Law Commons^™

101 Lawyers: Attorney Appearances In Twitter V. Musk, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

In summer 2022, Twitter sued Elon Musk, the world’s richest person, in Delaware’s Court of Chancery over his refusal to close his agreed-to $44 billion acquisition of the social-media company. Twitter v. Musk had the makings of corporate law’s trial of the century. Leading law firms represented Twitter, Musk, and third parties in a dispute with enormous financial, social, and political implications. In the lead up to trial, however, Musk relented and closed the deal. The corporate trial of the century was a bust, over almost as soon as it began.

But in the meantime, in Twitter’s eighty-six days …

The Fresh Start Paradox: Economic Disaster Relief Available To Title 11 Debtors, Kellsie Davis Ruane

Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal

The Small Business Administration (“SBA”) has been providing disaster relief in the form of Economic Injury Disaster Loans (“EIDLs”) since its inception in 1953. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the CARES Act charged the SBA with issuing forgivable loans through the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) to small businesses which would otherwise face permanent closure. Though the CARES Act did not specifically grant the SBA authority to do so, the SBA interpreted its powers to include the ability to set requirements for loan approval which were not laid out in the Act itself. Specifically, the SBA promulgated a rule …

Disclosure Procedure, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

Securities disclosure is a human process. Each year, public companies collectively spend over fifteen million hours producing disclosures that undergird an equities market with tens of trillions in market capitalization. The procedures they follow in doing so affect whether their disclosures contain misstatements or omissions—errors that can cause trading losses for investors, and litigation for issuers. Yet despite the importance of the disclosures that firms produce, the literature says little about how they do it, including whether they are spending too much, too little, or just enough on their disclosure procedures. To fill that gap, this Article uses original surveys …

From Director Liability To Officer Liability To Esg Caremark Claims: A Natural Evolution?, Gareth Mchugh

Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review

With the McDonald’s decision, officers and directors could face Caremark liability for the first time, and this decision could also lead to an influx of ESG-based Caremark claims in Delaware Courts. This Comment explains that, while ESG Caremark claims would force corporations to adopt ESG oversight systems to avoid liability, the very political, social, and legal environment that created a growing call for ESG Caremark claims presents a beneficial opportunity for corporations to appeal to consumers and investors by proactively adopting ESG oversight systems. Corporations are at a nexus where they can either willingly adopt ESG oversight systems and reap …

To Have Or Have Not: The Limits Of Comply-Or-Explain Governance In An American Exchange, Johnson A. Salisbury Jr.

Emory Law Journal

In 2020, the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (“Nasdaq”) proposed a comply-or-explain governance rule to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), aimed at increasing diversity in companies listed on its exchange. The resulting listing rule—approved by the SEC in 2021—was met with a mixed chorus of cheers and jeers from the public and regulated companies. Missing from that chorus, however, was an analysis of the effectiveness of Nasdaq’s approach in using a flexible, predominantly international comply-or-explain governance model to regulate the companies listed on its exchange.

Framed as a disclosure code, Nasdaq’s Listing Rule 5605(f)(2) requires listed companies …

Is "Public Company" Still A Viable Regulatory Category?, George S. Georgiev

Faculty Articles

This Article suggests that the ubiquitous “public company” regulatory category, as currently constructed, has outlived its effectiveness in fulfilling core goals of the modern administrative state. An ever-expanding array of federal economic regulation hinges on public company status, but “public company” differs from most other regulatory categories in that it requires an affirmative opt-in by the subject entity. In practice, firms today become subject to public company regulation only if they need access to the public capital markets, which is much less of a business imperative than it once was due to the proliferation of private financing options. Paradoxically, then, …

The Public’S Companies, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

This Essay uses a series of survey studies to consider how public understandings of public and private companies map into urgent debates over the role of the corporation in American society. Does a social-media company, for example, owe it to its users to follow the free-speech principles embodied in the First Amendment? May corporate managers pursue environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) policies that could reduce short-term or long-term profits? How should companies respond to political pushback against their approaches to free expression or ESG?

The studies’ results are consistent with understandings that both public and private companies have greater public …

Shareholder Inspection Rights: From Credible Basis To Rational Belief, Lynn Bai

Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review

Jurisdictions are split on the standard of proof for shareholder inspection lawsuits when inspections are for the purpose of investigating managerial misconduct. Delaware and its followers apply a credible basis standard that calls for extrinsic evidence, beyond mere suspicion, curiosity, or disagreement with management, to permit an inference of misconduct. A minority of jurisdictions require shareholders to show merely a rational belief that mismanagement likely happened. Rational belief can be satisfied by sound logic without referencing extrinsic evidence. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected rational belief for fear that a permissive standard would lead to a cascade of frivolous inspections, although …

Inherently Incompatible: The Irreconcilable Tension Between Corporate Negligence Claims And The Federal Tort Claims Act, Veronica J. Finkelstein

Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review

No abstract provided.

United We Stand, Divided We Fall: A Survey Of Current Public And Private Initiatives Addressing Board Diversity & A Proposed Sec Diversity Disclosure To Help Increase Board Diversity, Gabrielle Hunter

Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review

No abstract provided.

40 Acres And A Mule: Accountability For Corporations To Provide Reparations To Historically Black Colleges And Universities For Profits From Slave Labor, Meghan K. Marks

Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review

No abstract provided.

The Market For Corporate Criminals, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

This Article identifies problems and opportunities at the intersection of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and corporate crime and compliance. In M&A, criminal successor liability is of particular importance, because it is quantitatively less predictable and qualitatively more threatening to buyers than successor liability in tort or contract. Private successor liability requires a buyer to bear bounded economic costs, which can in turn be reallocated to sellers via the contracting process. Criminal successor liability, however, threatens a buyer with non-indemnifiable and potentially ruinous punishment for another firm’s wrongful acts.

This threat may inhibit the marketability of businesses that have criminal exposure, …