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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Protecting The State From Itself? Regulatory Interventions In Corporate Governance And The Financing Of China's 'State Capitalism', Nicholas C, Howson
Protecting The State From Itself? Regulatory Interventions In Corporate Governance And The Financing Of China's 'State Capitalism', Nicholas C, Howson
Book Chapters
From the start of China’s “corporatization without privatization” process in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime, apparently shareholder-empowering and determined by enabling legal norms, has been altered by mandatory governance mechanisms imposed by a state administrative agency, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). This has been done to protect minority shareholders against exploitation by the Party-state controlling shareholders, the power behind China’s “state capitalism.” This chapter reviews the path of this benign intervention by the CSRC and the structural reasons for it, and then speculates on why this novel example of the China’s “fragmented authoritarianism” continues to be …
Puzzles In Controlling Shareholder Regimes And China: Shareholder Primacy And (Quasi) Monopoly, Sang Yop Kang
Puzzles In Controlling Shareholder Regimes And China: Shareholder Primacy And (Quasi) Monopoly, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Professor Mark Roe explained that the shareholder wealth maximization norm (“the norm”) is not fit for a country with a (quasi) monopoly, because the norm encourages managers to maximize monopoly rents, to the detriment of the national economy. This Article provides new findings and counter-intuitive arguments as to the tension created by the norm and (quasi) monopoly by exploring three key corporate governance concepts that Roe did not examine—(1) “controlling minority structure” (CMS), where dominant shareholders hold a fractional ownership in their controlled-corporations, (2) “tunneling” (i.e., illicit transfer of corporate wealth to controlling shareholders), and (3) Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). …
Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism And The Chinese Firm, Curtis J. Milhaupt, Wentong Zheng
Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism And The Chinese Firm, Curtis J. Milhaupt, Wentong Zheng
Wentong Zheng
Chinese state capitalism has been treated as essentially synonymous with state-owned enterprises (SOEs). But drawing a stark distinction between SOEs and privately owned enterprises (POEs) misperceives the reality of China’s institutional environment and its impact on the formation and operation of large enterprises of all types. We challenge the “ownership bias” of prevailing analyses of Chinese firms by exploring the blurred boundary between SOEs and POEs in China. We argue that the Chinese state has less control over SOEs and more control over POEs than its ownership interest in the firms suggests. Our analysis indicates that Chinese state capitalism can …
Avenues To Foreign Investment In China’S Shipping Industry—Have Lease Financing Arrangements And The Free Trade Zones Opened Markets For Foreign Non-Bank Investment?, Rick Beaumont
Rick Beaumont
No abstract provided.
Avenues To Foreign Investment In China’S Shipping Industry—Have Lease Financing Arrangements And The Free Trade Zones Opened Markets For Foreign Non-Bank Investment?, Rick Beaumont
Rick Beaumont
No abstract provided.
Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism And The Chinese Firm, Curtis J. Milhaupt, Wentong Zheng
Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism And The Chinese Firm, Curtis J. Milhaupt, Wentong Zheng
UF Law Faculty Publications
Chinese state capitalism has been treated as essentially synonymous with state-owned enterprises (SOEs). But drawing a stark distinction between SOEs and privately owned enterprises (POEs) misperceives the reality of China’s institutional environment and its impact on the formation and operation of large enterprises of all types. We challenge the “ownership bias” of prevailing analyses of Chinese firms by exploring the blurred boundary between SOEs and POEs in China. We argue that the Chinese state has less control over SOEs and more control over POEs than its ownership interest in the firms suggests. Our analysis indicates that Chinese state capitalism can …
The Joint Venture And Related Contract Laws Of Mainland China And Taiwan: A Comparative Analysis, Clyde D. Stoltenberg, David W. Mcclure
The Joint Venture And Related Contract Laws Of Mainland China And Taiwan: A Comparative Analysis, Clyde D. Stoltenberg, David W. Mcclure
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.