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Articles 1 - 8 of 8

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Use Of Efficient Market Hypothesis: Beyond Sox, Dana M. Muir, Cindy A. Schipani Jun 2007

The Use Of Efficient Market Hypothesis: Beyond Sox, Dana M. Muir, Cindy A. Schipani

Michigan Law Review

This Article focuses on the regulatory use of finance theory, particularly the efficient market hypothesis ("EMH"), in two areas where securities pricing is at issue: shareholder appraisal cases and the use of employer stock in benefit plans. Regarding shareholder appraisal cases, the Article finds that the Delaware courts seem to implicitly respect the principles of EMH when ascertaining the fair value of stock, but recognize that markets cannot operate efficiently if information is withheld. Regarding employer stock in benefit plans, it concentrates on the explicit adoption of EMH by the Department of Labor to exempt directed trustees from traditional duties …


Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost Apr 2007

Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …


The Expressive Function Of Directors’ Duties To Creditors, Jonathan C. Lipson Apr 2007

The Expressive Function Of Directors’ Duties To Creditors, Jonathan C. Lipson

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article offers an explanation of the “doctrine” of directors’ duties to creditors. Courts frequently say—but rarely hold—that corporate directors owe duties to or for the benefit of corporate creditors when the corporation is in distress. These cases are puzzling for at least two reasons. First, they link fiduciary duty to priority in right of payment, effectively treating creditors as if they were shareholders, at least for certain purposes. But this ignores the fact that priority is a complex and volatile concept. Moreover, contract and other rights at law usually protect creditors, even (especially) when a firm is distressed. It …


Pandora's Ballot Box, Or A Proxy With Moxie? The Majority Voting Amendment To Delaware Corporate Law, John Verret Feb 2007

Pandora's Ballot Box, Or A Proxy With Moxie? The Majority Voting Amendment To Delaware Corporate Law, John Verret

ExpressO

The Delaware General Assembly has recently adopted an amendment to the Delaware General Corporation Law which provides that where shareholders have adopted a majority voting bylaw for corporate elections over the traditional plurality scheme, a corporation may not subsequently amend its bylaws to return to plurality voting without shareholder approval. I will compare this provision to other approaches and try to explain the reasons underlying its adoption. I will also briefly summarize the evolving shareholder empowerment debate and analyze the majority voting provision in the context of that discussion. I will describe some unique and unanticipated interactions between majority voting …


How We Make Law In Delaware, And What To Expect From Us In The Future, Lawrence A. Hamermesh Jan 2007

How We Make Law In Delaware, And What To Expect From Us In The Future, Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.


Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo Jan 2007

Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo

Journal Articles

Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …


Delaware Strikes Back: Newcastle Partners And The Fight For State Corporate Autonomy, Michael W. Ott Jan 2007

Delaware Strikes Back: Newcastle Partners And The Fight For State Corporate Autonomy, Michael W. Ott

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, Chief Justice Myron T. Steele Jan 2007

Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, Chief Justice Myron T. Steele

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.