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Full-Text Articles in Law

Iniciativas Legais Para O Desenvolvimento Da Governança Corporativa No Mercado Financeiro E De Capitais Brasileiro, Felipe Chagas Villasuso Lago Dec 2014

Iniciativas Legais Para O Desenvolvimento Da Governança Corporativa No Mercado Financeiro E De Capitais Brasileiro, Felipe Chagas Villasuso Lago

Felipe Chagas Villasuso Lago Mr.

The study of Corporate Governance is of utmost importance for the development of transparency and ethics in the conduct of public and private institutions activities. Corporate governance has been important for the development of relations between the shareholder and the senior management of companies, employees, suppliers, customers, banks and other lenders, Regulators and the community as a whole. The study of such practice goes beyond legal issues and also involves economic analysis and policy for discussing the best strategy to ensure the return on investment or consideration, in the case of public service. The Financial and Capital Market are industries …


Activist Compensation Of Board Nominees & The Middle Ground Response, Adam Prestidge Nov 2014

Activist Compensation Of Board Nominees & The Middle Ground Response, Adam Prestidge

Adam Prestidge

Shareholder activism has taken an increasingly high-profile and polarizing role in investing and corporate governance. Moves by shareholder activists, and the policy behind those moves, constantly appear in corporate headlines. One of shareholder activists’ primary methods of enacting changes in companies is to nominate directors to the board, and often those director nominees are highly-compensated by the shareholder activist itself. Some in the corporate world oppose this practice, arguing that it creates a significant conflict of interest and can damage the company in the short term, while others argue that the practice is a necessary tool for investors that may …


Who Sits On Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are & What They Do, Lawrence J. Trautman Nov 2014

Who Sits On Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are & What They Do, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

Corporate directors play an important role in governing American business, in the capital formation process, and are fundamental to the stewardship of economic growth. Texas businesses play a disproportionately important role among the states in aggregate U.S. job creation, responsible for 37% of all net new American jobs since the post 2008-2009 recovery began. It is the job of the board of directors to govern the corporation. The duties and responsibilities of a corporate director include: the duty of care; duty of loyalty; and duty of good faith. This paper results from the author’s previously assembled biographical data for most …


Shareholder Engagement Through Informal Dialogue: A Perspective From Spanish Listed Companies, Javier Agudo Jul 2014

Shareholder Engagement Through Informal Dialogue: A Perspective From Spanish Listed Companies, Javier Agudo

Javier Agudo

The purpose of this research is to further understand the behaviour of listed companies in the informal dialogue with their shareholders. While dialogue in CSR issues and the relations between IR officers and funds had already been studied, additional exploration was needed on dialogue regarding corporate governance and on the role of other company actors and external advisors in it. For this, a qualitative study was undertaken in the Spanish context. A total of eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted with directors of the board, heads of investor relations and secretaries of the board from various listed companies, together with proxy …


Corporate Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking About This?, Lawrence J. Trautman Jul 2014

Corporate Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking About This?, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

What exactly is board diversity and why does it matter? How does diversity fit in an attempt to build the best board for any organization? What attributes and skills are required by law and what mix of experiences and talents provide the best corporate governance? Even though most companies say they are looking for diversity, why has there been such little progress? Are required director attributes, which are a must for all boards, consistent with future diversity gains and aligned with achieving high performance and optimal board composition? My goal is to provide answers to these questions, and to discuss …


Framing A Purpose For Corporate Law, William W. Bratton Jul 2014

Framing A Purpose For Corporate Law, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

This article seeks to frame a short statement of purpose for corporate law on which all reasonable observers can agree. The statement, in order to succeed at its intended purpose, must satisfy two strict conditions: first, it must have enough content to be meaningful; second, it must be completely uncontroversial, both descriptively and normatively. The exercise, thus described, involves avoiding the issues that occupy center stage in discussions about corporate law while at the same time highlighting the discussants’ generally held presuppositions. Three closely interconnected issues arise. First, whether the statement of the purpose of corporate law should speak in …


Shareholder Activism As A Corrective Mechanism In Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Sharfman Mar 2014

Shareholder Activism As A Corrective Mechanism In Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

No abstract provided.


