresponding liability in a United Kingdom public limited company. Part II explains and illustrates the necessity of selecting specific entity types for comparison. Part III describes and illustrates the method for resolving the Scenario in both jurisdictions. Part IV explains and illustrates the novel process for close comparison—the extraction, juxtaposition, and comparison of decisional rules from the …

The "New" Fiduciary Standards Under The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: More Bottom Bumping From Nccusl, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Maine Law Review

Between 1995 and 2001, the influential National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated iterations of uniform laws pertaining to partnerships, limited partnerships and limited liability companies. One or more of those acts have been widely adopted by state legislatures. Each of the three acts—the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) (hereinafter RUPA), the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (hereinafter ULPA (2001)), and the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996) (hereinafter ULLCA) —contains identical fiduciary duty provisions. The acts all adopt the same standards for the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, and offer parties the same limited …

Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

Although officers are crucial to corporate operations, scholarly and theoretical accounts tend to slight officers and amalgamate them with directors into a single category, "managers." This essay anchors officers within the common law of agency-as does black-letter law-which crisply differentiates officers from directors. Understanding that agency is central of the legal account of officers' positions and responsibilities is crucial to seeing why, like directors, officers are fiduciaries, but distinctively so, not as instances of generic "corporate fiduciaries." Officers, like directors, owe duties of loyalty, but also particularized duties of care, competence, and diligence. Additionally, officers' duties of performance encompass two …

Directors And Standards: The Problem Of Insufficient Guidance, Nikolas Sopow

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

This thesis identifies two areas within Canadian corporate law where the case law has provided insufficient guidance, and tests the usefulness of an American theory of director liability as an aid to understanding this case law and the legislation it interprets. This theory has been termed the “implied contract approach”, and was developed by Robert J. Rhee. The two areas concern: if and when directors must consider the interests of stakeholder groups, otherwise known as the “stakeholder debate”, and when directors should be protected from personal liability when acting in the course of their duties.

Disciplining Corporate Boards And Debtholders Through Targeted Proxy Access, Michelle M. Harner

Indiana Law Journal

Corporate directors committed to a failed business strategy or unduly influenced by the company’s debtholders need a dissenting voice—they need shareholder nominees on the board. This Article examines the biases, conflicts, and external factors that impact board decisions, particularly when a company faces financial distress. It challenges the conventional wisdom that debt disciplines management, and it sug-gests that, in certain circumstances, the company would benefit from having the shareholders’ perspective more actively represented on the board. To that end, the Article proposes a bylaw that would give shareholders the ability to nominate direc-tors upon the occurrence of predefined events. Such …

The Shareholder Value Myth, Lynn Stout

Lynn A. Stout

No abstract provided.

In Praise Of Procedure: An Economic And Behavioral Defense Of Smith V. Van Gorkom And The Business Judgment Rule, Lynn Stout

Lynn A. Stout

No abstract provided.

Exploring The Standard Of Review Of Transactions With Controlling Shareholders After In Re Mfw Shareholders Litigation (Decided May 29th, 2013), Miriam Bitton, Odelia Minnes

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

This Article will begin with a review of the MFW case, followed by a review of the judicial history prior to this decision. Then it will try to analyze, albeit partially, some of the reasons for why this judgment is timely and reasonable considering changes that occurred in the last decades. It will also address some of the courts' reasoning and its persuasiveness.

More Burden Than Benefit? Analysis Of The Benefit Corporation Movement In California, Sarah Thornsberry

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

The benefit corporation movement has been associated with the separate camps of social entrepreneurship, nonprofit organizations, and for-profit corporations, while trying to establish itself as a community of businesses that pursue not only profit, but also environmental and social good. This article examines the legal attributes of benefit corporation legislation and articulates why incorporating as a benefit corporation can be an excellent business decision. Lastly, the article looks at how the movement can further expand in California.

How Corporate Political Spending Strains The Limits Of The Business Judgment Rule, David Rosenberg

David Rosenberg

A number of agency issues arise when a corporation chooses to exercise its freedom of speech by making donations to a super PAC or other political organization. This article draws a distinction between contributions designed to influence legislation and regulation of the corporation and political donations that corporations justify as goodwill or community outreach. Analyzing the issue with an emphasis on the duty of loyalty, the article argues that much corporate political spending cannot really be understood as a business decision that should enjoy the protection of the business judgment rule. It also reflects on the Supreme Court’s recent decision …

Present At The Creation: Reflections On The Early Years Of The National Association Of Corporate Directors, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

