Law Commons^™

Criminal Corporate Character, Robert E. Wagner

Florida Law Review

In the last few years, corporations have been accused of crimes ranging from environmental pollution on an unprecedented scale, to manslaughter, to election tampering, to large-scale antitrust violations. Many of these accused companies had previously committed similar acts or even the exact same offense. Unfortunately, the rules of evidence in the federal system and in virtually every state system prohibit the use of this information in a prosecution for such crimes. The reasons for this prohibition are based in historical anomalies, a mistaken understanding of corporate function, and a misplaced anthropomorphism of the corporation. This combination of errors has resulted …

The New Professional Plaintiffs In Shareholder Litigation, Jessica Erickson

Florida Law Review

In 1995, Congress solved the problem of professional plaintiffs in shareholder litigation—or so it thought. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) was designed to end the influence of shareholder plaintiffs who had little or no connection to the underlying suit. Yet it may have failed to accomplish its goal. In the wake of the PSLRA, many professional plaintiffs simply moved into other types of corporate lawsuits. In shareholder derivative suits and acquisition class actions across the country, professional plaintiffs are back. They are repeat filers involved in dozens of lawsuits. They are the attorneys’ spouses, parents, and children. They …

Policing Public Companies: An Empirical Examination Of The Enforcement Landscape And The Role Played By State Securities Regulators, Amanda M. Rose, Larry J. Leblanc

Florida Law Review

Multiple different securities law enforcers can pursue U.S. public companies for the same misconduct. These enforcers include a variety of federal agencies, class action attorneys, and derivative litigation attorneys, as well as fifty separate state regulators. Scholars and policy makers have increasingly questioned whether the benefits of this multienforcer approach are worth the costs, or whether a more coordinated and streamlined securities enforcement regime might lead to efficiency gains. How serious are these concerns? And what role do state regulators play in the enforcement mix? Whereas the enforcement efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission and class action lawyers have …

Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee

Working Papers

This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy.

If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …

The Puzzling Lack Of Cooperatives, Peter Molk

UF Law Faculty Publications

Some of the most recognizable companies, including Land O'Lakes, REI, the Associated Press, Ace Hardware, and State Farm Insurance, are organized as cooperatives--firms owned by their suppliers, workers, or customers. Yet aside from isolated areas of the economy, cooperatives constitute only a small portion of American enterprise, which is otherwise dominated by investor-owned firms. Conventional wisdom assumes that firms either start as cooperatives or convert to cooperatives when cooperatives offer the highest ongoing benefits to owners, and it explains the lack of cooperatives by suggesting that cooperatives usually do not maximize ongoing benefits. This Article looks at entrepreneurs' and brokers' …

When Subchapter S Meets Subchapter C, Martin J. Mcmahon Jr., Daniel L. Simmons

UF Law Faculty Publications

It is often said that “an S corporation is a corporation that is taxed like a partnership.” This statement is incorrect. An S corporation resembles a partnership only in that it generally does not pay income taxes and its income and losses pass through to the shareholders and retain their character as they pass through. Also, like a partnership, basis adjustments to an S corporation shareholder's stock reflect allocations of income, expense, loss, and distributions. However, no other rules of subchapter K governing partnership taxation apply to S corporations. Most of the rules governing the relationship between an S corporation …