The Evolution Of Corporate Governance In Japan: The Continuing Relevance Of Berle And Means, Takaya Seki, Thomas Clarke Mar 2014

The Evolution Of Corporate Governance In Japan: The Continuing Relevance Of Berle And Means, Takaya Seki, Thomas Clarke

Seattle University Law Review

The evolution of corporate governance in Japan towards international standards continues, though at a gradual pace that often concerns outsiders. The substance of Japanese corporate governance is often questioned due to a lack of understanding of the unique elements of the Japanese institutional system. Japanese companies are under a sustained assault from overseas investors to introduce a greater number of independent directors on boards, improve accountability, and enhance transparency. The majority of Japanese companies have taken what they regard as significant steps in this direction of accountability. In Japan, however, there is a different conception of the role of the …


State Capital: Global And Australian Perspectives, George Gilligan, Megan Bowman Mar 2014

State Capital: Global And Australian Perspectives, George Gilligan, Megan Bowman

Seattle University Law Review

The activities of state-related pools of capital need to be understood within the context of an era of globalization, in which economic and political ties between many jurisdictions are deepening, A variety of modes of governance are emerging that have a capacity for impacts of broad international scope. The rising influence of more proactive state-led capitalism is one of the shaping variables in how the global economy has been changing swiftly in recent decades, and the effects of the Global Financial Crisis have arguably accelerated these structural shifts. This Article identifies three discrete phenomena in the state capital arena. First, …


What Is A Corporation? Liberal, Confucion, And Socialist Theories Of Enterprise Organization (And State, Family, And Personhood), Teemu Ruskola Mar 2014

What Is A Corporation? Liberal, Confucion, And Socialist Theories Of Enterprise Organization (And State, Family, And Personhood), Teemu Ruskola

Seattle University Law Review

What is a corporation? An easy, but not very informative, answer is that it is a legal person. More substantive answers suggest it is a moral person, a person/thing, a production team, a nexus of private agreements, a city, a semi-sovereign, or a (secular) God. Despite the economic, political, and social importance of the corporate form, we do not have a generally accepted legal theory of what a corporation is, apart from the law’s questionable assertion that it is a “person.” In this Article, the author places the idea, and law, of the corporation in a comparative context and suggests …


"Quack Corporate Governance" As Traditional Chinese Medicine: The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas Calcina Howson Mar 2014

"Quack Corporate Governance" As Traditional Chinese Medicine: The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas Calcina Howson

Seattle University Law Review

From the start of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “corporatization” project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Indeed, the Chinese corporate law system has been cannibalized by all-encompassing securities regulation directed at corporate governance, at least for companies with listed stock. This Article traces the path of that sustained intervention and makes a case—wholly contrary to the “quack corporate governance” critique much aired in the United States—that for the PRC this phenomenon …


The Riddle Of Shareholder Rights And Corporate Social Responsibility, Dan Morrissey Jan 2014

The Riddle Of Shareholder Rights And Corporate Social Responsibility, Dan Morrissey

Dan Morrissey

Morrissey—Abstract

The Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility

Shareholders own the entrepreneurial interests in corporations. As such, the law has historically held that they must be run primarily to generate profit for those investors. Progressives and some enlightened business leaders however have long claimed that this “shareholder primacy” rule is inadequate and urged that the larger needs of the community must also be a concern of business decision-makers. This corporate social responsibility movement (CSR) has gained legal traction during the last several decades with legislative initiatives like constituency statutes and the benefit corporation. In recent years reformers have …


The Riddle Of Shareholder Rights And Corporate Social Responsibility, Dan Morrissey Jan 2014

The Riddle Of Shareholder Rights And Corporate Social Responsibility, Dan Morrissey

Dan Morrissey

Morrissey—Abstract

The Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility

Shareholders own the entrepreneurial interests in corporations. As such, the law has historically held that they must be run primarily to generate profit for those investors. Progressives and some enlightened business leaders however have long claimed that this “shareholder primacy” rule is inadequate and urged that the larger needs of the community must also be a concern of business decision-makers. This corporate social responsibility movement (CSR) has gained legal traction during the last several decades with legislative initiatives like constituency statutes and the benefit corporation. In recent years reformers have …


Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang Jan 2014

Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Unfair self-dealing and expropriation of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder are common business practices in developing countries (“bad-law countries”). Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, there are many questions unanswered in relation to behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. For example, a puzzle is that some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries voluntarily extract minority shareholders less than other controlling shareholders. Applying Mancur Olson’s framework of political theory of “banditry” to the context of corporate governance, this Article proposes that there are at least two categories of controlling shareholders. “Roving controllers” are dominant shareholders with …


Shareholder Derivative Litigation And The Preclusion Problem, George Geis Jan 2014

Shareholder Derivative Litigation And The Preclusion Problem, George Geis

George Geis

No abstract provided.


Corporate Governance Without Shareholders: A Cautionary Lesson From Non-Profit Organizations, George W. Dent Jan 2014

Corporate Governance Without Shareholders: A Cautionary Lesson From Non-Profit Organizations, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

A debate about corporate governance has long raged over the allocation of power between shareholders and directors. Proponents of “shareholder primacy” believe that the corporate board should be chosen by and accountable to the stockholders rather than dominated by the CEO, as they believe is common now. Advocates of “director primacy” want to limit shareholder power because they believe that shareholders have conflicting objectives, are uninformed, and pressure the directors to sacrifice the long-term health of the company to short-term share price.

The governance of non-profit organizations (“NPOs”) offers an example that illuminates the corporate governance debate. Directors of NPOs …