Effective corporate governance is critical to the productive operation of the global economy and preservation of our way of life. Excellent governance execution is also required to achieve economic growth and robust job creation in any country. In the United States, the premier director membership organization is the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). Since 1978, NACD plays a major role in fostering excellence in corporate governance in the United States and beyond. The NACD has grown from a mere realization of the importance of corporate governance to become the only national membership organization created by and for corporate directors. …

Seinfeld V. Slager: The Delaware Chancery Court’S New Legal Standard For Reviewing Directors’ Decisions About Their Own Pay, Lilia Volynkova

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Amending The Economic Espionage Act To Require The Disclosure Of National Security-Related Technology Thefts, David Orozco

Catholic University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Present At The Creation: Reflections On The Early Years Of The National Association Of Corporate Directors, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

Effective corporate governance is critical to the productive operation of the global economy and preservation of our way of life. Excellent governance execution is also required to achieve economic growth and robust job creation in any country. In the United States, the premier director membership organization is the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). Now over 36 years old, NACD plays a major role in fostering excellence in corporate governance in the United States and beyond. Over the past thirty-six years NACD has grown from a mere realization of the importance of corporate governance to become the only national membership …

The Shareholder Value Myth, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Proposed Restatement Of Corporate Governance: Is Reform Really Necessary?, Ira S. Levine

Pepperdine Law Review

The role of the director in a modern corporation has recently come under new scrutiny. The American Law Institute has proposed a "Restatement of Corporate Governance" which offers explicit guidelines for the conduct of corporate directors. The Institute proposes to increase the board of directors' responsibility for corporate affairs by raising the board's standard of care. The Proposed Restatement has, however, been criticized by the business community for failing to take into account the realities of corporate governance and for imposing a suffocatingly narrow set of guidelines. Corporate management is not in need of reform. But even if it were, …

Rethinking Judicial Review Of Director Care, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Lyman P. Q. Johnson

This article offers an extended critique of the Delaware Supreme Court's unprecedented use of an entire fairness test in a breach of due care setting, as first articulated in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) and Cinerama, Inc. v. Technocolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). The article then argues for a generalized reasonableness standard for director conduct and for judicially reviewing care claims, thereby providing Delaware law with something it has lacked historically ? a pervasive (yet still streamlined) duty of due care.

The Modest Business Judgment Rule, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Lyman P. Q. Johnson

This article argues that Delaware mis-formulates and mis-uses the business judgment rule. Properly understood, the business judgment rule's function in corporate law is quite modest. It is a narrowly-drawn judicial policy of nonreview which, in duty of care cases, shields the merits of board decisions from judicial scrutiny. The article contends that the business judgment rule, therefore, should be de-emphasized as an analytical construct in the law of director fiduciary duties and should be sharply differentiated from the broader-gauged duty of due care. Doing so will pave the way for Delaware courts to rethink the importance of articulating a robust, …

Corporate Officers And The Business Judgment Rule, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Lyman P. Q. Johnson

This article argues that the business judgment rule - a cornerstone concept in corporate law - does not and should not extend to corporate officers in the same broad manner in which it is applied to directors. The argument proceeds along both descriptive and normative lines. After first reviewing judicial decisions, the article concludes that, notwithstanding frequent, broad assertions to the contrary, application of the rule to corporate officers is not firmly established in case law. The article next examines the policy case by assessing three conventional rationales for applying the rule to directors and concluding, on balance, that the …

Decisional Integrity And The Business Judgment Rule: A Theory, Alfred Dennis Mathewson

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A 'Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Articles

While reference to "fiduciary duties" (plural) is routinely employed in the United States as a convenient short-hand for a corporate director's duties of care and loyalty, other common-law countries generally treat loyalty as the sole "fiduciary duty." This contrast prompts some important questions about the doctrinal structure for duty of care analysis adopted in Delaware, the principal jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Specifically, has the evolution of Delaware's convoluted and problematic framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct been facilitated by styling care a "fiduciary" duty? If so, then how should Delaware lawmakers and judges respond moving forward?

In …

Delaware's Duty To Auction After Paramount Communications, Inc. V. Qvc Network, Inc., Robert D. Ming

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle Harner

Michelle M. Harner

Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …

Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle M. Harner

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …

Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague

Robert Sprague

This paper explores whether the modern corporate governance model is sustainable. For many, particularly large, corporations, there is a separation between ownership and management, with an emphasis by management on short-term gains at the expense of long-term sustainability. This paper explores the role of corporate directors, particularly vis-à-vis shareholders, from an interdisciplinary perspective, analyzing legal case law as well as legal, management, and finance literature. This paper then explores emerging trends in expanding notions of corporate governance that incorporate concerns beyond just shareholders, recognizing the interrelationship between business and society. It is suggested that in order to remain viable and …